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The second decade of the twenty-first century has been that of digital nationalism. In particular, 
the 2016 United States presidential elections and Brexit vote in the United Kingdom have shown 
that the increased use of social media has raised popular nationalism (Whitmeyer 2002) to a 
whole new level. While Europe and other parts of the world have visibly become more 
globalized, the Northern Atlantic region has witnessed a contradictory tendency for the rise and 
spread of nationalist sentiment. Much of this phenomenon has been taking place on the internet 
where conditions of apparent anonymity created a fertile ground for uninhibited identity 
expressions and performances. From the United States to Poland, people have retreated to their 
stable, national identities as a way of coping with the various facets of liquid modernity, in which 
the need for networking pushes individuals to engage in community building by bonding with 
other individuals through shared emotions (Bauman 2006, 37). 
This has also been the case in Europe where the supranational project of the European 
Union (EU) has encouraged Polish, Czech, or Hungarian citizens to forego their national 
identities and to embrace a broader European identity instead. However, instead of strengthening 
a postnational perspective on the world, the internet and social media have paradoxically made 
people even more aware of their identity and the identities of others. There, discussions 
surrounding national identity, sovereignty, and free flow of people and products are always 
present and, almost unavoidably, always political. “The transition to a digital media 
environment,” Rushkoff (2016) writes, “is making people a whole lot less tolerant of this 
dissolution of boundaries. Am I Croatian or Serbian? Kurd or Sunni? Greek or European? 
American or Mexican?” The quiet erosion of European cohesion, culminating in the 2020 
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unprecedented withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, can also be explained in such a 
way. 
These tensions mirror more global concerns about the increasingly “liquid” world 
(Bauman 2005), in which “[t]he collapse of the ‘institutions’ of the solid modern era – of nation, 
state and territory – led to the emergence of a new world disorder where only the global elite 
may feel at home” (Jacobsen and Marshman 2008: 26). The internet and digital media further 
exacerbate this process as instantaneous communication makes people aware of the plethora of 
nonnational and/or post-national identities that others adopt. These fears are also present and 
tangible in present-day Poland where people’s belief in the unity and indivisibility of the Polish 
nation has been shattered by Silesian activism, both online and offline. There, questions of 
identity and sovereignty have unavoidably become highly politicized, representing an easy target 
for politicians searching for votes, status, or publicity. With the added social media dimension, 
another, and, arguably, an even more important group of political actors has emerged—popular 
activists, ideologically committed to spreading political messages in digital spaces. The ongoing 
Polish-Silesian conflict about identity is a case in point here. 
The 1989 political transformation has put Poland on a fast track to democracy and 
liberalization, but it has also opened up the discussion about the country’s internal minorities, 
including the largest unrecognized minority of Silesians in south-southwestern Poland (see the 
Silesia, Silesian, Silesians section). With Poland’s accession into the EU in 2004, Silesian 
activists have turned to the rhetoric of postnational “Europe of regions” to support their 
ethnolinguistic demands, which has generated much controversy and backlash among the Polish 
majority. The activists’ emphasis on multiculturalism and multilingualism has resulted in similar 
reactions. Such activism, critical with regard to the Polish state, has often coincided with 
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rhetorical strategies that involved the use of the German language along Polish. As a result, this 
led some politicians and publicists to believe that Silesian regional activism furthers German, not 
Polish, national agenda, and that self-identified Silesians can be viewed as “camouflaged 
Germans” (see chapter 2). Thus, the Polish-Silesian conflict over identity has become an ongoing 
political issue that affects the daily lives of Poles and self-identified Silesians, and that is 
discussed at the governmental and popular level, both online and offline. With the spread of 
social media, this issue has leaked into everyday discussions among nonelite political actors who 
now discuss it online. 
The debate on Silesian identity makes part of a larger discussion on Polish national 
identity at the turn of the twenty-first century. With the rapid liberalization, Poland and Poles 
have witnessed an ideological clash between the traditional and innovative understanding of 
what it means to be Polish. The traditional perspective builds on the narrative of collective 
victimhood on part of more powerful neighbors (for instance, Germans) who, despite violence 
and decades of subjugation, could not break the Polish spirit thanks to the leading role of the 
Roman Catholic church, preservation of the Polish language, and attachment to traditions. In the 
innovative version, a person can have more than one identity and identify as, for example, 
Cracovian, Pole, and European at the same time (cf. the EU accession campaign in Poland, 
which was spearheaded by the political elites under the slogan Tak, jestem 
Europejczykiem/Europejką ‘Yes, I am European’). 
My dissertation shows how online discourse drives social change, boundary work, 
identity performance, and, ultimately, community management (including in-group/out-group 
membership) by looking at the development and spread of popular nationalism on the internet. 
As people from outside of the political elites form online communities, they become politically 
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active in online discussions on national (and regional) identity. In doing so, such online 
communities become communities of practice (Eckert 2006) that discuss recent events and larger 
issues, take sides, form coalitions, come up with idiosyncratic ways of discussing certain topics 
and people, and, finally, engage in a range of online behaviors that involve othering, 
narrativizing, and hateful speech. As a result, nationalism becomes a catalyst for the formation of 
online communities that emerge and coalesce around political goals, common language, and 
shared ideological stances. The dissertation examines how public discourse drives social change 
by looking at nonelite political actors become the ‘movers and shakers’ who radicalize 
themselves over the course of ongoing online discussions and then advance their ideological 
agendas by inciting radicalization among others. Finally, this work also analyzes the key role of 
language in the process of political radicalization in online spaces. 
This dissertation traces the emergence, coalescence, and maintenance of two such 
factions in the Western Daily discussion forum (Pol. Dziennik Zachodni, 
https://dziennikzachodni.pl), as evidenced in language use. Taking a sociolinguistic approach to 
internet discussions and applying a close, critical discursive reading of unstructured online 
conversations, the dissertation examines such phenomena as linguistic creativity, othering, 
narrativizing, and hate speech. All of these phenomena are crucial for identity struggles because 
it is through them that identities are constructed in the Western Daily forum. Given the context 
collapse (Marwick and boyd 2011), it is through language that members of the two warring 
communities can instantaneously identify each other as language becomes an immediate 
identifier of each participant’s stance toward the topic of the discussion. Not only language 
conveys intended meanings, but it also encodes pre-existing assumptions that people bring to the 
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conversation, which is why methods of critical discourse analysis are well-positioned to uncover 
these meanings by focusing on language use. 
My upbringing in Poland and native knowledge of Polish endowed me with the 
sociocultural and linguistic background necessary for understanding and explaining the meaning 
of discourses surrounding the issue of Silesian identity in modern-day Poland. The privilege of 
working on a Ph.D. in the United States endowed me with much-needed theoretical, 
historiographic, and geographical distance, with which I approached this topic. This dissertation 
is thus written from the perspective of an “inside outsider,” that is, someone who is fluent in the 
social, cultural, and historical fabrics of the region and the country yet approaches it with a cool, 
analytical mind. In doing so, the goal is not to once-and-for-all determine whether Silesians are a 
separate people or Silesian a separate language, but, rather, to detect, extract, and critically 
analyze what the discussions on these topics can tell us about the larger societal views on 
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The second decade of the twenty-first century has been that of digital nationalism. In particular, 
the 2016 United States presidential elections and Brexit vote in the United Kingdom have shown 
that the increased use of social media has raised popular nationalism (Whitmeyer 2002) to a 
whole new level. While Europe and other parts of the world have visibly become more 
globalized, the Northern Atlantic region has witnessed a contradictory tendency for the rise and 
spread of nationalist sentiment. Much of this phenomenon has been taking place on the internet 
where conditions of apparent anonymity created a fertile ground for uninhibited identity 
expressions and performances. From the United States to Poland, people have retreated to their 
stable, national identities as a way of coping with the various facets of liquid modernity, in which 
the need for networking pushes individuals to engage in community building by bonding with 
other individuals through shared emotions (Bauman 2006, 37). 
This has also been the case in Europe where the supranational project of the European 
Union (EU) has encouraged Polish, Czech, or Hungarian citizens to forego their national 
identities and to embrace a broader European identity instead. However, instead of strengthening 
a postnational perspective on the world, the internet and social media have paradoxically made 
people even more aware of their identity and the identities of others. There, discussions 
surrounding national identity, sovereignty, and free flow of people and products are always 
present and, almost unavoidably, always political. “The transition to a digital media 
environment,” Rushkoff (2016) writes, “is making people a whole lot less tolerant of this 
dissolution of boundaries. Am I Croatian or Serbian? Kurd or Sunni? Greek or European? 
American or Mexican?” The quiet erosion of European cohesion, culminating in the 2020 
2 
 
unprecedented withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, can also be explained in such a 
way. 
These tensions mirror more global concerns about the increasingly “liquid” world 
(Bauman 2005), in which “[t]he collapse of the ‘institutions’ of the solid modern era – of nation, 
state and territory – led to the emergence of a new world disorder where only the global elite 
may feel at home” (Jacobsen and Marshman 2008: 26). The internet and digital media further 
exacerbate this process as instantaneous communication makes people aware of the plethora of 
nonnational and/or post-national identities that others adopt. These fears are also present and 
tangible in present-day Poland where people’s belief in the unity and indivisibility of the Polish 
nation has been shattered by Silesian activism, both online and offline. There, questions of 
identity and sovereignty have unavoidably become highly politicized, representing an easy target 
for politicians searching for votes, status, or publicity. With the added social media dimension, 
another, and, arguably, an even more important group of political actors has emerged—popular 
activists, ideologically committed to spreading political messages in digital spaces. The ongoing 
Polish-Silesian conflict about identity is a case in point here. 
The 1989 political transformation has put Poland on a fast track to democracy and 
liberalization, but it has also opened up the discussion about the country’s internal minorities, 
including the largest unrecognized minority of Silesians in south-southwestern Poland (see the 
Silesia, Silesian, Silesians section). With Poland’s accession into the EU in 2004, Silesian 
activists have turned to the rhetoric of post-national “Europe of regions” to support their 
ethnolinguistic demands, which has generated much controversy and backlash among the 
mainstream Polish majority. The activists’ emphasis on multiculturalism and multilingualism has 
resulted in similar reactions. Such activism, critical with regard to the Polish state, has often 
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coincided with rhetorical strategies that involved the use of the German language along Polish. 
As a result, this led some politicians and publicists to believe that Silesian regional activism 
furthers German, not Polish, national agenda, and that self-identified Silesians can be viewed as 
“camouflaged Germans” (see chapter 2). Thus, the Polish-Silesian conflict over identity has 
become an ongoing political issue that affects the daily lives of Poles and self-identified 
Silesians, and that is discussed at the governmental and popular level, both online and offline. 
With the spread of social media, this issue has leaked into everyday discussions among nonelite 
political actors who now discuss it online. 
The debate on Silesian identity makes part of a larger discussion on Polish national 
identity at the turn of the twenty-first century. With the rapid liberalization, Poland and Poles 
have witnessed an ideological clash between the traditional and innovative understanding of 
what it means to be Polish. The traditional perspective builds on the narrative of collective 
victimhood on part of more powerful neighbors (for instance, Germans) who, despite violence 
and decades of subjugation, could not break the Polish spirit thanks to the leading role of the 
Roman Catholic church, preservation of the Polish language, and attachment to traditions. In the 
innovative version, a person can have more than one identity and identify as, for example, 
Cracovian, Pole, and European at the same time (cf. the EU accession campaign in Poland, 
which was spearheaded by the political elites under the slogan Tak, jestem 
Europejczykiem/Europejką ‘Yes, I am European (m./f.)’). 
My dissertation shows how online discourse drives social change, boundary work, 
identity performance, and, ultimately, community management (including in-group/out-group 
membership) by looking at the development and spread of popular nationalism on the internet. 
As people from outside of the political elites form online communities, they become politically 
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active in online discussions on national (and regional) identity. In doing so, such online 
communities become communities of practice (Eckert 2006) that discuss recent events and larger 
issues, take sides, form coalitions, come up with idiosyncratic ways of discussing certain topics 
and people, and, finally, engage in a range of online behaviors that involve othering, 
narrativizing, and hateful speech. As a result, nationalism becomes a catalyst for the formation of 
online communities that emerge and coalesce around political goals, common language, and 
shared ideological stances. The dissertation examines how public discourse drives social change 
by looking at nonelite political actors become the ‘movers and shakers’ who radicalize 
themselves over the course of ongoing online discussions and then advance their ideological 
agendas by inciting radicalization among others. Finally, this work also analyzes the key role of 
language in the process of political radicalization in online spaces. The purpose behind this 
dissertation is to illuminate the issues of online radicalization, a widespread phenomenon at this 
time, which represents a sociolinguistic and sociological problem that threatens the very fabric of 
contemporary societies. This work is intended for all scholars and students of language in society 
who are interested in verbal violence and hateful speech in social media and online conversations 
within the context of nationalism and identity discussions, as well as for educators, 
policymakers, and organizations seeking to tackle such problems. 
The dissertation examines the phenomena of online radicalization and hateful speech by 
focusing on language use in one case study – the Western Daily discussion forum (see below for 
the rationale behind this choice). Central to this enterprise is language use in digital media, and, 
in particular, conflict discourse, which encompasses a range of oppositional, competing, or even 
antagonistic phenomena (Perelmutter 2018). As such, conflict discourse is characteristic of 
online polylogues, that is, multiparticipant interactions in which the “many-to-many” 
5 
 
communicative context dominates. Internet polylogue facilitate coalition- and alliance-building 
(Bruxelles and Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2004), which makes them a fertile ground for the emergence 
and spread of political discourse. The same is true about the Western Dialy forum where 
factionalism, advanced by widespread language-enabled othering, is common and widespread. 
Given these characteristics of multiparticipant conflict discourse, the larger question behind this 
project is: What is the role of language in the emergence and spread of hateful speech in 
online spaces? The goal of this study is to answer the following research questions: 
 
RQ: How nonelite political actors instrumentalize multiparticipant conflict discourse on 
Silesian identity to construct othering representations of their ideological enemies, and 
what are the implications for our understanding of the concepts of identity, language, and 
nation? 
 
Having considered and analyzed all the data, three major trends emerge in this dissertation: 
othering (chapters 1 and 2), hateful speech (chapter 3), and narrativizing (chapter 4). The first 
two issues are interrelated and co-occur in the data analyzed. As the data show, othering 
represents the first step toward verbal violence and hateful speech, which is particularly the case 
in online discussions of national identity. Narrativizing is the third major topic examined and 
represents a separate trend in online discussions in the Western Daily forum. 
The dissertation is structured as follows. The introduction outlines the goals, methods, 
and theoretical foundations of this dissertation. It also provides a sociohistorical background on 
the issue of Silesian identity, the Western Daily discussion forum, as well as issues of identity in 
digital spaces. Chapters 1 and 2 examine the modality of othering. Chapter 1 looks at instances 
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of linguistic othering and the strategy of sociolinguistic approximation. Chapter 2 takes the 
discussion of othering even further by looking at one particular type of othering relevant to the 
political situation in present-day Poland—the “camouflaged German option” discourse. In the 
collected data, othering often co-occurs or is followed by verbal violence and hateful speech, 
which is the topic of the subsequent chapter. Chapter 3 uses insights from the two previous 
chapters to trace and explain the production of verbal violence and hateful speech in the Western 
Daily forum from the perspective of proximization theory. While chapter 3 considers overt 
examples of hateful speech, the chapter that follows looks at covert instances of exercising 
violence through language. Focusing on the use of the neologism szlezjer and its derivatives, 
chapter 4 explores how single words and/or phrases become sociolinguistic labels that lead to the 
emergence of “mini-narratives” containing disguised messages about self-identified Silesians. 
The final chapter offers a brief discussion of the results and relates them to the research question 
posed at the beginning of this dissertation; limitations and further research are also briefly 
discussed. 
The Western Daily discussion forum 
The issues of online radicalization, verbal violence, and hateful speech are widespread in the 
Western Daily discussion forum (that is, comments left under news articles published there), 
which represents the source of data used for this study. Thus, looking at the discussions held 
there allows me to examine a large piece of discourse produced by nonelite political actors, 
which illuminates the problem of radicalization online in the context of discussions on national 
identity, sovereignty, and multiculturalism. 
As the largest regional newspaper in Upper Silesia, the Western Daily often provides 
regular coverage and commentary on the recent developments in the region. This also includes 
7 
 
issues surrounding Silesian identity, culture, language variety, and Silesian regional activism 
involving the Silesian Autonomy Movement (Pol. Ruch Autonomii Śląska, RAŚ) or the Silesian 
Regional Party (Pol. Śląska Partia Regionalna, ŚPR). Related to this is the fact that in the 2011 
census, one in four residents of Katowice (capital of the Silesia Province) declared Silesian 
ethno-national identification (78,838 declarations out of 310,764 in total, cf. GUS 2014, Table 
2). Finally, self-identified Silesians are active users of the newspaper’s digital edition 
(https://dziennikzachodni.pl) and frequently leave their comments there, which in turn generates 
comments from members of the Polish majority. Altogether, these factors make the Western 
Daily forum a destination that has the potential to yield data relevant to the research questions 
posed at the beginning of this dissertation. 
Here, one core modality of the Western Daily forum deserves a mention. Unlike 
structured discussion forums that use the phpBB forum package or similar, the Western Daily 
forum lacks such structure in that it is text-based only and that no registration is required. 
Consequently, forum users do not, as a rule, create user profiles and fill them with personally 
identifiable information. Instead, the forum is being continuously co-created with the common 
effort of all commenters. The relatively low barrier of entry for this forum (internet connection 
and an internet-connected device) thus represents one of the key features of this space, which 
influences the discussions held there both qualitatively and quantitatively. From the qualitative 
point of view, discussions on the Western Daily forum tend to be heavily conversational, with 
varied attention to spelling, orthography, or grammar, relaxed norms of politeness, and not 
infrequent mixing of different language codes. As a result, comments there resemble more 
spontaneous expressions of posters’ thoughts and ideas rather than carefully crafted and topic-
relevant arguments. This feature makes the Western Daily comments sections a perfect source of 
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popular ideas about the ideas of identity, language, or nation in modern-day Poland. From the 
quantitative point of view, the discussions held there often evolve into multi-comment 
arguments, or “flamewars” (Perelmutter 2013), and it is not unusual for a single comment section 
to contain a hundred or a few hundred comments in total (cf. chapter 3). 
In all this, users of the Western Daily forum produce single comments or whole comment 
threads in a rather stable yet fairly eclectic mixture of language varieties. Since the Western 
Daily online edition is produced almost exclusively in Polish (with the rare exception of articles, 
editorials, and other items that include some degree of Silesian), Polish is also the dominant 
language variety used in its comments sections. Nevertheless, the use of Silesian is quite 
widespread, especially in cases when the posters self-identify as Silesians (which can often be 
inferred from the content of their comments) and want to make their point heard. This is 
particularly the case when their comments become emotional because of the content of the article 
commented upon or because of the reactions that their comments have elicited. Given that Polish 
and Silesian represent the two most popular language varieties used in the Western Daily forum, 
the phenomenon of code-mixing or code-switching (Lipski 1982; Myers-Scotton 1993; Poplack 
and Sankoff 1981) is also present there, mostly in comments authored by self-identified 
Silesians. This linguistic collage is complemented by the occasional presence of German 
elements whose presence in those conversations is important for both ideological and 
sociolinguistic reasons (see chapters 1, 2, and 3 in particular). 
Data collection 
The data for this dissertation were collected from selected online discussions held at the Western 
Daily forum (Pol. Dziennik Zachodni, https://dziennikzachodni.pl). Relevant examples were 
selected according to the following criteria: 
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(1) presence of the keyword Ślązacy (Pol. ‘Silesians’) in the online material analyzed, 
(2) presence of the topic of Silesian identity and, more broadly, identity-related themes in the 
discussions, 
(3) discussions and single comments selected as a result had to be written no earlier than 
2004. 
 
The choice of this particular source of data is based on the fact that the geographical range of the 
daily coincides with the area where the majority of Silesian identifications have been declared in 
the 2002 and 2011 national censuses (see Map 3). Consequently, the newspaper (including its 
online edition) features articles, interviews, and op-eds concerning the problems of Silesian 
identity and culture in general, many of which sparked lively debates in the comment sections. 
Because of the large concentration and participation rate of self-identified Silesians, the Western 
Daily discussion forums provide a rich source of data for investigations of the Silesian mindset 
in general. Given their innately interactive character, these online conversations illuminate the 
otherwise obscure experience of being Silesian in contemporary Poland by providing both an 
insider’s (that is, Silesian) and outsider’s (that is, Polish) point of view on the ongoing process of 
construction, crystallization, and promotion of Silesian identity. 
The presence of Silesian identity-related discourse and identity-focused discussions were 
the two main selection criteria, which regularly guaranteed subsequent emergence of identity talk 
in the course of the conversation. The selection process was restricted to online comments posted 
after January 1, 2004, the year of Poland’s entry to the European Union (EU). The temporal 
scope of the data was limited to that turning point in Poland’s recent history to ensure that the 
data reflect contemporary attitudes and beliefs. Given this scope, the dissertation also indirectly 
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traces the persistence of essentialist vs. collectivist understanding of identity in the context of 
Poland’s continued participation in the supranational structures of the EU. 
The data collection and analysis process proceeded as follows. First, a Google search for 
the keyword ślązacy was performed, with the results restricted to the Western Daily website 
only. Next, the results obtained in such a manner were reviewed and analyzed for the selection 
criteria listed above. If single comments or strings of comments fulfilled these criteria, they were 
manually extracted and moved to a single MS Excel file. For each comment, the following data 
and metadata were extracted: the comment’s title, the comment proper, the comment’s author, 
the day and time the comment was written, the number of “upvotes” and “downvotes” the 
comment received, and the comment’s position in the course of a larger conversation (e.g., in 
reply to posters A and B). The forward slash (“/”) separates comments from their titles; original 
indenting preserved. All examples are presented in their original, including orthography, 
spelling, line breaks, etc. All translations into English are mine. 
The Excel spreadsheet created in this manner later became the main corpus used for 
further data analysis, selection, and, ultimately, write-up of the results. The initial corpus size 
was 900–1,000 comments and it was used for the initial, exploratory analysis. In the course of 
the initial analysis, comments were annotated (stance, perspective, language varieties used) and 
coded for instances of identity work as expressed in language use. Additionally, a topical 
analysis was performed to determine larger thematical clusters in the data. Further examinations 
indicated the need to include more examples and, thus, the initial corpus was later expanded to 
accommodate this need. 
It has been established that the data used for this study is not copyright protected and that 
its use for research purposes represents fair use. The KU Lawrence Campus Institution Review 
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Board (IRB) determined that the study does not meet the human research requirement, hence no 
oversight was required. All users are anonymous; accordingly, all nicknames were anonymized 
and do not appear in the study. The study has a strictly observational character and the language 
data used is for research purposes only. 
Theory and methodology 
This dissertation examines online discussions about self-identified Silesians in the Western Daily 
forum by applying the critical discourse analytic toolkit to the collected conversational data. As a 
whole, the dissertation is embedded within the multidisciplinary field(s) of critical discourse 
studies/critical discourse analysis (CDS/CDA). The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA, 
Reisigl and Wodak 2016) serves as the main methodological framework, in which subsequent 
analyses in chapters 1–4 are rooted. Theoretically, this dissertation takes a sociolinguistic 
approach to the issue of language and identity in computer-mediated communication (CMC) by 
incorporating and combining the idea of stancetaking (Du Bois 2007) on one hand with a 
constructivist and interactional approach to identity in language-in-use (Bucholtz and Hall 2005). 
While relatively new, the broader fields of CDS and/or CDA have become a site of 
intensive and burgeoning research within the last few decades (e.g., van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 
1995; Weiss and Wodak 2002; Hart 2011; Machin and Mayr 2012; Richardson et al. 2014; 
Wodak and Meyer 2016; Flowerdew and Richardson 2017). For instance, as of early 2020, a 
simple Google Scholar search for “critical discourse analysis” phrase yields more than 100,000 
results.1 Historically, the field of CDS stems from the tradition of discourse analysis, situated at 
the intersection of several cognate (sub)disciplines, including conversation analysis, pragmatics, 
 
1 In comparison, the related phrase “critical discourse studies” returns “only” 13,000 results. 
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ethnography of speaking, sociolinguistics, etc. All of them have several overlapping points of 
interest (Wodak and Meyer 2016a): 
(1) “An interest in the properties of ‘naturally occurring’ language use by real language 
users instead of a study of abstract language systems and invented examples), 
(2) A focus on larger units than isolated words and sentences, and hence, new basic units of 
analysis: texts, discourses, conversations, speech acts, or communicative events, 
(3) The extension of linguistics beyond sentence grammar towards a study of action and 
interaction, 
(4) The extension to non-verbal (semiotic, multimodal, visual) aspects of interaction and 
communication: gestures, images, film, the internet and multimedia, 
(5) A focus on dynamic (socio)-cognitive or interactional moves and strategies, 
(6) The study of the functions of (social, cultural, situative and cognitive) contexts of 
language use, 
(7) Analysis of a vast number of phenomena of text grammar and language use: coherence, 
anaphora, topics, macrostructures, speech acts, interactions, turn-taking, signs, politeness, 
argumentation, rhetoric, mental models and many other aspects of text and discourse” 
(emphases original). 
 
The difference between discourse studies and CDS lays in the critically oriented focus of the 
latter that goes beyond the immediate results of linguistic analyses. CDS incorporate the seven 
points of interest, typical for discourse studies, enumerated above and combine them with an 
interdisciplinary, problem-oriented approach. Thus, CDS is “not interested in investigating a 
linguistic unit per se but in analysing, understanding and explaining social phenomena that are 
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necessarily complex and thus require a multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach” 
(Wodak and Meyer 2016a, 2). One of the major concerns of CDS is the idea that language 
represents a form of social practice, which cannot be understood without looking at the broader 
power relations in play (Bennett 2015, 85). As Wodak and Meyer (2016a, 4) contend, “CDS 
approaches are characterized by the common interest in deconstructing ideologies and power 
through the systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, spoke or 
visual).” Consequently, it is not surprising that language can and, indeed, is used for social 
control, as I have argued elsewhere (Borowski 2018a). Since CDS scholars believe that language 
use and language choices are not incidental but guided by functional purposes, it becomes the 
task of the analyst to identify and explain such choices as well as their effects and motivations 
(Bennett 2015, 104). This is also the goal of this dissertation, which takes a close look at online 
discussions about Silesian identity to examine how those conversations can inform our 
understanding of identity and related concepts in contemporary Poland. 
In this enterprise, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) is well-positioned to 
uncover the unspoken attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments behind examples of language-in-use 
collected from the Western Daily discussion forum. As one of the major approaches to CDS, 
DHA is based on ten major principles (Reisigl and Wodak 2016, 31–32): 
(1) “The approach is interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinarity involves theory, methods, 
methodology, research practice and practical application, 
(2) The approach is problem-oriented, 
(3) Various theories and methods are combined, wherever integration leads to an adequate 
understanding and explanation of the research object, 
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(4) The research incorporates fieldwork and ethnography (study from ‘inside’) if these are 
required for a thorough analysis and theorizing of the object under investigation, 
(5) Research necessarily moves recursively between theory and empirical data (…), 
(6) Numerous genres and public spaces as well as intertextual and interdiscursive 
relationships are studied, 
(7) The historical context is taken into account when interpreting texts and discourses. The 
historical orientation permits the reconstruction of how recontextualization functions as 
an important process of linking texts and discourses intertextually and interdiscursively 
over time, 
(8) Categories and methods are not fixed once and for all. They must be elaborated for each 
analysis according to the specific problem under investigation, 
(9) ‘Grand theories’ often serve as a foundation (…), 
(10) The application of the results is an important aim. Results should be made 
available to and applied by experts and be communicated to the public.” 
 
Overall, the DHA consists of three analytical dimensions and focuses on (1) the content and 
topic of specific discourse, (2) its discursive strategies, and (3) linguistic means and their 
linguistic realizations. A DHA-oriented analysis is oriented by five questions about the nature of 
discursive strategies used in a specific example of language-in-use. These are (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2016, 32): 




(2) What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, 
phenomena/events and processes? 
(3) What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? 
(4) From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed? 
(5) Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, intensified or mitigated?” 
 
In this dissertation, I use these principles, analytical dimensions, and questions about discursive 
strategies to guide my analyses of online discussions about Silesian identity. However, rather 
than applying them comprehensively, I modify the original DHA framework to best serve the 
analytical goals at hand while preserving a critical approach to language data and keeping in 
mind the larger sociocultural question and sociohistorical context. In each analytical chapter, I 
combine and complement the methodological and theoretical orientations of DHA with related 
theories, frameworks, and insights from sociolinguistics, linguistic anthropology, sociology, and 
other social sciences as needed. Thus, I stay true to the critical and interdisciplinary nature of 
CDS-oriented research to study, analyze, and explain the topics at hand through close functional 
analysis of collected conversational data. 
In an attempt to complement the methodological framework of DHA with social theory, 
this dissertation utilizes ideas and theories expressed in recent sociolinguistically and socially 
oriented research within the broader field of sociocultural linguistics (Bucholtz and Hall 2005). 
Here, two main theoretical approaches are prominent and relevant for all analytical chapters in 
the dissertation. The first one is concerned with stancetaking and the second with an interactional 
approach to identity as expressed in language-in-use. 
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The notion of stance as a theoretical construct, put forward by Du Bois (2007), deals with 
the act of taking a stance, which, in addition to being its linguistic expression, achieves specific 
interactional goals. Stance, Du Bois (2007, 163) writes, is “a public act by a social actor, 
achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, 
positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient 
dimension of the sociocultural field.” From the perspective of the person who takes a stance, this 
definition can be explained through the following well-known informal formula: “I evaluate 
something, and thereby position myself, and thereby align with you” (ibid.). This formula is 
often represented by the figure of the eponymous stance triangle, representing two subjects doing 
the work of evaluating and positioning with regard to the object at hand while simultaneously 
(dis)aligning themselves with respect to each other. Since the concept of stance is inherently 
interactional, not only is it something individuals “have” (in the sense of mental beliefs and 
attitudes), but it is also something that they do. While the original formulation of stancetaking 
was based on English-language examples of affective and evaluative verbs and other parts of 
speech (e.g., I agree; That’s horrible, etc.), I extend this modality to Polish-language data to 
demonstrate that the work of stancetaking can also be performed through apparently neutral 
content words (e.g., Paljaki, see chapter 1) or through the morphological process of suffixation 
(e.g., szlezjerki, see chapter 4), common in Polish and other Slavic languages. 
The utility of applying the concept of stancetaking to online discussions on Silesian 
identity in the Western Daily forum lays in the very character of those conversations, which are 
inherently centered on stance. As the first analytical chapter shows, stancetaking represents 
probably the most common interactional practice among users of this forum. Taking a stance on 
issues surrounding Silesia, Silesian, and Silesians is an ever-present phenomenon in the collected 
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data as posters exhibiting either pro-Silesian or anti-Silesian views engage in endless discursive 
battles over what it means to be Polish or what it means to be Silesian. In doing so, they attempt 
to get their message across by arguing their perspectives and, consequently, taking a stance on 
each smaller or larger issue under discussion. Given all this, the concept of stance represents the 
theoretical frame for all analytical chapters as well as the dissertation as a whole. As the larger 
narrative frame, stancetaking remains the omnipresent link between language and identity in the 
context of online discussions in the Western Daily forum. In the analytical chapters that follow, I 
successively use that frame to analyze four different types of stancetaking identified in my data: 
othering as stancetaking (chapter 1), associating as stancetaking (chapter 2), verbal violence and 
hateful speech as stancetaking (chapter 3), and naming as stancetaking (chapter 4). 
Consequently, this dissertation shows that stancetaking is one key modality of identity 
wars online. In the context of the Western Daily forum, stancetaking represents probably the 
most common modality of user behavior in discussions centered on identity. The conversations 
held in the comments sections there are characterized by constant evaluation of the points and 
arguments made by the users. This kind of evaluation is performed both discursively (on the 
intersentential level) linguistically (on the intrasentential level) and results in the frequent work 
of positioning (van Langenhove and Harré 1999). The latter concept, auxiliary for the framework 
of stancetaking, assumes that “[w]henever somebody positions him/herself, this discursive act 
always implies a positioning of the one to whom it is addressed” and that “when somebody 
positions somebody else, that always implies a positioning of the person him/herself” (van 
Langenhove and Harré 1999, 22). Viewed from this perspective, the online activity of Western 
Daily forum users can be theorized (and explained) as a constant work of positioning, which in 
turn results in acts of stancetaking. As I demonstrate in its analytical chapters, the Western Daily 
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discussions studied are not about debating and reaching a constructive conclusion – instead, they 
are about repeated performances of individual identities as expressed in language-in-use. 
The concept of identity represents another salient component of this dissertation 
theoretical toolkit. Following the analytical framework for analyzing identity in linguistic 
interaction by Bucholtz and Hall (2005), I approach the concept of identity as “a relational and 
sociocultural phenomenon that emerges and circulates in local discourse contexts of interaction 
rather than as a stable structure located primarily in the individual psyche or in fixed social 
categories” (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 587–586) and define it as “the social positioning of self and 
other” (ibid.) that emerges in interaction. Consequently, instead of talking about “Poles” and 
“Silesians” in my data, I employ more interactional and locally grounded labels of “pro-Silesian 
posters” and “anti-Silesian posters” (see chapter 1) that better reflect the discursive identity work 
performed in the Western Daily forum. In doing so, my goal is to avoid the danger of “making” 
or “unmaking” the Silesian community, or what Brubaker (2002, 164) calls “groupism”: “the 
tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and 
agency can be attributed.” While such attempts represent a frequent trope in much sociocultural 
and linguistic research on Silesian identity and self-identified Silesians, the question of whether 
Silesians represent an ethnic or national community (or a separate people) will not be dealt with 
in this dissertation. 
Instead, the analytical chapters that follow are theoretically informed by the following 
five principles about identity in interaction from a sociocultural linguistic perspective (Bucholtz 
and Hall 2005, 587–606): 
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(1) “Identity is best viewed as the emergent product rather than the pre-existing source of 
linguistic and other semiotic practices and therefore as fundamentally a social and 
cultural phenomenon” (the emergence principle), 
(2) “Identities encompass (a) macro-level demographic categories; (b) local, 
ethnographically specific cultural positions; and (c) temporary and interactionally 
specific stances and participant roles” (the positionality principle), 
(3) “Identity relations emerge in interaction through several related indexical processes, 
including: (a) overt mention of identity categories and labels; (b) implicatures and 
presuppositions regarding one’s own or others’ identity position; (c) displayed evaluative 
and epistemic orientations to ongoing talk, as well as interactional footings and 
participant roles; and (d) the use of linguistic structures and systems that are ideologically 
associated with specific personas and groups” (the indexicality principle), 
(4) “Identities are intersubjectively constructed through several, often overlapping, 
complementary relations, including similarity/difference, genuineness/artifice, and 
authority/delegitimacy.” (the relationality principle), 
(5) “Any given construction of identity may be in part deliberate and intentional, in part 
habitual and hence often less than fully conscious, in part an outcome of interactional 
negotiation and contestation, in part an outcome of others’ perceptions and 
representations, and in part an effect of larger ideological processes and material 
structures that may become relevant to interaction. It is therefore constantly shifting both 




As it becomes evident later in this dissertation, all these principles apply to the discussions in the 
Western Daily forum. The collected conversational data show that you cannot readily tell users’ 
identities, particularly because of the forum’s text-only character (the emergence principle), the 
semantics of “Silesian” acquires different meanings depending on the poster’s position on the 
issue of Silesian identity (the positionality principle), interactions between users yield identity 
relations and include overt mentions of identity categories and labels, assumptions about users’ 
identities, and linguistically performed ideologies about individuals and groups (the indexicality 
principle), identities are discursively constructed through constant relational work in ongoing 
discussions (the relationality principle), and discursive constructions of identity in the Western 
Daily forum are necessarily partial, fractional, and resulting from various sources including the 
immediate interactions at hand, the users’ cognitive processes, and larger ideological frameworks 
that are being discursively imported into the ongoing discussions (the partialness principle). 
The issue of identity in online discussions and computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) has received much attention in recent research in sociocultural linguistics and 
neighboring fields (e.g., Marwick and boyd 2011; Page, Harper, and Frobenius 2013; Bou-
Franch and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich 2014; Hardaker and McGlashan 2016; Jacknick and Avni 
2017; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2017; Baider and Kopytowska 2017; Borowski 2018b; 
Perelmutter 2018; Tovares 2019, among others). This body of research has, on one hand, tested 
the usefulness of “offline” theories in novel, digital contexts while generating new theoretical 
approaches and concepts that the advent of CMC has produced. As a result, ideas such as 
“context collapse” or “imagined audience” (Marwick and boyd 2011; Androutsopoulos 2014; 
Szabla and Blommaert 2017) have entered the theoretical lexicon of researchers of CMC 
interactions. Similar advancements have been made in the field of (critical) discourse studies as 
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applied to digital communicative practices (for an overview, see, e.g., Herring 2004, 2013; 
Herring and Androutsopoulos 2015; and, more, recently, Blitvich and Bou-Franch 2019). 
In an attempt to marry some of the major tenets of critical discourse studies with the 
advent of CMC, KhosraviNik (2017) offered a discussion of social media critical discourse 
studies (SM-CDS), an approach to studying discourses and discursive practices in the context of 
participatory social media (including, but not limited to, social networking sites). As an approach 
to critical investigations of discourse, SM-CDS “deals with discourse, not technology, as its 
central object of analysis. We are not only interested in what happens in media per se but in how 
it may shape and influence social and political sphere of our life worlds” (KhosraviNik 2017, 
586). Accordingly, “digital performances of identity, conflict, and misogyny are to be interpreted 
within a wider socio-political context, which embeds the digital mediation” (KhosraviNik and 
Esposito 2018, 55). Thus, the SM-CDS approach is both local and global in that it seeks to 
illuminate how local discursive practices, for instance, in an online discussion forum, reflect 
and/or are reflective of larger sociopolitical trends and ideologies in play, with which CMC 
participants come to table. In this dissertation, I adopt this approach as an auxiliary theoretical 
framework to study discussions in the Western Daily forum and how these local discourses can 
inform our understanding of larger discourses about identity, language, and nation in the twenty-
first-century Poland. 
Previous research 
There exists relatively little prior research on the topic of Silesian identity from the perspective 
of digital media and computer-mediated communication. In a notable exception, Majewski 
(2012) offers an account of how self-identified Silesians use the Internet and new media to 
(re)construct their identities. Since that study predated this dissertation, it provides a useful 
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window into the world of early Silesian online activism that emerged as a consequence of the 
availability of broadband internet connection in Poland. Majewski finds that means of digital 
communication have become a welcome addition for the way self-identified Silesians consume 
and look for content relevant to their identity. These developments have led to the emergence of 
ethnic vigilantes labeled “Silesian cybernationalists”: 
 
“… with a mass access to the internet, a new category emerged among people declaring 
membership in the Silesian nation – internet users who can be described by the name of 
Silesian cybernationalists, not only fighting with the means of the keyboard for their 
‘right to’ possess their identity but also [fighting] against all those who dare to foul the 
sacred national principles and oppose their vision of the world” (Majewski 2012, 160). 
 
Consequently, the digital spaces become an arena of fervent discursive battles over the ongoing 
constructions of “discursive worlds” that, after having been constructed, need to be defended by 
their adherents. According to Greń (2014, 257), it is “not a coincidence that Silesian identity and 
the processes that accompanied its determination reached a larger scale thanks to and during the 
era of the Internet.” As Majewski notes, self-identified Silesians co-construct their national 
discourse on the internet and, in doing so, they devote “much time, energy, and space for 
constructing contents that are supposed to perform the function of ‘conventional/canonical’ 
materializations of the national spirit” (2012, 153). In this manner, the Silesian digital activism 
reflects the ontological character of all conflicts over subnational identities, as described by 




“Struggles over ethnic or regional identity - in other words, over the properties (stigmata 
or emblems) linked with the origin through the place of origin and its associated durable 
marks, such as accent - are a particular case of the different struggles over classifications, 
struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to 
know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social 
world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups.” 
 
In a related line of work, Buchowski and Chlewińska (2012) incorporate data collected from the 
internet to report on political tolerance in Poland and its limits using the Silesian Autonomy 
Movement as a case study. Szmeja (2014, 219) argues that the internet and new media shape a 
new image of Silesia as people “learn anew how to use the Silesian dialect or how to behave in 
accordance with the groups’ cultural norms.” Other researchers look at the problem of folk 
standardization of the Silesian variety in online spaces. For instance, Greń (2007) identifies five 
distinct orthographical tendencies in the texts from Upper Silesia, Opole Silesia, and Cieszyn 
Silesia; Mętrak (2016) classifies Silesian websites regarding their language and content; more 
recently, Greń (2019) analyzes a sample of online Cieszyn Silesia texts from a linguistic point of 
view. 




Map 1: Map of the historical region of Silesia superimposed on present-day borders: 
Austrian Silesia in cyan, the Prussian Province of Silesia delineated in red 
(Lommes / CC BY-SA (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0), image source: 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/01/Silesia-map.svg) 
 
Silesia is a historical region, located along the upper and middle course of the Oder River (Pol. 
Odra) in southwestern Poland and, partly, in the Czech Republic alongside the Polish-Czech 
border from south of the Kłodzko Valley in the north to Teschen Silesian in the south. The 
historical capital of Silesia is Wrocław (Germ. Breslau). Traditionally, the region is divided into 
Lower Silesia (its western part) with Wrocław and Upper Silesia (its eastern part) with its 
industrial basin. Today, the Polish part of Silesia is divided into the Lower Silesian (around 
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Wrocław), Opole (around Opole), and Silesia (around Katowice) Provinces, with a small part in 
the Lubusz (around Zielona Góra) Province. The etymology of the region’s name is commonly 
derived from the name of the Ślężanie tribe, linked with the Ślęza River or the Ślęża Mountain, 
located less than 50 km southwest of the region’s capital, Wrocław (Malec 2003, 236). 
The history of Silesia took quite a different turn compared to the rest of Poland. In the 
late Middle Ages, Silesia was composed of small principalities as the Polish Kingdom entered 
the period of fragmentation (1138–1320). As the different provinces of the country were 
gradually united under Władysław Łokietek after 1320, most Silesian princes opted for a 
rapprochement with Bohemia. In 1340, the Polish king Casimir the Great renounced Silesia, 
which came under Bohemian influence, later to be passed into the Austrian (since 1526) and 
Prussian (since 1740) hands (Davies 2005, 70). These decisions consequently separated Silesia 
from the core Polish areas for six centuries and it was not until 1945 that Poland regained control 
of most of the region’s territory. 
While this unique historical trajectory of Silesia is not commonly found in Polish 
historiographic works, it represents one of the building blocks of Silesian (regional, ethnic) 
identity and is key for self-identification as a Silesian, as later chapters in this dissertation will 
show. This sociohistorical and sociopolitical separation of Silesian from core Polish lands is also 
the rationale behind the local narrative of Silesia as a region that has always been a part of the 
European cultural milieu. According to this narrative, the same cannot be said about Poland itself 
or many Polish areas, which had to endure other (that is, non-Western European) influences in 
their turbulent history. This narrative of always-European Silesia gained particular prominence 
after the end of World War Two, as the region witnessed an influx of ethnic Poles from 
territories annexed in the east by the Soviet Union; this idea is also present in the contemporary 
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discourse of Silesian regional activists (see chapter 1). The roots of this type of mental mapping 
run, however, much deeper. In the early sixteenth century, Bartholomäus Stein wrote 
Silesiographia, in which a distinction between Silesian locals and Poles was already made 
known. According to Stein, Poles “are rustic, rough, without industry and ingenuity … Ours, by 
contrast, as if their civilization [humanitas] had come from the West, lead a more cultured life 
and have more industrious habits, and more open minds” (cited in Karch 2018, 29). 
One important consequence of Silesia’s divergent history is the different sociolinguistic 
and sociocultural context, in which the locals lived for generations. This was especially the case 
for the region’s eastern part, Upper Silesia. In historiography, as Karch (2018) observes, both 
German and Polish historians tend to promote narratives that create assumptions about German 
or Polish roots of Upper Silesia and its populace while minimizing the influence of the other 
culture and language on the complex ethnolinguistic fabric of the region. The reality, however, 
was more complicated and multi-layered. As in other European regions in the pre-national era, 
bilingualism was common in Upper Silesia, as German was used alongside a Slavic dialect 
called ślonzok or schlonsak (‘Silesian’). While German was the language of the middle- and 
upper-class newcomers from core German areas, ślonzok was mainly used by the local 
Slavophones rooted in the region for generations. Although the local vernacular was distinctly 
Slavic in its grammatical structure, it nevertheless included a fair amount of Germanic 
vocabulary. This is attested in the name given to ślonzok by German speakers – Wasserpolnisch, 
or ‘watered-down Polish’. Similarly, its speakers were pejoratively called Wasserpolen, 
‘watered-down Poles’ (Karch 2018, 222). In sociolinguistics, such a co-presence of two 
linguistic codes used under different conditions, one of which is more prestigious and dominates 
the official use while the other is mostly limited to the informal context is known as diglossia 
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(Ferguson 1959). Under Prussian rule, German was the dominant (‘high’ variety, in Fergusonian 
terms) language in Upper Silesia and the local ślonzok variety was used in everyday 
communication in semiformal or informal situations. This linguistic configuration became 
common in the second half of the nineteenth century (Zeller 2019). 
Despite the rapid industrialization and urbanization that took place in the eastern part of 
Silesia in the nineteenth century, the region failed to produce stable national identifications 
among the local Slavophones. As in other parts of Europe (e.g., Judson 2006), nationalist 
activists sought to convince the local population of their “Germanness” or “Polishness,” drawing 
national boundaries along linguistic lines. When it comes to ślonzok, the rhetoric of German and 
Polish activists mirrored each other. On the one hand, some German activists viewed the local 
Slavic vernacular as too distinct from Polish and infused with enough Germanic lexicon to 
consider it a separate language (Bjork 2016, 108–109). On another hand, ślonzok had a Slavic 
grammatical foundation, which allowed Polish activists to claim it as a Polish dialect. 
Interestingly, this line of thinking was supported by data from Prussian censuses, which regularly 
recorded Polish as the mother tongue of the local Slavic speakers (Service 2013, 176–177). 
Nevertheless, the local population seemed largely immune to the arguments of nationalist 
activists. In 1891, for example, the Gazeta Polska (Polish Daily) newspaper published in Opole 
bemoaned the existence of “many irrational people, who regard a Pole or a German as hardly 
different from each other” (Karch 2018, 66). Indifference to the widespread bilingualism was yet 
another juncture for disagreement, especially that locals saw the acquisition of German as a 
worthy investment in their children’s future. In one article, the same newspaper complained: 
“There are parents who hardly worry about the matter and who are indifferent to the language in 
which their child prepared for Holy Communion; on the contrary they urge their children to take 
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part in German instruction, so that they can show other the refinement of their children” (ibid.). 
Such tolerance, and partly even encouragement for bilingualism, was not only characteristic of 
individuals but political associations as well. For example, in 1883 a resolution passed by the 
Catholic Center Party complained that German-only instruction in Upper Silesia “produced 
children who ‘cannot read Polish but cannot understand German’” (Bjork 2016, 110). With time, 
Upper Silesia natives seemed to have also mastered German. The case of miner Leon 
Lukaszczyk who “did not know one word of German” only to become fluent in the language by 
his twenties (Bjork 2016, 111) seems to confirm this general trend. 
The issue of development and presence or persistence of Silesians as a separate (ethnic, 
regional, ethno-national) entity has become one of the most contested points in historical, 
sociological, but also sociolinguistic research. Some historians associate the emergence of 
Silesians as a distinct group with the German and Polish nationalizing efforts that took place in 
the region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Bjork 2008; Karch 2018). In this 
process, the adherence of Silesians to the Roman Catholic Church that crossed the linguistic lines 
was of paramount importance (Bjork 2008). In another view, Silesians represent generations-
long residents of the region who, having to endure ennationalizion efforts on part of the German 
and Polish national projects, responded by deploying their pre-existent identity that was neither 
German nor Polish but Silesian (Kamusella 2016). According to Karch (2018, 2), the national 
strife that took place in Silesia eventually “created the presence of Silesians” (emphasis 
original), a group that “emerged in Poland not through expulsions or resettlements, but rather 
through a regional invention of the very category of the Upper Silesian.” The two major forces 
behind this identity construction were the dominance of Catholicism in the region and the use of 
the ślonzok vernacular combined with widespread bilingualism. As Silesians rejected German or 
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Polish national belonging, they opted for identification with the region. In doing so, they 
“navigated a century of mass politics, world wars, mass murder, and expulsions by intentionally 
crafting their own national ambiguity” (Karch 2018, 4) to pass as loyal German or Polish 
citizens. This stance caused German and Polish activists to intensify their nationalizing efforts, 
which in turn yielded even more national apathy among Upper Silesians. In this manner, a 
feedback loop between nationalism and national ambiguity was created. 
After World War One, both Germany and Poland contested Upper Silesia due to its 
economic potential. Following the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, a plebiscite was mandated to 
determine the future of the region. In the Upper Silesian plebiscite (1921), nearly 60% of votes 
were cast in favor of Germany and the region was eventually split between the two countries, 
with Poland receiving its easternmost part with the counties of Rybnik, Pszczyna, Katowice, and 
Lubliniec. In the period leading to the plebiscite, a third geopolitical option emerged – that of 
Upper Silesian independence. These ideas, however, were more of a conglomerate of different 
scenarios rather than one coherent narrative, as regional activists proposed that Upper Silesia 
become an independent province within Prussia, an independent state within Germany, or an 
entirely independent country. In all this, Upper Silesian instrumentalism played not a negligible 
part: 
 
For the autonomists, the German and Polish nations were only as worthy as the material 
benefits and cultural freedoms they offered. While most autonomy activists came out as 
pro-German ahead of the plebiscite vote, their stance toward each nationality was 





With the incorporation of Silesia into Poland after the World War Two, native Upper Silesians 
had to undergo the so-called “national verification,” in which they had to prove their 
“Polishness,” or, better, “non-Germanness,” to the communist authorities. To avoid deportation 
to Germany, Upper Silesians had to answer questions about their language use, attachment to 
Poland, or any affiliation with German or Nazi associations in the past, later reviewed by local 
verification committees. Overall, the verification procedure was quite lenient, as demonstrated 
by the numbers. For instance, less than 5% of Upper Silesian applications for Polish residency 
(with about one-third left to go) have been denied by September 1946 (Karch 2018, 273). Those 
successfully verified as Poles had to declare their patriotic feelings for Poland in an oath that, 
among others, read: 
 
“I promise to be a faithful and obedient citizen of the Polish Republic and to break off 
every connection with Germans and Germandom, to thoroughly erase any feelings for 
Germandom, to raise children in the Polish spirit and to ignite in their hearts a love for 
Poland – the fatherland of my ancestors” (cited in Karch 2018, 272). 
 
Such a caution against any potential markers of Germanness went hand in hand with the 
communist regime’s ideology, according to which “no ‘hidden’ Germans should be allowed into 
the Polish body politic” (Ehrlich 2005, 193). This trope of potential danger on part of “hidden 
Germans” on Polish soil survived the collapse of communist Poland and re-emerged under the 
label of “camouflaged German option” in an official political document published 75 years later 
(see chapter 2). 
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The fall of communism brought a change in the sociopolitical landscape of Poland that 
allowed Upper Silesians to re-emerge as a community. Before that, however, communist Poland 
was designed as an ethnically homogeneous country (Łodziński 2012a). Thus, the authorities 
adopted a “unitary vision of Polish national identity, which has been based upon the conviction 
that the whole nation is ethnically homogeneous” (Wódz and Wódz 2006, 11). Since that system 
“did not leave much room for the expression of cultural differences of the Poles, regional and 
ethnic distinctiveness were never mentioned in official political discourse” (ibid.). 
Unsurprisingly, post-1989 Poland witnessed a revival of Upper Silesian activism as a reaction to 
Polish centralism (Karch 2018). In this capacity, the Silesian Autonomy Movement (Pol. Ruch 
Autonomii Śląska, RAŚ) represents one of the most vocal advocates of Silesian identity in 
contemporary Poland. Established in the early 1990s, the Movement is an association whose 
goals include (1) achieving regional autonomy for Silesia within the Polish state, (2) 
consolidating the Silesian regional identity, and (3) promoting the Silesian language variety, 
among others (RAŚ 2011). 
The re-emergence of Silesians as a distinct community became most apparent in the 2002 
and 2011 censuses when, respectively, some 173,000 and 847,000 (ca. 2% of the total 
population) people self-identified as Silesians in terms of nationality (GUS 2003, 2015). Those 
numbers effectively established Silesians as numerically the largest minority in the country. In 
the 2002 census, only one ethno-national identification was allowed. There, nationality was 
defined as “a declarative (based on subjective feeling) individual feature of each person, 
expressing her/his emotional, cultural, or genealogical (due to the origin of parents) relationship 




(1) “What is your nationality? (nationality should be understood as national or ethnic 
belonging – and should not be confused with citizenship), 
(2) Do you also feel a sense of belonging to another nation or ethnic community?” (GUS 
2015, 22). 
 
In question (1), respondents could either choose one of the fourteen pre-determined options of 
ethno-national identification (in original order: Polish, Belarusian, Czech, Karaim,2 Lithuanian, 
Lemko,3 German, Armenian, Romani, Russian, Slovak, Tatar, Ukrainian, Jewish) or use the 
write-in option to provide a different answer. In question (2), the possible answers were “Yes” 
and “No”; in the case of the former, respondents were asked to provide the answer themselves 
(ibid.). 
Here, it is worth mentioning that the category of self-identified Silesians as established by 
the 2011 census is not in any manner homogeneous, but consists of three main groups: (1) those 
who declared Polish and Silesian nationality (430,000 or 49.4% of all Silesian declarations), (2) 
those who declared German and Silesian nationality (64,000 or 7.4%), and (3) those who 
declared Silesian nationality exclusively (376,000 or 43.2%) (GUS 2015, 36). Further, while 
99.8 percent of respondents declared Polish nationality as their first (of the two possible) options 
in terms of ethno-national identification, the results for self-identified Silesians are vastly 
different, as 51.5 percent of them chose the label “Silesian” in their first, and the remaining 48.5 
 
2 The Karaims (also known as Crimean Karaites; Pol. Karaimi, Crimean Karaim Кърымкъарайлар) are a 
Turkic-speaking minority living in Poland and its eastern neighbors. In the 2011 census, 346 respondents self-
identified as Karaims (GUS 2015, 131). 
3 The Lemkos (Pol. Łemkowie, Lemko Лeмкы) are a minority living in southeastern Poland, near the 
Polish-Slovak border. While perceived as a sub-group of (Carpathian) Rusyns, they are considered a separate 
community in Poland. In the 2002 census, ca. 5,900 respondents self-identified as Lemkos; this number rose to 
10,500 in the 2011 census (GUS 2015, 40). 
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percent in their second option (GUS 2015, 34). Interestingly, the corresponding statistics for 
Kashubians in the 2011 census are 7.6 and 92.4 percent, respectively. 
While the two censuses de facto established Silesians as a separate community, those 
results did not lead to their official recognition as a (national or ethnic) minority. According to 
the 2005 Act on national and ethnic minorities and regional language, there are nine national (in 
original order: Belarusians, Czech, Lithuanians, Germans, Armenians, Russian, Slovaks, 
Ukrainians, Jews) and four ethnic (in original order: Karaims, Lemkos, Romani, Tatars) 
minorities that are officially recognized in Poland (Act 2005). Thus far, attempts at granting 
Silesians the status of an officially recognized minority have been unsuccessful. According to 
Tambor (2019), such attempts are destined to fail due to the fears of Upper Silesians’ 





Map 2: Map of the Silesia Province (in existence since 1999) including the Upper Silesian metropolitan area with 
around Katowice (12) in the center 






Map 3: Map of the Silesian declarations in the counties of the Opole (western part) and Silesia (eastern part) 
Provinces based on the 2002 census results 




Similarly, Silesian linguistic activism has failed to elevate the Silesian variety to the status of a 
regional language, despite several efforts (for details, see Jaroszewicz 2019).4 From the 
 
4 As of early 2020, Kashubian (spoken in northern Poland) is the only regional language officially 
recognized in Poland (Act 2005). 
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economic point of view, it is predicted that no change in this area is possible because should 
Silesian be officially recognized as a regional language, the legal protection of another (after 
Kashubian) regional language would require more providing financial means from the state 
(Tambor 2019). Nevertheless, the issue of the Silesian (Sil. ślōnskŏ gŏdka, ISO 639-3 code 
[since 2007]: szl) variety continues to be one of the most focal points of Silesian regional 
activism. In the 2011 census, close to 530,000 respondents declared using Silesian at home (GUS 
2015, 70), making it the second most used language variety in the country. Commonly perceived 
as a dialect of Polish (Siuciak 2012; Urbańczyk 1962; Wronicz 2013; Dejna 1973; Zaręba 1969–
1996; see Jaroszewicz 2019 for a contrasting view), Silesian has in recent decades attracted 
much attention thanks to its spread from closed circles of family and friends to enter the world of 
literature, theatre, social media, new technologies, advertising, etc. (Jaroszewicz 2018). In this 
manner, the Silesian variety has become “fashionable” and one of the most often used markers of 
Silesian self-identification, including the digital spaces (Daeninck 2012; Filipkowska 2014; Greń 
2019; Orzeł 2014). As I have shown elsewhere, despite the increased visibility, Silesian is 
commonly viewed as a mere Polish dialect, ‘uncouth’, and more suited for ludic than all-domain 
communicative purposes (Borowski 2018b). 
As a language variety closely related to Polish, Silesian stands out among other varieties 
spoken in the country because of the relatively high concentration of Germanic-origin lexicon in 
comparison to, for instance, most Polish dialects. Due to the region’s history (see above), the 
Slavophones of Upper Silesia lived for several centuries in German-speaking states, which has 
initiated the long process of Germanic-Slavic language contact. The nineteenth-century 
industrialization and urbanization of the region resulted in significant sociolinguistic changes. 
The emergence of mines and factories resulted in the uprooting of the natives who moved into 
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the rapidly developing urban areas where they found employment. The development of heavy 
industry necessitated the presence of mid- and upper-level management. They arrived in Upper 
Silesia from core German areas and spoke German, which started to infiltrate the local Slavic 
vernacular. It was in this diaglossic environment that the Silesian language variety developed, 
borrowing numerous Germanic words, especially in the professional and technical domain, e.g., 
Sil. gruba ‘mine’ (cf. Germ. Grube vis-à-vis Pol. kopalnia), Sil. autobana ‘highway’ (cf. Germ. 
Autobahn vis-à-vis Pol. autostrada), Sil. cug ‘train’ (cf. Germ. Zug vis-à-vis Pol. pociąg). As 
research shows, however, the Germanic influence did not stop here and involved, apart from 
vocabulary, morphology, and syntax as well (Tambor 2014). Some notable contact-induced 
features include (Tambor 2014, 152–153): 
(1) calquing German prepositional phrases: 
a. Sil. jechać z tramwajym ‘to go by tram’ (cf. Germ. fahren mit der 
Straßenbahn, Pol. jechać tramwajem), 
b. Sil. cwiter od Ewy ‘Ewa’s sweater’ (cf. Germ. Pullover von Eva, Pol. sweter 
Ewy), 
(2) changes in case government: 
a. Sil. niy mom nic przeciw ciebie.ACC ‘I have nothing against you’ (cf. Germ. 
Ich habe nichts gegen dich.ACC, Pol. nie mam nic przeciwko tobie.DAT), 
b. Sil. łón jest mój szef.NOM ‘He is my boss’ (cf. Germ. Er ist mein Chef.NOM, 
Pol. On jest moim szefem.INS). 
 




(1) differences in nominal morphology: 
a. ACC.SG ending -a in feminine nouns, e.g., Sil. widza ta rodzina ‘I can see this 
family’ (cf. Pol. widzę tę rodzinę), 
b. GEN.SG ending -e in soft-stem feminine nouns, e.g., Sil. tyj tradycje ‘of this 
tradition’ (cf. Pol. tej tradycji), 
(2) differences in verbal morphology: 
a. PRS.1.SG ending -a, e.g., Sil. widza ‘I (can) see’ (cf. Pol. widzę), 
b. PST/COND.1.SG ending -ch (characteristic for aorist), e.g., Sil. urodziyłech sie 
‘I was born’ (cf. Pol. urodziłem się), bardzo bych sie ucieszyła ‘I would be 
very happy’ (cf. Pol. bardzo bym się ucieszyła), 
c. transitivization of intransitive verbs and extended use of the passive voice, 
e.g., Sil. mjała to wyskoczone [transitive] (w kolanie) ‘it came up (in her 
knee)’ (cf. Pol. coś jej wyskoczyło [intransitive] w kolanie ‘something came 
up in her knee’). 
 
As it will become apparent later in this dissertation, some of the features typical for Silesian will 




Chapter 1: Linguistic othering 
“Despite the occupation and humiliation of Germany (Upper Silesia) after the lost war, 
60% voted for Germany because they didn’t want to be in contact with the eastern steppe culture.” 
(a pro-Silesian poster) 
 
The Other and othering 
Othering represents one of the most common stancetaking strategies in the data collected for this 
dissertation. As pro-Silesian and anti-Silesian posters come together in the Western Daily forum, 
they immediately recognize each other based on the content of their posts and the stance that 
each poster brings into the larger discussion on Silesian identity. Once their stances are brought 
together and expressed in language-in-use, othering becomes a pervasive rhetorical move that 
allows pro- and anti-Silesian posters to (1) uphold/defend their positions and (2) distinguish in-
group members (those who hold similar views on the topic) from out-group members (those who 
hold divergent views). As both groups become more entrenched in their pre-conceived views, 
they use linguistic othering to construct, delineate, and sustain their community against the 
opposing community. This process is realized linguistically by combining complex 
sociohistorical contexts with linguistic creativity, as this chapter shows. 
In sociolinguistics, the practice of othering has been linked with the work of 
representation in which collective and individual identities are discursively constructed, 
maintained, and challenged. Coupland (2010) defines representations as “the totality of semiotic 
means by which items and categories, individuals and social groups, along with their attributes 
and values, are identified, thematised, focused, shaped and made intelligible” (242). Because 
representations are both cognitive and discursive, they both constitute and are constitutive of the 
very ideas they represent. Once imbued with sociocultural values, representations become 
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ideological in how they depict groups or individuals (ibid.). It is such portrayals that are typical 
of the process of othering. 
The idea of the Other in human thought can be dated back as far as Plato (Riggins 1997). 
Traces of what is now referred to as the process of othering can also be found in Georg Simmel’s 
concept of the stranger. According to the sociologist, the stranger represents an individual who 
“does not conform completely to the norms of the system” (Rogers 1999, 61). Simmel’s 
conceptualization of the Other as someone who fails to adhere to an established system of 
rules—be it real or imagined—is also mirrored in recent (and often overlapping) definitions of 
othering. For instance, Coupland (2010) understands othering as a “process of representing an 
individual or a social group to render them distant, alien or deviant” (244). While such 
representations produce social exclusion, they are also often linked with an ascription of a 
socially disadvantageous position to the ones subjected to othering, contributing thus to their 
marginalization (ibid.). The theme of deviation represents a recurring topic in the literature on 
othering processes. Looking at discussions on extremist online forums, Baumgarten (2017) 
shows how discussants other third parties (immigrants, Jews, LGBTQ people, Muslims, and 
others) through (1) assumptions about how they violate the unspoken norms about the desired 
status quo and (2) ascriptions of behaviors believed to be immoral and/or dishonest. 
The process of othering also figures prominently in writings about Orientalism. For Said 
(1978), Orientalism represents “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological 
distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (2), “a distribution 
of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and 
philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographic distinction (the world is 
made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also as a whole series of ‘interests’ 
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which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, 
landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than 
expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to 
incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world” (12, emphasis 
original). Since the East/West division makes part and parcel of these definitions, Orientalism as 
a style of thought is imminently involved in othering processes as well as identity work. 
Orientalist thinking has been shown to function within the geographic borders of Europe 
as well. Wolff (1994) has demonstrated how the phenomenon of “mental mapping,” achieved 
mainly through associations and comparisons that contributed during the Enlightenment to the 
construction and intensive othering of Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the Western part of the continent. 
This type of imaginary social geography was perhaps best evidenced in the travelogue authored 
by the Count de Ségur who—having passed from Prussia to Poland on his way to Catherine the 
Great’s court—“felt that he had ‘left Europe entirely,’ and furthermore had ‘moved back ten 
centuries’” (6). Through such and similar discourses, geopolitical facts were metonymically 
transposed onto other areas of social life to demonstrate the assumed superiority of one nation or 
group of people over another one. This is also the case in Central Europe, itself a modern 
invention that is supposed to delineate the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia from 
its eastern neighbors and, in doing so, metaphorically draw them closer to the Western part of the 
European continent. To wit, Zarycki (2014) calls contemporary contemporary Central and 
Eastern Europe “a prisoner of what Edward Said called Orientalism” (1), pointing out that “[t]he 
region can be seen as both a victim of external orientalization and, at the same time, as a locus of 
intensive production of orientalist discourses” (ibid., emphasis mine). According to Kuus (2004), 
“orientalist assumptions about East-Central Europe persist not simply because they are imposed 
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on the accession countries but also because they are actively used by these countries against their 
particular Easts. This reinscription works not as an absolute dichotomy of self and other, but as a 
more complex and contingent pattern of degrees and shades of otherness” (479). Given this 
context, it then follows that Polish self-identification is to a considerable degree based on the 
representation of Russia as a not fully valuable yet dangerous Other (Grzymski 2000). “In order 
to feel more Western,” Grzymski (2000) writes, “one needed to look at the Russian” (75). As it 
becomes apparent later in the analysis, the Orientalist style of thought represents a key 
ideological repertoire that pro-Silesian posters utilize as they attempt to delineate themselves 
from the Polish majority whose members’ overall otherness is portrayed as fundamentally 
incongruent with what it means to be Silesian. 
The above-mentioned insights point to the importance of discourse in accounts and 
representations of the Self and Others. “For a person to develop a self-identity,” Riggins, (1997) 
writes, “he or she must generate discourses of both difference and similarity and must reject and 
embrace specific identities” (4, emphasis original). Hall (2006) defines discourse as “a group of 
statements which provide a language for talking about—i.e. a way of representing—a particular 
kind of knowledge about a topic” (165). As a result, discourse “is about the production of 
knowledge through language” (ibid.). The power to produce knowledge through representation 
comes with serious consequences for “both those who employ it and those who are ‘subjected’ to 
it” (173). For van Dijk (1997), focusing on othering discourses can yield important insights about 
power and group relations as well as ideologies pervading public consciousness regarding the 
Othered and the Otherer, effectively becoming a mode of social analysis. 
This feature of othering is especially instrumental in the context of minoritarian groups 
and communities that lack official recognition and/or support. In the case of Polish-Silesian 
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discussions online, the distinction between pro- and anti-Silesian commenters represents the key 
distinction around which those conversations are structured. Consequently, the idea of Silesian 
identity (as well as language and ethnicity) becomes the key argument argued for (by pro-
Silesian posters) or against (by anti-Silesian posters) in the Western Daily discussion forums. 
While participants in these disputes virtually never seem to agree on what it means to be Silesian 
(and whether being Silesian automatically excludes the possibility of being simultaneously 
Polish), the ability to voice their opinions and argue—quite often in a very unsophisticated 
manner—results in increased identity awareness for members of both groups as they face, 
confirm, or challenge identitarian features associated with Silesian identity. As I show in the 
analysis, the Western Daily discussion forums enable both pro- and anti-Silesian discussants to 
produce, maintain, and promote mutually othering discourses that play a key role in the 
construction of respective identities. 
Barth’s (1969) idea of ethnic boundaries, prominent in the literature on ethnicity and 
identity, depends heavily on the process of othering. It is through the process of boundary 
making (inevitably involves othering), the anthropologist argued, that ethnic difference is 
constructed and produced in everyday life, for the continuity of ethnic units “depends on the 
maintenance of a boundary” (14). Thus, while the cultural diacritics allowing one to distinguish 
between insiders and outsiders may change, the ongoing in-group/out-group member dichotomy 
makes it possible to study how these groups continue to persist (ibid.). 
As Schwalbe et al. (2000) argue, othering represents one of the four main processes for 
the (re)production of inequality. In their view, othering “entails the invention of categories and of 
ideas about what marks people as belonging to [dominant or inferior] categories” (422). 
Similarly, Weis (1995) defines othering as “that process which serves to mark and name those 
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thought to be different from oneself (18). For Morin and Lee (2010), othering “distinguishes 
between the familiar and the foreign” (497), and is thus instrumental to how group identities are 
formed. Consequently, the construction of exclusion/inclusion aids the process of establishing 
rules of belonging (ibid.), a process that further crystallizes and juxtaposes in-group members 
against out-group members. This is, for example, evident in the conceptualization of othering as 
“a reflexive move with the floating signifier as target” (Fielder & Catalano 2017, 209). It follows 
is that othering can be harnessed for increasing group cohesion and group identity (Jaworski and 
Coupland 2005). 
With regard to the notion of discourse, recent studies in the area of language in society 
have approached othering as a discursively constructed phenomenon. For instance, Jensen (2011) 
views othering as “discursive processes by which powerful groups, who may or may not make 
up a numerical majority, define subordinate groups into existence in a reductionist way which 
ascribe problematic and/or inferior characteristics to these subordinate groups. Such discursive 
processes affirm the legitimacy and superiority of the powerful and condition identity formation 
among the subordinate” (65). Following this line of thinking, Molek-Kozakowska and Chovanec 
(2017) hold that the discursively constructed idea of “the other” serves national communities to 
enforce their own identities. As they point out, while typically associated with discourses 
disseminated by the elites through mass media, othering can also become a strategy in semi-
public contexts, such as that of online discussion forums. In such settings, othering may be 
performed “in less subtle ways by expressing politically incorrect sentiments, trolling and 
flaming” (5). As I demonstrate in this chapter, this is precisely the case with online discussions 
on the Silesian minority. For the purpose of this chapter, I define othering as the discursive 
practice of constructing, delineating, and maintaining in-groups and out-groups, which can be 
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effectuated in online, written discourse through various forms of explicature (that is, what is 
explicitly said), implicature (that is, what is implied), associations, and other linguistic 
strategies. 
Although viewed prevalently as a process, othering can also be approached as a 
framework describing “how certain groups are set apart from and marginalized by the 
mainstream community” (Olsen, El-Bialy, Mckelvie, Rauman, & Brunger 2016, 60). Even 
though the process of othering is most commonly associated with numerical minorities, it need 
not be as I show in my analysis. In doing so, I recursively move between data and four major 
topics/questions that Molek-Kozakowska and Chovanec (2017) have proposed in their 
framework for studying othering. These topics include: 
(1) What are the groups subjected to othering? 
(2) What sociocultural, historical, political contexts are brought into othering discourses? 
(3) What specific othering strategies are used in these practices? 
(4) How othering is linguistically performed at the micro-, textual level, and what 
functions do these instances possess at the macro-, societal level? 
 
Using this framework, I look at the established dichotomies in play, describe and explain the 
broader (both local and national) context of othering practices, investigate specific othering 
strategies present in online discussions on Silesian minority, and finally move from analysis 
through interpretation and explanation of how othering is discursively employed for identity 
work. 
Because of the sociolinguistic and discourse-centered focus of this chapter, I concentrate 
on how language use in its many forms facilitates and contributes to othering processes. This and 
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similar ideas have figured prominently in sociocultural and linguistic works that focus on 
othering and identity. For instance, Rampton (1999) holds that language can “appropriate, 
explore, reproduce or challenge influential images and stereotypes of groups that they don’t 
themselves (straightforwardly) belong to” (421). Perelmutter (2018) shows how conflict 
discourse can be utilized in the context of an online discussion forum to negotiate identities and 
for othering work. Garcés-Conejos Blitvich and Sifianou (2017) argue that aggression and 
(im)politeness represent key factors in othering. These elements can also be traced in right-wing 
populist discourses where othering becomes a recurrent discursive strategy (Wodak 2015). 
Similarly, Tekin (2010) demonstrates how pejoration (see below) in the processes of othering 
Turkey becomes an important component of the construction of European identity. 
Since the othering effect is contingent on an interplay of language and social context, 
linguistic or textual representations become key for the process of othering (Coupland 2010). 
Because varied linguistic means can be used to other groups or individuals, othering itself can 
come in various forms. For instance, Schwalbe et al. (2000) distinguish between “(1) oppressive 
othering; (2) implicit othering by the creation of powerful virtual selves; and (3) defensive 
othering among subordinates” (422–423). Analyzing the 1927 Great Speech by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, Morin and Lee (2010) have identified the following types of othering: homogenization 
(rendering groups unified), separation (drawing distinctions between “us” and “them”), conflict 
(using the discourse of war and war-related metaphors), and typification (creating a typical 
representation of the Turkish nation, one in which Turks are singled out as a community through 
references to their historical enemies). According to Coupland (2010), there are four recurrent 
(and somewhat overlapping) types of discursive strategies employed in representations to 
produce the othering effect: homogenization (reducing individual characteristics in order to 
47 
 
create a unified depiction of a group), pejoration (projecting evaluative qualities onto groups), 
suppression and silencing (limiting or erasing group representations), and subverting tolerance 
(rejecting liberalism as the guiding principle in discussions about multiculturalism). 
Baumgarten’s (2017) account of extremist talk indicated that othering is discursively achieved 
mainly through “negative judgement” and “negative appreciation,” strategies akin to pejoration 
and subverting tolerance respectively, to use Coupland’s terms. 
Sociolinguistic approximation 
In what follows, I contribute to the ongoing conversation on othering by drawing attention to one 
specific method of producing the othering effect, prevalent in online discussions about the 
Silesian minority on http://www.dziennikzachodni.pl, the electronic edition of the Western Daily 
(Pol. Dziennik Zachodni). Using selected examples from a corpus of online comments, I point to 
what I call sociolinguistic approximation, a strategy in which discussants (1) introduce stable 
associations between their interlocutors and chosen (non)standard varieties, and then (2) employ 
them in order to render their interlocutors distant, distinct, and foreign, effectively producing 
them as Others. As I progress through examples and analysis, it will become apparent that these 
associations become saturated with ideological positions that other addressees and that are 
repeated throughout the corpus, regardless of when each example was written. Toward the end of 
the investigation, it will also become evident that such instances have effectively become a 
distinct genre on its own, with predictable content and stable, consistent through time 
interpretations. 
Since the discussions under consideration take place between pro- and anti-Silesian 
posters, their creative use of several varieties effectively increases the social distance between 
Poles and Silesians, producing a social difference. As I demonstrate below, the strategy of 
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sociolinguistic approximation is also employed by members of both groups for identity work. 
While focusing on this method of producing an othering effect, I also build on existing literature 
on othering effect to show how the strategy of sociolinguistic approximation draws from the 
already established models of othering work, and how it broadens our understanding of what 
nonlinguistic resources can be harnessed for producing othering effects. In doing so, I account 
for how internal and external differences are erased or minimized in othering processes (Morin 
and Lee 2010), how they inadvertently result in reductivism (Coupland 2010), and how some 
examples instantiate what Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) call homogeneism, that is, “the 
idea that the ideal society should be as uniform or homogeneous as possible” (117). As I 
progress with my analysis, it also becomes apparent how othering work facilitates and fuels 
identity work. In online discussions under consideration, self-identified Poles and self-identified 
Silesians perform identity work in a push-and-pull manner as the former ones attempt to 
discursively reduce the social (and ethnic) distance between the two groups (the pull) while the 
latter ones endeavor to do the opposite (the push). 
Pro-Silesian and anti-Silesian camps 
In the Western Daily forum, pro-Silesian commenters make a major effort in these debates to 
‘prove’ or otherwise ‘confirm’ that identification as a Silesian represents a definable and 
delineable set of attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs that are greatly incongruent with Polish 
identification. This, in turn, forces anti-Silesian participants in these discussions to defend the 
integrity of the nation by insisting that Silesians be seen as a regionally inflected sub-group 
that—despite its peculiarities—belongs to and makes part of the greater Polish community. In 
doing so, both groups reveal several presuppositions and deeply seated assumptions about “what 
makes a Pole” or “what makes a Silesian,” providing thick descriptions of two apparently 
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contrasting and/or incongruent worldviews. In fact, initial analysis of the corpus indicated that 
two main ideological camps have crystallized in online conversations in the Western Daily 
comment sections: there are (1) those who believe that being Silesian represents an 
ethnicity/identity position in its own rights and cannot be simply subsumed under the category of 
being Polish, and (2) those who disagree with that statement. For this dissertation project, I call 
the first camp “pro-Silesian” (since it is from this community that most vocal advocates of 
Silesian culture recruit from) and name the second camp “anti-Silesian.” This division between 
pro- and anti-Silesian posters represents the ideological fault line along which alliances are built 
and discussions are structured. 
While I acknowledge that these designations are somewhat simplified and that they may 
invoke more generalized and homogeneous portrayals of both groups than it is actually the case, 
I use the pro-Silesian/anti-Silesian binary for reasons of simplicity and as a shorthand to 
designate sets of ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions that ultimately either support or reject the 
idea of Silesian identification as an at least autonomous, if not fully independent, identity 
position. The choice of the word “camp” is meant to indicate assemblies of individuals into 
groups or factions that align with certain sets of ideas and ideologies concerning the greater idea 
of Silesian identity. However, it needs to be stressed that by talking about pro- or anti-Silesian 
camps, I do not mean to equate these assemblies of largely anonymous commenters with either 
Poles or Silesians as larger ethno-national categories so as not to cast “Poles” or “Silesians” as 
major actors whose stances stem directly from the very fact of belonging to one or the other 
group. Because of the innately interactive, fluid, and polyvocal character of online discussions, 
participants in those conversations may or may not choose to consistently engage in debates and 
arguments with other Internet users. 
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As it becomes evident later in the chapter, members of the pro- and anti-Silesian camps 
constitute fluid and ad hoc communities that—united by the common adherence to an implicit 
set of ideas—spontaneously discuss and exchange thoughts in an intra- and inter-group manner. 
Consequently, the engagement of these participants mirrors the theoretical underpinnings of 
stancetaking (Du Bois 2007) as they recognize each other’s worldviews, evaluate them, and then 
(dis-)align with regard to the object of evaluation (here: claims about the idea of Silesian 
identity). Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that some discussants willingly and frequently 
participate in these exchanges, repeating and/or reformulating their previous stances on the topic 
of the conversation, and successfully polarizing members of the opposite camp. While those 
posters represent the most tangible examples of individuals invested in the discursive victory of 
their camp, what I intend to show is the multiplicity and complexity of worldviews and stances 
among both self-identified Poles and self-identified Silesians. What I ultimately hope to 
demonstrate in this chapter (and this dissertation in general) is that the categories of “Poles” and 
“Silesians” represent assemblies of individuals with heterogeneous worldviews that can 
nonetheless be classified as “Polish” or “Silesian” because they align with presupposed and 
assumed, both implicitly and explicitly expressed assemblages of ideas and ideologies—that is, 
discourses—of “Polishness” and “Silesianness.” 
In other words, I take an interactional linguistic approach to identity in this (and other) 
chapters by contending that individuals are Poles or Silesians because they construct, sustain, 
and/or promote discourses on what it means to be Polish or Silesian, discursively acting along 
previously scripted lines of either “Polishness” or “Silesianness.” (The idea of scripts of 
“Polishness” or “Silesianness” will become apparent once a considerable discord emerges in a 
conversation among members of the same camp, producing confusion and facilitating policing 
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behaviors to align particular discourses with general, group-specific discourses.) In doing so, I 
treat the categories of “Poles” and “Silesians” as communities of ideas, rather than communities 
of origin or heritage, citizenship, language, culture, or blood, as some ethnocentric theories of 
identity and nation posit. Because my approach here is derived from the theory of discourse and 
social constructivism, I take being Polish or being Silesian as the endpoint of ideological struggle 
(hence, the sum of ideas and ideologies that ultimately make individuals to be perceived as 
members of either of the group), not the starting point. In this way, becoming Polish or becoming 
Silesian in the context of online discussion forums represents an interactive and self-reflective 
process whereby individual stances and attitudes are filtered through the grand discourses of 
“Polishness” or “Silesianness” to produce a readily identifiable set of ideas and stances that 
follow the scripts of “Polishness” or “Silesianness” already in place. 
Analysis and discussion 
 
introductory analysis 
Initial analysis of the corpus indicated that posters use several varieties other than Polish or 
Silesian and that in doing so, they regularly employ several linguistic strategies aiming at the 
discursive construction of their own as well as out-group members’ identity, consequently 
marking them as Others. Following the initial analysis, I marked the corpus for instances of 
identity and othering work expressed linguistically. As a result, I created a sub-corpus containing 
151 examples of linguistic othering. Then, I examined the data with regard to the following 
aspects: (1) varieties used, (2) scripts used, and (3) the manner in which varieties other than 
Polish and Silesian have been incorporated in posts under examination. Subsequent analysis of 
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the sub-corpus showed that German and Russian represent two main varieties employed for 
identity and othering work. 
Overall, posters utilized German-origin words and phrases twice as often than they 
utilized Russian in that capacity. The remaining part of the sub-corpus included examples of 
Ukrainian origin and one example of a dialectal approximation (see Table 1 for details). Given 
that the latter (ze Ljwiowa ‘from Lviv’ with a double, nonstandard palatalization) represents an 
isolated case, I do not include it in the analysis below and focus instead on German-, Russian-, 
and Ukrainian-origin forms. Given these results, I divide instances of othering into four 
categories according to the variety in which they originated and examine selected examples 
within those main categories. 
 
Table 1: Frequency statistics of linguistic instances of othering in the sub-corpus 
origin German Russian Ukrainian Polish dialect TOTAL 
no. of examples 94 46 10 1 151 
% of the total 62.25 30.46 6.62 0.66 1005 
 
Table 2: Distribution of linguistic instances of othering with regard to varieties and strategies used 
origin total PRO ANTI INS APP LEX NEO 
German 94 2 92 12 26 8 48 
Russian 46 44 2 7 37 1 1 
Ukrainian 10 5 5 – 10 – – 
 
Explanation of abbreviations: PRO: pro-Silesian instances, ANTI: anti-Silesian instances, 
INS: insertions, APP: approximations, LEX: lexicalizations, NEO: neologizations 
 
The analysis also indicated that the Latin script (default to German, Polish, and Silesian) was 
used in the majority of instances and that Cyrillic-only examples were found in less than 5 
percent of all examples examined. While some Cyrillic-script examples were transcribed or 
 
5 Percentages of the total are rounded up; therefore, they do not add up to 100%. 
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transliterated into the Latin script and some were not, Latin-script instances preserved their script 
and were not transcribed or transliterated into the Cyrillic script. 
Based on further analysis, for major linguistic strategies of othering were distinguished in 
the data gathered in the sub-corpus: 
(1) insertion, in which the original form (including the original script) of the word/phrase is 
inserted into a comment; this category includes both standard and nonstandard renderings 
of intended forms that do not acquire inflectional characteristics of the target variety, e.g., 
Oberschlesien (Germ. ‘Upper Silesia’), 
(2) approximation, in which the original form undergoes nativization as far as orthography 
and script are concerned; examples in this category are to mirror the original forms 
phonologically but not graphically; often, this strategy is used to produce linguistic 
instances of othering that mock their referents, e.g., Paljak (approximated from the 
akan’e/unstressed vowel-reduction pronunciation in Russ. Поляк ‘Pole’); like insertion, 
this category only includes uninflected forms, 
(3) lexicalization, in which the original form starts functioning in the target variety by 
acquiring its inflectional characteristics; at times, lexicalized forms acquire additional 
morphological markers through suffixation (e.g., szlezjerów GEN.PL of szlezjer ‘Silesian’ 
[m., pejoratively]) or word-formation (e.g., Ślonzojczu VOC.SG of ślonzojcz ‘a German-
oriented Silesian [pejoratively]’, a blending of Pol. ślonzok ‘Silesian [m.]’ and Germ. 
Deutsch ‘German’); unlike insertion and approximation, this category includes only 
inflected forms, 
(4) neologization, in which the original form(s) is/are used to coin a new word, e.g., 




I now turn to the presentation and discussion of specific examples as I select and provide posts 
that illustrate different types of linguistic strategies outlined in the previous section. In doing so, 
I explain the origin and meaning of words or phrases under examination (in bold), focusing on 
how such instances are strategically employed by both pro- and anti-Silesian posters to 
discursively construct their identities or mark and construct members of the opposite camp as 
Others. Each post is provided in its original form, including spelling and punctuation. All 
translations are mine and—given the often nonstandard or colloquial character of comments 
produced in the Western Daily discussion forums—are approximate to best reflect the intended 
meaning of each entry. The forward slash indicates the boundary between post title and the 
content of the post (the Western Daily discussion forum separates posts from their titles by 
dedicating separate fields to them; while some posters make use of the title field, featured above 
the comment field, many of them decide to neglect its importance by either beginning their 
thought in the title field already or by filling that field with content that bears little to no 





(1) poloczki czy my sie wtracamy do tego co porabiacie w takich pieknych miastach jak : 
rzeszow, pila, radom,kielce, skierniewice, sosnowiec, chelm czy suwalki??? NIE!! bo 





‘Hey Polacks, are we interfering with what you do in such beautiful cities as Rzeszów, 
Piła, Radom, Kielce, Skierniewice, Sosnowiec, Chełm or Suwałki??? NO!! Because we 
don’t give a s*** what you all do there. You better, too, stop interfering and getting 
interested in Upper Silesia [German].’ 
 
(2) Górny Śląsk nie Obers...itd. niemiecki patrioto!!! 
‘Upper Silesia [Polish], not Obers… etc., you German patriot!!!’ 
 
The exchange in examples (1–2) was produced under an article (Zasada 2013b) reporting on a 
controversial picture posted on his Facebook profile by Peter Langer, member of the Upper 
Silesian Council (Pol. Rada Górnośląska), an assembly of Silesian organizations that advocate 
for formal recognition of Silesian nationality and the Silesian code as a regional language by the 
Polish state. In the picture, the head of a soldier wearing a helmet is accompanied by an emblem 
featuring a yellow-and-blue eagle, portrayed on a yellow-and-blue flag. The image includes the 
following caption in German: Es lebe freies Oberschlesien! (‘Viva free Upper Silesia’, see 
below). “The soldier in the helmet comes from a Nazi propaganda poster, which encouraged to 
join the ranks of the Waffen-SS.6 The original emblem of the SS was from the helmet,” the 
introduction of the article warns (Zasada 2013b). As of February 2, 2018, the article elicited 686 
comments. 
As evident from the two posts above, they were authored by a pro-Silesian (example 1) 
and an anti-Silesian (example 2) commenter. In the first post, written almost entirely in Polish, 
the author decides to utilize the German-language toponym Oberschlesien (‘Upper Silesia’) 
 
6 The military wing of the SS (from Germ. Schutzstaffel), the Nazi Germany security force. 
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instead of its Polish equivalent Górny Śląsk in the final part of the comment. Because the overall 
tone of the entry is radically anti-Polish, as evidenced by the profanity as well as the (probably) 
intentional lack of capital letters for the cities numbered in the post, the use of a non-Polish name 
for the region adds to the emotionality of the statement and—because the region is mostly 
located in present-day Poland—represents a significant power act in itself. In doing so, the 
author of (1) discursively distances the region from the rest of Poland in what becomes a bid for 
autonomy. Since the comment includes a contrast between HERE (= Upper Silesia) and THERE (= 
Poland), it introduces a division between the region and the rest of Poland. This dichotomy is 
further evidenced by the decision to call the region with its German, and not Polish, name. 
Suggesting that outsiders stop being interested in Upper Silesian matters (just as the locals seem 
not to care about what is happening in other parts of Poland, the argument goes), the first poster 
successfully others non-locals (here: Poles). The emotional import of the first comment causes a 
quick response—written in less than 20 minutes after the first entry—from the second poster 
who comments under the nickname Slazak (‘Silesian’). Accusing the interlocutor of favoring 
and/or aligning with Germany, this poster demands that the region be called with its Polish 
name. To express the disagreement with the convention used in (1), the second commenter 




(3) maniakalny germanofob @. / @. notorycznie zaśmieca forum DZ swoimi 
niemerytorycznymi wpisami. Panie @. pora się leczyć z obsesji, choć prawdopodobnie w 




‘Maniacal Germanophobe @. / @. notoriously litters the Western Daily forum with his 
unmeritorious entries. Mr. @., it’s time to cure the obsession, although in Your case, it 
most likely may not be effective anymore.’ 
 
(4) Słuchaj no, ojro, patologiczny germanofilu, donosicielu oraz zestrachany histeryku 
(dowód: "Ponownie zgłaszam uwagę na wpisy @. do moderatora forum DZ "), czy to co 
napisałem teraz obraża cię? Nie powinno, bo przecież jest "niemerytoryczne". 
 
‘Hey, listen there, ojro, you pathological Germanophile, denunciator, and a scared as 
heck hysteric (proof: “Again, I call the attention of the DZ [Western Daily] forum 
moderator to the posts by @. “), is what I’ve just written offensive to you? It shouldn't 
because, after all, it’s ‘without merit.’’ 
 
In the heat of discussions, posters tend to attack each other verbally, including mocking each 
other’s words and/or nicknames. This is the case in the examples (3–4) where the first 
commenter accuses an interlocutor of being a Germanophobe while the second commenter calls 
the first one a Germanophile. More importantly, however, the nickname of a frequent participant 
in the Western Daily discussion forums (and one of the few who posts under a registered 
nickname), Euro, is intentionally misspelled and nativized into ojro, following its phonological 
rendition in Polish. Because the first poster is called a “pathological Germanophile,” misspelling 
the nickname represents a face-threatening act intended to insult the addressee. Together, 
misspelling the nickname and assuming its German (and not, for instance, English) 
pronunciation of the word ‘Euro’ work alongside to produce a Germany-oriented representation 
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of the author of the example in (3). By introducing a non-Polish element into an otherwise all-
Polish entry, the author of (4) others the user Euro whose strong German connection is thereby 
emphasized. 
 
(5) Znowu grozisz lebrze? Myslisz, że taki cieniutenki niymiecki wyrobnik jest mnie w 
stanie przestraszyć? Służysz Niymcom na dwóch łapkach, przymilasz sie do nich za pora 
euro. Nic w tobie dumy narodowej, nic godności. Jesteś szumowiną narodowosciową, 
która na prostej drodze napada na spokojnych ludzi i straszy, że im kanciokiem do w ryj. 
Du primitiwisze Schlonzake! 
 
‘Are you threatening again, idler? Do you think that such a delicate menial worker is able 
to scare me? You serve Germans on two paws, you endear yourself to them for a couple 
of Euros. There’s no national pride, no dignity in you. You’re a national scum who 
assaults calm people in the daylight, threatening to hit them in the mouth with a squared 
piece of wood. You primitive Silesian [German]!’ 
 
The comment in (5) was produced under an interview (Domagała 2012) with Michał Stawiński, 
the lead singer of the band Oberschlesien (Germ. ‘Upper Silesia’) that uses the Silesian variety in 
its songs. Asked about the band’s name, Stawiński revealed that band members took little time to 
decide the band’s name—which they chose because it means ‘Upper Silesia’ in German—and 
that they liked the name’s graphic representation in Gothic script. While admitting that both he 
and his band colleagues are all native to Silesia, the singer stated that they “do not want to 
manifest Silesianness” [Pol. śląskość], despite the band’s name. 
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This and other similarly apolitical statements from the interview were strategically 
employed in the comment sections as one of the most active representatives of the anti-Silesian 
camp who suggested that the Silesian identity discourse does not represent an actual sentiment 
and/or identity position, as evident from the interview. In doing so, the poster used the above-
mentioned reasons for choosing the band’s name as a proof to this claim, implying that the 
choice of the name Oberschlesien was based on pure aesthetics and not some ideological 
underpinnings. After this entry elicited several offensive replies containing personal insults, the 
author of the initial post ridiculing the band’s name choice posted the comment reproduced in 
(5). 
In it, the poster accuses one of the interlocutors of animal-like servility to Germans and of 
having no national pride or dignity. The commenter concludes this string of insults by calling the 
addressee ‘a primitive Silesian,’ and does so by nativizing an originally German phrase, as 
evident from the use of the Polish-specific digraph sz instead of the German-specific trigraph 
sch. Nevertheless, the nativization is not executed entirely as the author of the post retains the 
German-specific trigraph in the last word of the phrase (Schlonzake instead of Szlonzake). 
Despite this inconsistency, the poster manages to deliver a final blow as the addressee is insulted 
in German, the language of the addressee’s claimed ideological allies. As a result, the author of 
the comment above successfully others the interlocutor as a representative of an out-group, here 
represented by the interlocutor’s implied alignment with Germany. While the majority of the 
entry is written in Polish, the poster writes in Silesian in several instances, including the two 
explicit references to Germany in the text: niymiecki (Pol. niemiecki) and Niymcom (Pol. 
Niemcom). By using these two forms in a variety native to the interlocutor—as presumed from 
the interlocutor’s pro-Silesian stance—the commenter in this example further stresses the 
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addressee’s ideological alliance with all things German and overall intensifies the final message 




(6) W jakim kraju Europy język urzędowy nie jest obowiązkowo nauczany w szkołach? / 
Proste pytanie - ale dla wielu szlezjerków na pewno za trudne. 
 
‘In which European country isn’t the official language taught obligatorily in schools? / A 
simple question – but probably too difficult for many Silesians [pejorative].’ 
 
This example was written in reaction to a comment in which a poster claimed that the Polish 
language should lose its hegemonic status in Silesia. In response, the author of the post in (6) 
asked a rhetorical question to suggest that it is an established and mandatory practice for 
European countries to have their official languages taught in schools. In doing so, the commenter 
uses the form szlezjerków (GEN.PL of szlezjerki ‘German-oriented Silesians’ [diminutive]) to 
address the interlocutor as well as other members of the pro-Silesian camp. This lexical choice 
comes with serious consequences for how the entry as well as its author’s ideological stance are 
to be interpreted, especially that the approximation szlezjer ‘German-oriented Silesian’, 
including its derivatives, represents the most frequently utilized linguistic instance of othering in 
the whole sub-corpus and was overall utilized 55 times (which represents more than one third of 
all examples analyzed for this chapter), in anti-Silesian posts exclusively. As evident from the 
context above and similar examples, this approximation is tinged with pejorative connotations 
that allow members of the anti-Silesian camp to other those who belong to the pro-Silesian 
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community in the discussions analyzed. Here, this negative overtone of the form—and the whole 
comment—is further augmented by the diminutivization (szlezjerki instead of szlezjerzy [neutral] 
or szlezjery [deprecatory]), through which the author of the post discursively diminishes the 
importance and power of the group in question. As a result, those who seek to subvert the present 
linguistic status quo in the region as for what languages are/should be taught in schools are 
mocked and ridiculed. At the same time, this ideological position is criticized as it is linked with 




(7) Folksdojckie bydło / Opanujcie się rasiaki trochę co ksiądz takiego powiedział niby 
??? zryci ziejący żółcią fanatycy, mówicie że to wam ktoś czegoś zabrania jak reagujecie 
na poglądy innych??? 
 
‘You Volksdeutsch rabble / Get it a little together, rasiaki [supporters of the Silesian 
Autonomy Movement, Pol. RAŚ, pejorative], what on Earth did the priest say??? Freaked 
up, gall-spouting fanatics, you say that it is you all who are prohibited from [doing] 
something, how do you react to others’ views???’ 
 
The post in (7) was produced in the comments section under an interview (Pustułka 2011) with 
Wiktor Skworc, Roman Catholic archbishop of Katowice, the capital of the Silesia Province. In 
the interview, Skworc declared the following: “We live in Silesia, but we are Poles,” triggering a 
lively debate on what it means to be Polish or Silesian, and whether Silesians can claim 
allegiance to Poland. As a result, the interview elicited 296 comments in total (as of February 5, 
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2018). In the comment, written in defense of the archbishop and his statement, the poster 
nativizes (Volksdeutsch > folksdojcz) and adjectivizes the German word Volksdeutsch (a Nazi-era 
term used to denote people living outside of Germany but defined as Germans by race regardless 
of citizenship who were enjoying certain privileges compared to the local, non-German 
populace), effectively producing the neologism folksdojcki. Overall, the author of the post uses 
negative reactions to the archbishop’s words on behalf of self-identified Silesians as a rhetorical 
tool in the ongoing larger debate on Silesian identity in the Western Daily discussion forums. 
Consequently, this strategy positions the commenter in the anti-Silesian camp. Using the term 
Volksdeutsch in its nativized, adjectival form, the poster discursively others members of the pro-
Silesian camp who oppose the archbishop’s words, marking those discussants as distant, non-
Polish, and possibly plotting against Poland with its historical enemy, Germany. In this manner, 
the highly offensive phrase folksdojckie bydło sets members of the pro-Silesian camp as traitors 




:) / I co na to szlezjerstwo? 
 
‘:) / And what does the Silesian collective [pejorative] say to that?’ 
 
The post in (8) was produced under a news article (Kownacka 2013) titled “Texas Silesians 
Visited the Opole Region,” featuring a photograph of an information board from Panna Maria, 
TX, with the following text: “The Oldest Polish Settlement in America” (see below). The article 
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presents the story of settlers from the Opole region who in the mid-nineteenth century migrated 
to Texas. The story also features interviews with their descendants, some of whom still cultivate 
Polish traditions and speak the Polish language. Because the board (see Figure 1) includes a clear 
delineation of national allegiance (that is, they came from Silesia, but they saw themselves as 
Poles, in line with the text featured in the information board), this context was used by members 
of the anti-Silesian camp to claim that Silesians are in fact Poles, as evident from the case of 
Panna Maria. (Nevertheless, the newspaper caption beneath the photograph names the town 
“Silesian,” suggesting that it may designate the locale as Silesian in a strictly geographical—
because of where first settlers came from—and not an ethno-national sense.) 
 
Figure 1: “The Oldest Polish Settlement in America” information board in Panna Maria, Texas 
64 
 
(Luxetowiec / CC BY-SA (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0); image source: 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/20/Panna_Maria%2C_Texas_-_tablica_informacyjna.jpg). 
 
Given all that, the author of the comment in (8) opens up the floor for discussion by posting a 
provocative post containing the pejorative neologism szlezjerstwo ‘Silesian collective’. The 
commenter creatively uses the Polish collective suffix -stwo (cf. wujostwo ‘aunt and uncle’ < wuj 
‘uncle’) to collectively address members of the pro-Silesian camp. The word szlezjer, nativized 
from German into Polish (Schlesier ‘resident of Silesia’ > szlezjer), represents one of the most 
frequent terms in anti-Silesian discourse in the discussions examined (a similar cognate szlyzjer 
is also in use throughout the corpus). Due to its German etymology and connotations (as evident, 
for instance, from its non-Polish phonological structure), not only does szlezjer designate 
members of the pro-Silesian camp, it also marks them—in the eyes of anti-Silesian posters—as 
Others whose foreignness is further stressed by the implicit association with Germany. 
Overall statistics concerning the distribution of the four strategies of linguistic othering 
are presented in the table below. 
 
Table 3: Typological overview of German-origin linguistic instances of othering. 
strategy insertions approximations lexicalizations neologizations 





a co sie tak ciepiecie, 
co robicie propaganda, 








‘But why are you all getting so excited, 
why are you spreading propaganda, 





4-four [in Russian].’ 
 
The post in (9) was written in a discussion concerning teaching Silesian in schools, in response 
to a commenter who was worried that ajnc, cwaj, draj (cf. German eins ‘one’, zwei ‘two’, drei 
‘three’) should become the proper forms used to teach children how to count in Silesian. 
Subsequently, the commenter was told to calm down by the author of the example in (9) and 
instructed about the proper way of counting, which turned out to be in Russian. In this manner, 
the initial attempt to regulate Silesian by an outsider belonging to the anti-Silesian camp was 
responded with a similar effort portrayed in the instance reproduced above. By suggesting 
Russian as the addressee’s in-group language (po waszymu byłoby) and providing 
counterexamples from ‘one’ to ‘four’, the author of this post others the addressee as someone 
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who counts in a language other than German or Polish. On the ideological plane, the poster 
implies the addressee’s Eastern (and, therefore, non-native) identity as someone whose character 
has been shaped by Eastern (here metaphorically represented by the Russian language) and not 
Western Europe.7 
As a result, this brief discussion about the proper way to count in Silesian (which, nota 
bene, never comes to fruition as commenters end up insulting each other) becomes reflective of 
greater identity work schemas in the corpus. In this work, the following pattern can be observed: 
while pro-Silesian posters intend to distance themselves from representatives of the Polish 
majority and, thus, introduce a difference to successfully execute the discursive construction of 
identity, members of the anti-Silesian camp work in the opposite direction. This push-and-pull 
strategy is evident in the above-mentioned example as well: once promotion of a German-like—
and thus, less similar to Polish—way of counting is criticized (the ‘pull’ moment produced by an 
anti-Silesian user), a rebuttal containing Russian numerals is provided as a counter-argument (the 






7 A pronounced, ideologically tinted division between Western and Eastern (or: non-Western) Europe 
represents one of the most frequent themes present in othering comments in the Western Daily discussion forum. For 
self-identified Silesians, this divide is of particular importance because it allows them to discursively disassociate 
themselves from the Polish majority as pro-Silesian posters claim (and express) cultural allegiance to Western 
Europe and its heritage through the centuries-long connection to and inclusion into German-speaking lands. This 
Western orientation, according to pro-Silesian posters, is inherently incongruent with Poles’ cultural and ideological 
positions that are reflective of Poland’s (historically: its central, eastern, and north-eastern parts) history of political 
subjugation to Russia, which – for those posters – are the source of a major social and cultural incompatibility. 
Given this mindset, discursive alignments of anti-Silesian (and, assumedly, pro-Polish) posters with Russia and its 
present or past (cultural, political, etc.) heritage like the one presented in (9) represent some of the most effective 
strategies for performing identity work and enforcing the view that self-identified Silesians represent a community 
that cannot simply be subsumed under the larger category of Poles. 
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Czy juz podpisal petycje o obowiazku noszenia krakowskich strojów przez Slazaków ? 
Co Wiktorij Skforcow mysli o autonomii, narodzie, jezyku, przyszlosci, terazniejszosci, 
przeszlosci, rzeczywistosci, problemach, tematach spolecznych i socjalnych, biedzie, 
bezrobociu, goroloizacji, slaskich zolnierzach w Afganistanie i wielu innych 'stricte' 
slaskich tematach ? Czy interesuja go tylko rzeszowskie dozynki ? (...) 
 
‘Has he already signed a petition about the obligation of Silesians to wear [traditional] 
Cracovian attire? What does Wiktorij Skworcow think about autonomy, people, 
language, future, present, past, reality, problems, societal and social problems, poverty, 
unemployment, Polonization, Silesian soldiers in Afghanistan, and many other *strictly* 
Silesian topics? Is he only interested in harvest festivals in Rzeszów? (…)’ 
 
The post in (10) was written in the discussion under the above-mentioned article (Pustułka 2011) 
featuring the Katowice archbishop Wiktor Skworc and his statement: “We live in Silesia, but we 
are Poles.” As evident from the tone of the comment, the poster takes issue with the archbishop’s 
pronouncement, ironically referring to an imaginary petition obliging Silesians to wear 
Cracovian—that is, non-Silesian—attire. (Similarly, another non-Silesian city, Rzeszów, is 
mentioned in the post as well.) The commenter’s ironic stance toward Skworc’s words is, 
however, best represented in the second rhetoric question where the archbishop’s name is 
Russianized by applying suffixes typical for Russian personal names: Wiktorij (cf. Jurij Gagarin) 
Skworcow (cf. Nabokow). In doing so, the poster others Skworc as an outsider (hence the non-
Polish name) and a putative foreigner (even though Skworc was born in Ruda Śląska in Silesia), 
portraying him as someone who does not seem to understand the violent influence of his words 
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on self-identified Silesians. In light of the historical experiences of Soviet control in post-1945 
Poland, Russianization of the archbishop’s name can also be interpreted as a discursive move 
that aligns the archbishops with totalitarian practices of communist Poland. The commenter’s 
choice to render the name phonetically (Skforcow instead of Skworcow) represents a personal 
insult that further magnifies the overall message of the post. 
 
(11) 
Częstochowa krzyczy...Ślask zawsze polski!!!!!!! / Częstochowa duchowa stolica polski 
mówi nie niemieckiemu Ślaskowi!!!! 
 
‘Częstochowa is screaming… Silesia always Polish!!!!!!! / Częstochowa, the spiritual 
capital of Poland, says “no” to German Silesia!!!!’ 
 
(12) 
! / Częstochowa zawsze w gubernii pietrokowskoj priwislinskawa kraja! 
 
‘! / Częstochowa forever in the Piotrków gubernia of the Vistula Land!’ 
 
The exchange in (11–12) was produced under an article about plans to conceive a sociopolitical 
movement to counter the activity and ideas put forward by the Silesian Autonomy Movement. 
Featured in the article was a photograph of protesters holding a banner that read Polski Śląsk 
(Pol. ‘Polish Silesia’). As of February 12, 2018, the article elicited 293 comments. In the heat of 
the discussion, the exchange between an anti-Silesian (example 11) and a pro-Silesian (example 
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12) commenter took place. In it, the first poster suggested that Silesia will always be Polish, 
expressing disagreement about German rule over the region. In response, the second poster 
mocked the idea by presented in (11) by suggesting that Częstochowa will always remain part of 
the Piotrków (Russ. Петроков) gubernia it belonged to in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. (The city of Częstochowa, famous for its Black Madonna icon, is a religious hub for 
Roman Catholics, visited by millions of pilgrims each year. While it administratively belongs to 
the Silesia Province and is therefore featured in the Western Daily, it does not lie within the 
borders of the historical region of Silesia, a fact which is often repeated by pro-Silesian users in 
online discussions. For this reason, Częstochowa represents a city that is ‘foreign’ [that is, ‘not 
ours’] in the eyes of self-identified Silesians, like Cracow or Warsaw.) 
In doing so, the second commenter repeats the word ‘forever’ and completes the entry 
with a Russian phrase denoting the city’s administrative location at the turn of the twentieth 
century, in transliteration from Russian to Polish. However, the second poster’s Russian 
translation of the phrase bears traces of Polish-specific word order (gubernii pietrokowskoj 
instead of pietrokowskoj gubernii), which suggests that the commenter is not fluent in Russian. 
Nevertheless, the second author successfully ridicules the claim put forward in the first comment 
while simultaneously othering Częstochowa as a locale that has nothing to do with (Upper) 
Silesia because of the implied link with its Russian overlords 150 years ago. This is also evident 
in the usage of the name Vistula Land (Russ. Привислинский край), a designation used at the 
time by Russian authorities for the area encompassed by Congress Poland, allowing the 
commenter to speak pejoratively of Poland in an indirect manner, without explicitly mentioning 
the name of the country. 
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As in many similar examples, the two entries reproduced above are reflective of greater 
ideological narratives of representation present and expressed in online discussions between 
members of the pro- and anti-Silesian camps. Here, the initial attempt to align Silesia with 
Poland with simultaneous distancing it from Germany in (11) is countered by the attempt to 
distance Silesia from Poland while simultaneously bringing it closer to Russia and Russian 
history of some of its lands in (12). These discursively achieved power moves deserve more 
attention because they reflect larger discourses of oppression and/or control over another as far 
as spatial or political units are concerned, about the dominators and the dominated. In the context 
of the above-reproduced exchange, there are four power players involved (alphabetically): 
Germany (including Nazi Germany), Poland, Russia (including Soviet Union), and Silesia, with 
the following power indices attached to/associated with them: high (Germany and Russia, both 
with history of subjecting or occupying parts of contemporary Poland), medium (Poland, 
historically independent for several centuries yet subjected to both Germany and Russia 
throughout much of its modern period, but nevertheless controlling Silesia), and low (Silesia, 
with no history of independence as a unified, region-wide polity, subjected to both Germany and 
Poland, among others). 
Plotted on a single-axis graph with power as the only axis, the power moves reflected in 
(11–12) can be represented as follows: in (11), the anti-Silesian commenter attempts to decrease 
the power of Germany over Silesia while increasing the power of Poland over Silesia, and, 
consequently, reducing the power of Silesia due to its attempted subjection to Poland; Russia is 
absent from discourse here. In (12), the commenter attempts to decrease the power of Poland by 
subjecting it to Russia (hence the transcription from Russian to Polish, including the usage of the 
phrase “Vistula Land”) while simultaneously increasing the power of Silesia by freeing it from 
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the subjection to Poland previously expressed; Germany is absent from discourse here. While the 
intent in (11) is to discursively bring Silesia closer to Poland, in (12) it is Poland that is 
discursively brought closer to Russia and, consequently, Silesia is discursively distanced from 
Poland, since the former has no history of subjection to Russia, unlike the latter (although partly 
and not entirely). These discursive projections of power and power struggles, I believe, reveal 
key conceptualizations about the ideological underpinnings of how Poles view Silesia(ns) and 
vice versa. Thus, Silesia (and, by extension, residents of Silesian and self-identified Silesians) is 
viewed as a region that—in the eyes of the first commenter—needs to be liberated from German 
influences. At the same time, the imperative to preserve the current geopolitical status quo is of 
instrumental importance, as evidenced in the explicitly expressed wish for Silesia to never 
become German again. Paradoxically, however, what the first poster sees as a remedy for 
possible rapprochement between Silesia and Germany is making sure that Poland has and retains 
power over the region. While the first commenter does not phrase it as such, this scenario is 
ideologically predicated on maintaining the subject status of Silesia but with Poland—and not 
Germany—becoming the subjecter. 
On the other hand, the discursive power projection in (12) indicates the presence of a 
strong, internal drive from Silesia to reduce the power of Poland over the region, as well as of an 
existent drive for greater autonomy. Further, it needs to be stressed that Poland as its current 
subjecter is rejected on civilizational grounds, as indirectly evident in the exchange reproduced 
above as well as other examples cited in this chapter and the dissertation corpus in general. In the 
eyes of Silesia, Poland represents a liminal space in its own rights, one with a solid presence of 
the East that hampered and delayed a complete spread of the West in the area. Most importantly, 
such view is not solely tied to the example in (12), but represents an active discourse among self-
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identified Silesians who—based on my research of online discussion forums—represent Poland 
in a surprisingly unitary fashion as an entity that is yet to catch up not only with Western Europe 
(here, the ideal state of cultural, economic, social, and political development), but with (Upper) 
Silesia itself (hence the pervasive othering of Poles as newcomers who brought their Eastern, 





Precz z polskimi sierpomłotami imigrującymi na Górny Śląsk z Polszy od 1945 / 
☭☭☭☭☭ 
 
‘Away with Polish hammer-and-sickles migrating from 1945 to Upper Silesia from 
Poland [Russian] / ☭☭☭☭☭’ 
 
The example in (13) was produced under a news article describing a 2015 anti-immigrants march 
held in Katowice (Pudełko 2015). While the article talks about the social response to the 
immigration problem in contemporary Europe, the author of the post employs this topic as a 
springboard to speak about the historical process of internal migrations to Upper Silesia. Due to 
its concentration of heavy industry, the region has in communist Poland become a popular 
destination for thousands of Poles in search of better socio-economic prospects. In the comment, 
the poster expresses a stance toward this process, calling post-1945 newcomers to Silesia 
sierpomłoty, a compound created from the words sierp ‘sickle’ and młot ‘hammer’, both symbols 
of the Soviet Union and Soviet/communist oppression. Due to the implicit connotation with the 
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post-World War Two political situation, the referents’ arrival to the region is presented as aided 
by the communist regime and, thus, treated with suspicion and mistrust. The pejoration of migrants 
to Silesia does not, however, stop here as the commenter uses the Russian word for Poland 
(Польша, transliterated to Polsza), instead of the standard Polish Polska ‘Poland’. This 
lexicalization of the original form works in tandem with the previous designation of newcomers 
to Silesia as “people under the sign of the hammer and the sickle,” represented both verbally and 
graphically by the string of hammer-and-sickle symbols, to other those whose ties to the region 
start no earlier than 1945, the year that most of Silesia became part of Poland. The othering 
mechanism in example (13) is further corroborated by the implicit logic of indigeneity, according 
to which only those whose families lived in Upper Silesia before the Second World War deserve 
to be called locals, unlike those who moved there at a later point. 
While the comment is written in standard Polish, the choice of the Russian word for 
‘Poland’ bears significant ideological consequences for the general overtone of the entry. First of 
all, the Russianism Polsza stands out from the otherwise neutral string for the Western Daily 
discussion forum string of discourse, magnifying the intended effect on readers and members of 
the anti-Silesian camp in particular. Second, to intentionally misspell or misrepresent one’s place 
of origin is to insult that person and represents a face-threatening act. Third, the discursive 
approximation of Poland with Russia allows the author of the post to increase the claimed 
difference between Poles and Silesians, similarly to the push-and-pull manner employed in 
previous examples reproduced in this chapter. Altogether, these factors aid the ongoing process 
of othering of non-Silesians (here understood almost exclusively as Poles), simultaneously 
contributing to the greater process of identity work executed by self-identified Silesians in the 
Western Daily discussion forum. 
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Overall statistics concerning the distribution of the four strategies of linguistic othering in 
Russian-origin examples are presented in the table below. 
 
Table 4: Typological overview of Russian-origin linguistic instances of othering 
strategy insertions approximations lexicalizations neologizations 
frequency 15% 81% 2% 2% 
 
Ukrainian-origin examples 
(1) approximation of Ukrainian: 
 
(14) 
Przyjezdne glywickie lwiwioki / Do przyjezdnego z Glywic...w Bytomiu były wybory i 
owszem RAŚ przegrał sromotnie ale dla tego że w tym mieście jeszcze nic nie zrobił a 
już chcieli do wyborów. W Bytomiu to przynajmniej myslą bo w Glywicach nawet 
referendum nie potrafią poloki zorganizować. Glywickie lwiwioki mieszkajom sam 70 
lot i śni im się lwiw zamiast za robota się brać. 
 
‘Leopolitan arrivers to Gliwice / To the newcomer to Gliwice…There were elections in 
Bytom and, indeed, the Silesian Autonomy Movement lost miserably, but [that was] 
because [the Movement] hasn’t yet done anything in the city, yet they already wanted [to 
go] to the elections. At least they think in Bytom because Poles in Gliwice can’t even 
organize a referendum. The Gliwice Leopolitans have been living there for 70 years, and 




The post in (14) was produced in a discussion about the prospect of granting Silesia with 
autonomy. In the discussion, a poster representing the anti-Silesian camp firmly rejected that 
idea, suggesting that the Silesian Autonomy Movement (Pol. Ruch Autonomii Śląska, RAŚ) 
seems to be entering a phase of political marginalization in the region, as evident from the results 
of local elections in Bytom and a referendum held in Gliwice, two towns west of Katowice. 
These opinions were voiced by a commenter whose nickname disclosed his masculine gender as 
well as his residence in Gliwice. In response, the author of the example in (14) justified the 
reason for the Movement’s lack of success in local elections, indicating that the organization of 
the 2012 Gliwice referendum was far from perfect. (In the lead up to the referendum, in which 
residents were to vote on ousting the city mayor at the time, it was reported that there were 
problems with signatures necessary as many of which were rejected, cf. Toros 2012). 
This charge was coupled with a generalized statement about the mindset of Polish 
residents of Gliwice who—according to the commenter—still long and think about Lviv (Pol. 
Lwów), the city they assumedly came from. In the interbellum, Lviv belonged to Poland and was 
home to a large Polish community whose members were resettled in western Poland following 
the population exchange between Poland and Soviet Ukraine after the Second World War. The 
poster then uses this historical fact to stress the non-indigenous character of many residents of 
Silesia, the addressee included, all of whom represent newcomers (Pol. przyjezdni) to the region 
in the eyes of the commenter. The same is true about the addressee whose status as an outsider is 
included in the opening sentence of the comment (“To the newcomer to Gliwice…”). 
This othering does not, however, stop here as Poles are called ‘Leopolitans’, that is, 
residents of Lviv, and like the city itself is references thrice in the relatively short entry. The 
linguistic-ideological import of the demonym used in (14) deserves further attention. First of all, 
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the approximation of the Ukrainian language, as evident from the form lwiw- (instead of the 
Polish lwow-) that follows the Ukrainian pronunciation of the toponym, needs to be stressed. 
This choice comes with ideological implications for the general overtone and interpretation of 
the comment. Because the addressee is singled out as a presumed newcomer and Leopolitan 
(albeit indirectly and through the association of the addressee, a newcomer, with others who 
came to Gliwice from Lviv), the author of the comment in (14) produces a double othering 
mechanism. As evident from the representation of Poles as indolent (= “they should get to 
work”) and disorganized (= “they can’t even organize a referendum”), the poster ideologically 
equates the East and Easternness (Lviv is geographically located east of Silesia and the Polish-
Ukrainian border) with inferiority. Thus, the author of the post automatically assumes a higher 
social prestige as lwiwioki, Polish newcomers to Gliwice from Lviv, are othered as non-natives 
who do not understand Silesia (“they dream about Lviv”) with negative personality traits. At the 
same time, the masculine suffix -ok, present in Silesian but nonstandard to Polish, marks the 
poster as a Silesian. 
 
(15) 
Jurij Horiłka nosz podprzemyski firerek / Powinien zawalczyć o autonomia dlo 
Stubienki kole Priemyślia, skąd jego ród po kadzieli. (...) 
 
‘Jurij Horiłka [actually: Jerzy Gorzelik], our little führer from the Przemyśl area / 
should start fighting for autonomy for Stubienko near Przemyśl [Russianized] from 




Unlike examples in the two previous sections, instances of linguistic othering in the Ukrainian-
origin category are not skewed to any of the sides of the debate—of the ten comments grouped in 
this class, half of them were pro-, and the other half anti-Silesian in their general overtone. The 
post reproduced above illustrates how anti-Silesian users utilize the strategy of approximation to 
other not immediate interlocutors, but an absent one—namely, Jerzy Gorzelik, art history 
professor and leader of the Silesian Autonomy Movement. Due to the latter occupation, Gorzelik 
represents one of the most vocal advocates for Silesian identity who seek to obtain legal 
recognition for self-identified Silesians in the ethnic and linguistic domain. In (15), his 
pronounced attachment to and identification with Silesia is put into question as the author of the 
comment points to the activist’s partly non-Silesian ancestry. Thus, the poster points out that 
Gorzelik’s maternal lineage hails from the area of Przemyśl near the Polish-Ukrainian border. To 
other—and, simultaneously, ridicule the ideas promoted by the activist—the commenter 
Ukrainianizes Gorzelik’s name into “Horiłka.” (Etymologically, the name “Gorzelik” is linked 
with the Polish word gorzałka ‘vodka, spirit, hooch’, of which the Ukrainian word горілка 
‘same’.) At the same time, the activist’s leadership skills are ridiculed as Gorzelik is referred to 
by the diminutive ‘little führer’. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the numerous ways in which members of the pro- and anti-
Silesian camps other each other in online discourse. In doing so, they combine Polish and/or 
Silesian with varieties external to the Polish-Silesian debate on Silesian identity: German, 
Russian, and Ukrainian. 
 
Table 5: Timeline of linguistic instances of othering in the sub-corpus 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
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German 24 15 34 3 1 16 1 
Russian 2 6 15 0 7 12 4 
Ukrainian 1 4 0 0 1 1 3 
Total 27 25 49 3 9 29 8 
 
The distribution of varieties used for othering throughout the sub-corpus that represents the 
source of data for this chapter is uneven and depends on whether the addressee belongs to the 
pro- or anti-Silesian camp. For instance, while German is employed by members of both camps 
(e.g., Schlesien vs. oft-repeated szlezjery), Russian-origin words and phrases (e.g., Paljaki, 
transcription of Russ. Поляки ‘Poles’) appear prevalently in comments written by pro-Silesian 
posters. The creative usage of Ukrainian for othering in the material analyzed is balanced out 
between members of the two camps: while pro-Silesian commenters other post-1945 newcomers 
to the region (e.g., lwiwioki), anti-Silesian commenters utilize approximations of Ukrainian (e.g., 
Jurij Horiłka) to point out that Jerzy Gorzelik’s (the SAM leader) maternal grandfather hailed 
from Przemyśl near the present-day Polish-Ukrainian border. In so doing, they question 
Gorzelik’s identification as a Silesian, implying that it represents a pose rather than a fact, as 
evidenced by the ancestry of the Silesian Autonomy Movement activist. 
Overall, three major themes emerge as a result of the analysis of linguistic examples of 
othering: these are (1) selective use of history as a point of reference, (2) indigeneity, and (3) the 
push-and-pull mechanism of identity work. As evident from several examples examined above, 
history represents one of the most important critical lenses for successful explanation and 
interpretation of othering processes in the instances reproduced in this chapter. Individual and 
highly selective use of historical facts allows both pro- and anti-Silesian posters to construct, 
maintain, and promote stable representations of each other while simultaneously participating in 
the identity work of one’s in-group. 
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The push-and-pull mechanism of identity work makes up the ideological bedrock of 
sociolinguistic approximation, defined above as a strategy in which a stable association between 
interlocutor(s) and chosen (non)standard varieties is first introduced and then utilized to render 
interlocutor(s) foreign, consequently producing an othering effect. Because the process of 
sociolinguistic approximation is inherently both social and linguistic, it results in the linguistic 
production of representations that rely on and reveal social imaginations about the addressee(s) 
of the approximation in question. This mechanism, I believe, adequately describes the processes 
of pervasive othering in the Western Daily discussion forum as well as explains (1) the use of 
(mostly) Russian to other members of the anti-Silesian camp portrayed as Eastern newcomers 
whose ways of being are not congruent with those claiming indigenous status in Silesia, and (2) 
the use of German to render members of the pro-Silesian camp foreign as those whose rejection 
of Poland as the greater point of reference goes hand in hand with their pro-German alignment. 
While these assumptions are the product of prejudices voiced openly and candidly by 
many, largely anonymous online commenters, the larger picture suggests that such associations 
are by no means merely incidental, spontaneous, or conceived in the heat of the debate. Rather, 
they represent a stable genre with its basic ideological that remains unchangeable (for pro-
Silesian posters: think Germany, for anti-Silesian posters: think the East) while its linguistic, 
more creative, form is being continuously (re)developed and (re)phrased, fueled by the creativity 
and general knowledge of individual commenters. Thus, while pro-Silesian posters may be—
directly or indirectly—referred to per various adjectives (e.g., szlezjerski, from Germ. Schlesier 
‘resident of Silesia’ with the Pol. adjectival suffix -ski; folksdojc(zows)ki, from Germ. 
Volksdeutsch; or ślonzojczowski, from the blending of Sil. ślonzok ‘Silesian [male]’ and Germ. 
Deutsch ‘German’ with the Pol. adjectival suffix -ski), these approximations nevertheless contain 
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and are linked with each other by one common ideological denominator—that of expressing an 
explicit German connection. The same is true of anti-Silesian posters whose linguistic 
representations may include divergent nominal phrases (e.g., Paljaki, from Russ. Поляки 
‘Poles’; or priwislincy, from Russ. Привислинский край ‘Vistula Land’) that nevertheless 
involve and promote a unified, ideologically saturated message of an assumed, innately Eastern 
(European) characteristic of those being referred to. Ideological stability in sociolinguistic 
approximations of pro- and anti-Silesian commenters goes hand in hand with stability over time: 
while the oldest examples cited in this chapter were produced in December 2011, the newest 
one—in April 2017, the timeline of szlezjer-derivated approximations spans from December 
2011 to November 2016. 
While the data included in the previous section represent a snapshot only of the overall 
sub-corpus, such timeline warrants, I think, at least two conclusions. First of all, I believe that 
examples of sociolinguistic approximation can be conceived of as a distinct genre on its own that 
is highly specific for the Western Daily discussion forum. Second, the ideological persistence of 
specific social, cultural, and historical associations in the way pro- and anti-Silesian commenters 
represent each other suggests that those instances of social imaginations function as a reservoir 
of ideologically-imbued discourses about membership in both camps and—by extension—about 
how being Polish or being Silesian is viewed and defined by outsiders. (These themes will 
become more apparent in chapter 2 where I trace and analyze the presence and persistence of a 
discourse that is simultaneously anti-Silesian and anti-German.) My hitherto research on Silesian 
identity indicates that this is precisely the case and that the examples of linguistic othering 
produced in the process of sociolinguistic approximation described in this chapter mirror some of 
the grand themes omnipresent in numerous discussions between interlocutors with both pro- and 
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anti-Silesian stances, whether in the Western Daily discussion forum, other online spaces, or the 
offline environment.  
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Chapter 2: “Camouflaged Germans” and anti-German sentiment 
 “Upper Silesia, not Obers[chlesien]… etc., you German patriot!!!” 
(an anti-Silesian poster) 
 
“FOR ME IT’S OBERSCHLESIEN!!!! THIS IS HOW MY FATER, 
MY OPA, AND THE OPA OF MY OPA TALKED!!!! 
YOU CAN EVEN SAY СЛАСК, I DON’T CARE ABOUT IT!!!!” 
(a pro-Silesian poster) 
 
In chapter 1, I have investigated examples of linguistic othering in the Western Daily forum. This 
chapter continues the study of othering in online spaces and treats political othering related to the 
(re)production of the “camouflaged German option” discourse in contemporary Poland. As the 
subsequent analysis will show, this type of othering is firmly entrenched in the political 
discourse concerning self-identified Silesians and the apparently ever-present German threat in 
the consciousness of the Polish society at large. 
A 2016 anti-Silesian comment, a 2017 interview with a prominent Polish politician, a 
2018 tweet posted by Poland’s Ministry of Marine Economy and Inland Navigation official 
Twitter account. What might they all have in common? The anti-German sentiment expressed in 
implicit or explicit linguistic choices. Consider the tweet in (1) reproduced below (spelling as in 
original, emphasis mine): 
 
(1) Na niemieckim portalu Der Onet dowiemy się, jaka jest opinia niemieckiego posła, który 
twierdzi, że ‘‘Polska nie będzie im mówić, co mają robić”. 
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Ale już Niemcy to mogą Polsce mówić, co ma robić.8 (...) (Press 2018) 
 
‘In the German [web] portal Der Onet we’ll find out about the opinion of a German MP 
who maintains that ‘Poland will not tell them what to do’. 
But then Germans can tell Poland what to do. (…)’ 
 
While this tweet was later quickly removed citing unauthorized access as the source of the 
posting, its rhetorical power remains obvious and lies in the linguistic incorporation of the 
seemingly innocuous German masculine definite article der in the otherwise Polish text. As a 
result, the tweet implies that Onet (https://onet.pl), one of Poland’s largest web portals, 
represents a German (thus foreign), and not a Polish media outlet. The rationale for such 
proposition stems from the fact that the portal is owned by the Swiss-German media 
conglomerate Ringier Axel Springer Polska. Consequently, this fact allows right-wing-leaning 
commentators to offer an assumedly rational explanation whenever Onet publishes news stories 
and/or other materials criticizing the Law and Justice government. This is a foreign/German-
owned outlet, therefore its goal is to undermine Poland’s vital interests, the argument goes. The 
German article der in conjunction with the portal’s name is commonly used as a marker of such 
anti-German sentiment. As of early June 2019, a Google search for the phrase “der Onet” yields 
18,000 hits (the portal has been under Swiss-German ownership since June 2012). 
The 2017 interview with Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the Law and Justice political 
party, contains another instance of anti-German sentiment, exemplified in a categorizing nominal 
 
8 The last sentence, followed by an angry face emoji, said: Bezczelne są te ku*** i zuchwałe (spelling 
original), translated by Cecil Parrott as: ‘The whores here are pretty fresh, I must say’ (Hašek 2005, 524); in Czech 
original: Jsou ale tady ty kurvy drzý (Hašek 1920, 90). 
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phrase. In it, the politician stated that Donald Tusk (the former Prime Minister of Poland) is “a 
German candidate” (Gójska-Hejke, Sakiewicz, and Lisiewicz 2017) for the position of the 
President of the European Council that Tusk has held since 2014. The digital version of this 
interview is titled Tusk jest kandydatem niemieckim ‘Tusk is a German candidate’, with the 
adjective “German” placed in postposition. In contemporary Polish, adjectives in postposition 
are CLASSIFYING—and not merely DESCRIPTIVE—in nature. Thus, the choice of kandydatem 
niemieckim (instead of niemieckim kandydatem) has a symbolic, perlocutionary effect as it 
implies that Tusk—despite being born and raised in Poland—cannot be categorized as a Polish 
politician, but a German one, a connotation that goes back to 2005 Tusk vs. Kaczyński conflict 
(see Kriki 2017). The timing of this usage is not coincidental. The issue containing the interview 
was originally published on March 8, 2017, one day before Tusk’s re-election for the European 
Council Presidency in which all but one European Union countries (the only country voting 
against being Poland) supported Tusk in his bid for another 2.5-year term. 
The third example comes from a 2016 comment produced in the Western Daily forum 
under a news article on the significance of November 11, 1918, the day the Second Polish 
Republic (Pol. II Rzeczpospolita Polska) became independent, in Silesia (Wieczorek 2016). In 
this comment, an anti-Silesian poster praises the article because of its perceived truth value, 
comparing it to “a breath of fresh air” (see 2 below). The poster taps into the anti-German 
sentiment and repeats the rhetorical move used in example (1) by adding the German definite 
article Der to the abbreviated name of the newspaper that published the November 11 story. In 
doing so, the poster suggests that while the editors in this particular case did a good job 
presenting a non-biased view on an episode in Polish history, the newspaper’s ideological 
leaning seems to be pro-German and, thus, anti-Polish at the same time. Given that Prussia and 
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later Germany ruled over Silesia since the mid-eighteenth century and that the region was 
incorporated into Poland only in 1945 (while a smaller part became part of Czechoslovakia), 
such accusations carry a louder resonance as implicit or explicit associations with Germany bring 
forth in Poland the historical experiences of Nazi German occupation, activating deeply-seated 
fears about both past and potentially future German involvement into Polish matters. The poster 
achieves this potent rhetorical effect precisely by incorporating the German article der. 
 
(2) Ślązak to Polak (a ściśle mówiąc Polok). A Niemiec to Schlesier. Tertium non Datur. / 
Nareszcie trochę prawdy o Ślązakach w Der DZ. Ten artykuł jest jak haust świeżego 
powietrza, jak potężny łyk źródlanej wody. Ten artykuł orzeźwia i odświeża. (...) 
 
‘A Silesian is a Pole (or, strictly speaking, a Polak9). And a German is a Schlesier. 
Tertium non datur. / Finally, some truth about Silesians in Der Western Daily. This story 
is like a breath of fresh air, like a huge gulp of mineral water. This story invigorates and 
refreshes (…)’ 
 
The three examples presented so far indicate that Germany, more than 70 years after the end of 
World War II, still represents a significant symbolic reference in Polish collective memory. 
These examples also suggest that in contemporary Polish political discourse, Germany has 
become a powerful Other against which many Poles identify as they attempt to make sense of the 
world around them. What such instances of anti-German rhetoric have in common is that they 
 
9 A Silesian-inflected version of the lexeme ‘Pole’ (Sil. Polok vs. Pol. Polak). Because this post was written 
by an anti-Silesian poster, the Silesian-inflected form of the ethnonym has no pejorative meaning but, rather, is used 
as a symbolic gesture through which the poster wishes to rhetorically include self-identified Silesians into the larger 
community of Poles. 
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are rooted in an anti-German sentiment that has become one of the dominant ways of thinking 
about the role of Germany in post-EU accession Poland. According to that sentiment, Germany 
represents a major geopolitical threat to Poland’s national interests, meddling with its internal 
affairs by proxy of German-owned media outlets. What follows is the practice of renaming such 
media companies and Germanizing their names by, for instance, adding the German-typical 
definite article der before the newspaper’s or magazine’s proper name—hence Der DZ[iennik 
Zachodni/Western Daily] or Der Onet, one of Poland’s largest web portal (https://onet.pl). 
From the perspective of stancetaking (Du Bois 2007), anonymous internet users who 
performs such politically motivated renamings achieve several goals in one as they (1) 
negatively evaluate the worthiness of information produced by the scapegoated media outlets, (2) 
position themselves in the “anti-German camp,” that is, among those Polish residents who see 
Germany as a conceivable danger to Poland’s vital interests as well as position mentioned media 
outlets on the other side of the political fence, and by doing so (3) disalign themselves from 
content produced by those media, suggesting their assumed ideological leaning toward Germany. 
As I show elsewhere in this dissertation (chapter 1 on linguistic strategies of mutual othering, 
chapter 4 on szlezjer mini-narratives), naming and nominalization practices represent one of the 
most popular ways of doing politics in the Western Daily discussion forum by both sides of the 
debate on Silesian identity. In this chapter, I continue this thread by focusing on linguistic 
references to Germany to show that in contemporary Polish political discourse, the word 
“German” has transcended its original meaning as a marker of citizenship, nationality, or 
national origin, and has functionally become a negatively charged label whose rhetorical effects 
range from irony and sarcasm to outright insult. 
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This is also the argument that I make in this chapter as I study the trope of “camouflaged 
German option” by examining selected comments from the Western Daily discussion forum. In 
doing so, I explain the origin of that now-notorious phrase and then situate it in the context of the 
ongoing conflict between pro- and anti-Silesian posters in the forum. Instead of focusing on the 
same phrase, however, I broaden the scope of my investigation by studying examples of 
German-language words and phrases, all produced by members of the anti-Silesian camp. My 
ultimate goal is to demonstrate both the presence and the durability over years of the 
“camouflaged German option” (CGO) discourse in the Western Daily comments section to show 
how this discourse influences the social imagination about self-identified Silesians in 
contemporary Poland. 
Operating within Hansson’s (2015) calculated overcommunication framework, I situate 
my analysis within a larger method of political communication that results in shift blaming and 
discursive constructions of scapegoats. Focusing on excessive repetition, one of the dimensions 
of overcommunication, I approach my examples holistically and point to the diachronic stability 
of their semantic content that produces the mitigating effect of expressing ‘commonsense 
knowledge’ about self-identified Silesians and pro-Silesian posters in the forum. Finally, 
studying selected comments both individually and collectively, I show how formally distinct, yet 
functionally similar, postings strengthen the anti-German sentiment in Poland by building a 
rhetorically powerful discourse that views German involvement in Polish matters as threatening 
the stability of the country, Silesia, and the Polish people in general. In doing so, I demonstrate 
that the anti-German sentiment in the Western Daily comments sections builds on and 
consolidates the “camouflaged German option” discourse (see below), effectively extending it to 
the online world. 
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The “camouflaged German option” (CGO) discourse in contemporary Poland 
The analysis presented in this chapter has its sociopolitical roots in the controversies that arose 
around a catchphrase that appeared in a 2011 political document issued by the Law and Justice 
(Pol. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) political party. In the document, the phrase “camouflaged 
German option” (Pol. zakamuflowana opcja niemiecka) was used to name self-identified 
Silesians (a self-proclaimed minority based in southern Poland): 
 
Istnieje wiele przesłanek, by twierdzić, że kategoria Narodu nie jest podnoszona w 
programach i zasadniczych wystąpieniach przedstawicieli PO, choć mówi się tam o 
Polakach czy pozycji Polski. Z drugiej strony, PO w swoim przekazie mocno podkreśla 
znaczenie regionalizmów, czego szczególnym przykładem jest ostentacyjne 
akcentowanie przez Donalda Tuska swojej kaszubskości. Niedawno umieszczono, wbrew 
wyrokowi Sądu Najwyższego z 2007 roku, narodowość śląską w spisie powszechnym. 
Sąd Najwyższy słusznie bowiem wywiódł, że historycznie rzecz biorąc, niczego takiego 
jak naród śląski nie ma. Można dodać, że śląskość jest po prostu pewnym sposobem 
odcięcia się od polskości i przypuszczalnie przyjęciem po prostu zakamuflowanej 
opcji niemieckiej (PiS 2011, 34–35). 
 
‘There are numerous premises to maintain that the category of People is not raised in the 
programs and principal addresses made by representatives of the Civic Platform,10 
although Poles or the position of Poland are mentioned there. On another hand, the Civic 
Platform strongly emphasizes in its message the meaning of regionalisms, of which 
 
10 Pol. Platforma Obywatelska (PO) is a center-right, liberal-conservative political party. 
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Donald Tusk’s ostentatious stress on his Kashubianness11 is a particular example. 
Recently, Silesian nationality was included in the national census, against the 2007 ruling 
of the Supreme Court, for the Supreme Court rightly deduced that historically speaking 
there is no such thing as the Silesian people. It can be added that Silesianness is simply a 
certain way of detaching oneself from Polishness and, probably, of simply assuming 
a camouflaged German option’ (translation and emphasis mine). 
 
Such a portrayal of Silesian regional activism was facilitated by the fact that, before World War 
I, most of the historical region of Silesia belonged to Germany ever since Prussia wrestled Upper 
Silesia from Austrian hands in the mid-eighteenth century. Due to a historical precedent (the 
Polish part of Silesia enjoyed autonomy in the interbellum), Silesian activists nowadays demand 
that Poland grants autonomy to the historical region of Silesian within the Polish state. These 
demands, however, are commonly confused with separatism, given that Poland has no 
longstanding tradition of federalism or decentralization or even fears of German involvement in 
Polish issues. These fears are further exacerbated by still vivid memories of the Nazi occupation 
of Poland, the trauma that followed, and the complicated history of the region and its residents, 
many of whom were first instrumentalized for the war purposes and drafted into the Wehrmacht 
to be later deemed “ethnically suspect” in post-war, Poland and subjected to what the communist 
authorities dubbed as “national verification” (Nijakowski and Bartoszyńska 2009). Given this 
complex sociopolitical context, slogans demanding autonomy for Silesia in post-1989 Poland 
have been commonly met with surprise mixed with suspicion. According to one major 
 
11 Kashubians are a linguistic minority based in northern Poland. Their language, Kashubian, is officially 




explanation, granting autonomy to Silesia would only become the first step in the process of 
separating the region from Poland and, presumably, reincorporating it into Germany. This is 
precisely why the phrase “camouflaged German option” was directed not at Germans, but 
Silesian activists. 
Once this phrase leaked into mainstream media, it quickly made headlines, becoming a 
major talking point before the 2011 parliamentary elections. As Buchowski and Chlewińska 
(2012, 7) explain, the perlocutionary, long-term effect of such usage was the discursive 
production of an inextricable link between “Silesian organisations promoting the autonomy and 
the strengthening of Silesian cultural identity with some kind of an anti-Polish ideology, without 
even attempting to explain this notion.” Later, at the request of local Law and Justice politicians, 
the phrasing of the document was slightly altered to specify that the phrase referred to only those 
from among self-identified Silesians who reject a simultaneous Polish national identification. 
Nevertheless, the phrase quickly gained notoriety and became a pejorative catch-all used about 
self-identified Silesians and/or Silesian activists, including members of the Silesian Autonomy 
Movement.12 
In the region of Silesia (southern and southwestern Poland), the phrase was met with 
surprise, incredulity, and outrage. This was especially the case for those residents of Poland who 
not only live in Silesia but who also self-identify as Silesians in terms of ethno-national 
identification. The use of such anti-Silesian (and, consequently, anti-German) rhetoric by the 
Law and Justice milieu was not without influence on the results of the 2011 national census. One 
 
12 Silesian Autonomy Movement (Pol. Ruch Autonomii Śląska, RAŚ) is an organization established in the 
early 1990s that advocates granting autonomy to the historical region of Silesian within Poland. In the recent decade, 
the Movement has increased its visibility on the regional political scene, becoming one of the most vocal advocates 




of its most striking results was that the number of self-identified Silesians (the census allowed 
for write-in options in terms of ethno-national identification) has skyrocketed to about 850,000 
people, increasing almost fivefold compared to the previous census in 2001. This sudden 
increase in the membership in the imagined community of Silesians was interpreted by Polish 
sociologists and political scientists as a sign of protest against the discriminatory narrative about 
Silesians expressed in the Law and Justice document mentioned above. In the following years, 
this opposition became manifest in several grassroots up activities taken up by local activists and 
entrepreneurs in Silesia, including, for instance, pro-Silesian gear such as t-shirts with the slogan 
“camouflaged German option” and Silesian symbols printed on them. 
While the presence of the “camouflaged German option” phrase in political discussions 
was relatively short-lived, the phrase nevertheless became a handy moniker. In nonelite political 
conversations (especially in digital media), the idea of “camouflaged Germans” on Polish soil 
has been since applied wholesale to anyone who claimed Silesian identity without unequivocally 
declaring oneself as Polish. On the other side of the political fence, Silesian activists denounced 
such simplistic and pejorative ideas, sometimes managing to break into mainstream news. In a 
famous instance of that sort, Jerzy Gorzelik,13 was caught on record saying: “I’m a Silesian, not a 
Pole. I didn't promise Poland anything, so I didn’t betray it and I don’t feel obliged to be loyal to 
this country” (Klich 2001). As a result, the ongoing debate on Silesian identity has been 
pervaded with more hostility, insinuations, and verbal violence than rational arguments. Thus, it 
has become a widespread occurrence for participants in those debates to refer to the idea of 
“camouflaged German option” in order to reject the idea of Silesian identity (the anti-Silesian 
 
13 Jerzy Gorzelik, a professor of art history at the University of Silesia in Katowice and leader of the 
Silesian Autonomy Movement (Pol. Ruch Autonomii Śląska, RAŚ), an organization advocating granting autonomy to 
the historical region of Silesia within Poland, given the historical precedence based on the autonomous status of 
Silesia Province in interwar Poland. 
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position) or to use it as an argument proving the oppressiveness of the Polish state that denies its 
citizens the right for self-identification (the pro-Silesian position). As a result, such repeated 
performances of anti-Silesian stances contributed to the production of anti-Silesian discourse, 
best exemplified in the phrase “camouflaged German option.” 
The same holds for the examples analyzed in this chapter, which focuses specifically on 
pieces of discourse produced from anti-Silesian positions. As it is the case with potent discourses 
that pervade societal thinking, the negative portrayal of recognition-seeking Silesians in elite 
political discourse stems from the cultural and sociopolitical fabric of the Polish society. While 
discussions on ethnic/national minorities in post-war Communist Poland were taboo (Łodziński 
2012a), the 1989 transformation allowed for more freedom in this regard. Still, the discourse that 
dominates in traditional and conservative milieus is that of maintaining ethnic homogeneity to 
preserve national unity, which, due to the historical experience of what became known in history 
as partitions of Poland, is the top priority. It is against such rigid mental structures that bottom-up 
discourses about minorities, including self-identified Silesians, need to struggle to have the 
possibility to become widespread and, perhaps, prevailing. 
For Krzyżanowski (2017), the post-1989 public arena in Poland is characterized by “a 
lack of pluralism of voices and is often outright dominated by social animosity, hate, and deep-
seated, politicized ideological struggles.” Thus, all those features stand in stark opposition to the 
values of liberalism, democracy, and rational debates. This has also been the case for discussions 
concerning ethnic or national minorities wherein anti-Semitic-like scapegoating, a common 
discursive practice in contemporary Poland leaks into hateful speech on ethnic/national 
minorities (ibid.). This is precisely the case for discussions on Silesian identity, in which naming 
practices become one of the major tools instrumentalized in political discourse. As KhosraviNik 
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(2010, 25) notes, “widespread, common and normalized referential strategy of naming a group 
may have deep and long lasting influence on the psyche of society.” Thus, normalization and 
conventionalization of naming strategies can effectively evolve into self-standing discourses 
about groups or individuals that are both ideological (that is, are produced from positions 
favoring some ideas about the society over another) and positioning (that is, imply the existence 
of an unnamed social order and hierarchies that need to be maintained). This is, for instance, the 
case for the oft-repeated phrase “guest workers” (or Gastarbeiter) in German-speaking countries, 
or the ideological and positioning categorization of self-identified Silesians as “camouflaged 
Germans.” 
The trope of German threat in Polish history and culture 
While the three examples discussed above all represent recent instances of anti-German 
discourse, the trope of the German threat in Polish culture has a much longer history. Its 
historical roots go back at least as far as 1226 when Konrad I (Duke of Masovia) invited the 
Teutonic Knights to what is nowadays northeastern Poland to help defend against Baltic 
Prussians. As the Knights successfully executed this mission, they also became a threat to 
Masovia and the medieval Polish state with the rivalry between the Teutonic Order and Poland 
culminating in the 1410 Battle of Grunwald. The German-Polish rivalry figures prominently in 
the novel The Knights of the Cross (Pol. Krzyżacy), authored by the Positivist writer Henryk 
Sienkiewicz in 1900 and its 1960 film adaptation directed by Aleksander Ford. 
Aside from centuries-long close geopolitical proximity between the two nations, the Nazi 
German occupation of Poland during World War II cemented the status of Germany as Poland’s 
significant “Other.” This status was further confirmed after the war when the Polish Communist 
government itself fomented anti-German sentiment in the country. The postwar enforcement of 
94 
 
ethnic homogenization in Poland was based on the idea of eliminating “internal enemies” (that 
is, individuals whose Polishness was under question) in this process, forced deportations were 
one of the tools used for that purpose (Łodziński 2012b). As a result, national verification among 
borderland communities—Masurians, Pomeranians, Silesians—followed. 
With the war trauma still alive, violence and hatred followed as even speaking German 
was dangerous and became a punishable offense (Service 2013). Hostile feelings toward 
Germans and Germany were also accompanied by concrete actions on part of the government 
(Kamiński 2016), including mass relocations of Germans from Poland’s new western territories 
(known by the official name of “Recovered Territories” or Ziemie Odzyskane), procedures of 
rehabilitation, national verification, and de-Germanization (through, for instance, first and last 
name changes) that took place in Silesia and other newly acquired parts of the country. Despite 
the invasive nature of these procedures, they were often perceived as “well earned” given the 
atrocities perpetrated by Nazis on Poles and other nationalities during the war (Lemańczyk 
2019). Fear for life caused some to go underground and remain hidden to the Communist 
government, effectively becoming “invisible” to officials. As one member of the German 
minority recalls, they learned “a perfect camouflage over these several dozen years. My wife 
does not know with whom she lives, you know” (Łodziński 2012, 73; emphasis mine). The anti-
German sentiment in postwar Poland was further reinforced through popular culture. For 
instance, one of the most popular TV series produced in Communist Poland, Stakes Larger Than 
Life (Pol. Stawka większa niż życie), told the story of a Polish secret agent, captain Hans Kloss 
(actually: Stanisław Kolicki), who infiltrates the Abwehr, the German intelligence. 
Ultimately, it was not until 1980s that Poland-based Germans attempted to increase their 
presence in the public sphere, with their efforts yielding results in the early 1990s with the 
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establishment of the association of Germans in Opole Silesia (Pol. Towarzystwo Społeczno-
Kulturalne Niemców na Śląsku Opolskim, Germ. Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen 
im Oppelner Schlesien) as well as other organizations and initiatives. Since 1991, the German 
Minority Electoral Committee has participated in parliamentary elections and—since the 5% 
election threshold is waived for national minorities—has regularly won seats in the Polish 
parliament (from 7 in 1991 to 1 since 2007). According to the 2005 act on national and ethnic 
minorities and the regional language, the German minority represents one of the 9 legally 
recognized national minorities in Poland (Act 2005). 
According to Lutomski (2006), the historically troubled Polish-German relations have 
also suffered due to the more recent trends in German historiography that seek to complicate and 
reinterpret the role of Germans in World War Two as not only perpetrators but also victims. 
Such attempts, received with incredulity and mistrust in post-1989 Poland, represent a vital 
threat to the Poles’ traditional self-portrayal as historical victims of more powerful neighbors. 
Perhaps even more importantly, such a reinterpretation of German agency during WW2 opens 
the door for a similar reevaluation on the Polish side. In contemporary Poland, such a narrative-
changing portrayal of Poles’ represents a highly controversial topic (as evidenced by, for 
example, the popular reception of the 2012 film Pokłosie [Aftermath] by Władysław Pasikowski) 
and remains taboo in public discourse. As Lutomski writes: 
 
“German attempts to reinterpret the past have provoked renewed tensions. While more 
and more Germans have begun to focus on their own suffering during the years of war 
and its aftermath and to see themselves not only as perpetrators but also as victims, many 
Poles have witnessed this situation with certain unease. The Polish reaction is motivated 
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in part by the fear that German claims of being victims of World War II, or of the 
expulsions, could threaten the "traditional" status of Poles as victims” (2006, 241). 
 
Poland’s turbulent relationship with Germany and its German minority are also reflected in 
language ideologies about the Slavic varieties spoken in the former Polish-German borderland of 
Upper Silesia, and the Upper Silesian Industrial Area (Pol. Górnośląski Okręg Przemysłowy) in 
particular. It was there where the Silesian variety, a West Slavic ethnolect with substantial 
Germanic influence, emerged (Borowski 2020). However, the Germanic stratum in Silesian 
proved to be problematic for those unfamiliar with this variety, contributing to its negative 
evaluation and constructing a negative stereotype of its speakers. As a result, Silesian speakers 
were perceived as representatives of “the German world” by the postwar Polish Communist 
government (Siuciak 2010). After the 1989 transformation, these ideologies about Silesian did 
not disappear. As Tambor explains, the Silesian variety is perceived as “broken” due to the 
presence of Germanisms while the “good” and “beautiful” Silesian is the one that “has not been 
Germanized” (1998, 212). 
Given the incorporation of the historical region of Silesia into German-speaking countries 
(Austria, Prussia, Germany), the presence of the German language in Silesia nowadays possesses 
a distinct historical significance. This, for instance, can be witnessed in the existence of bilingual 
(Polish and German) signs in numerous municipalities in the Opole Province in southwestern 
Poland. Aside from that, the German language has also a symbolic meaning in contemporary 
Poland. In the context of modern-day political discourse in Poland, the adjective “German” 
serves as a marker of otherness, if not outright foreignness. As Mierzyńska (2019) notes, 
97 
 
portrayals of Donald Tusk as a German (representative)14 are not merely referential in terms of 
nationality but also indicative of Germany as Poland’s major enemy. However, the strategic use 
of language to spread anti-Silesian (and, with that, anti-German) sentiment in the Western Daily 
goes beyond simple nominalizations and constitutes an example of how language and its 
typological qualities can be harnessed in political discourse and exploited for political gains. 
Repetition in discourse 
As I analyze how anonymous internet users do politics with language, I operate within the 
framework of calculated overcommunication, defined as “a macro-strategy which incorporates 
strategic provision (i.e., based on a more or less formal goal-oriented plan) of what might be ‘too 
much information’ for certain audiences, and/or strategic uses of excessive repetition and 
irrelevance in language” (Hansson 2015, 173). Looking at the deployment of excessive repetition 
for blame avoidance in administrative language, Hansson identifies the following types of 
calculated uses of overcommunication: 
(1) “Keeping the floor, avoiding dialogue and rebuttal; 
(2) Insinuating scapegoats (via semantic prosody and lexical cohesion); 
(3) Exhausting the opponent; 
(4) Winning the argument based on validity effect and mere exposure effect” (185). 
 
For this chapter, I mostly focus on the modality of excessive repetition to study their import for 
the construction and promotion of anti-German sentiment, rooted in the CGO discourse, in the 
 
14 The underlying idea of Tusk being a German (representative) is also rooted in the 2005 presidential 
elections, in which Tusk faced Lech Kaczyński who was eventually elected president. During the campaign, rumors 
were spread that Tusk’s grandfather, Józef, volunteered to serve in the Wehrmacht, the Nazi German armed forces, 




Western Daily comments sections. One rationale behind this choice is that references to Germans 
and/or Germany are omnipresent in this digital space, be it in the form of explicit arguments 
about Poland’s western neighbor or through overt usage of the German language in the forum 
(see chapter 1 for examples of linguistic strategies of othering with German origin). Another 
reason for taking a closer look at the role of repetition is that the trope of “camouflaged 
Germans,” best exemplified in the CGO discourse, represents another frequent occurrence in my 
data. Thus, it is the modality of repetition that links examples of anti-German sentiment in the 
Western Daily forum with the larger CGO discourse that is visibly present there. Since repetition 
is one of the major means of performing calculated overcommunication, this framework lends 
itself useful for a functionally oriented analysis of political discussions, including those on 
Silesian identity in contemporary Poland. In doing so, I test the usefulness of this framework for 
such purpose by extending its use from the original focus on administrative language to the study 
of bottom-up political activism on the internet. 
Hansson (2015, 179) defines (linguistic) repetition as “the recurrence and 
recontextualisation of words and phrases in one particular conversation or text (synchronic 
repetition or intratextual patterns) or in another, later conversation or text (diachronic repetition 
or intertextual patterns).” In this chapter, I specifically focus on such recurrences and 
recontextualizations of the anti-German sentiment in linguistic naming that are semantically 
consonant with each other and rooted in ideologically similar visions of the social world, 
regardless of the actual form that scrutinized words and phrases take. In this manner, my goal is 
to show that analogous modes of thinking about whole communities need not necessarily take 
the same literal form, but that they nevertheless have a solid foundation in almost identical, 
linguistically constructed group representations. This is especially the case in the Western Daily 
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forum where discussants exhibit a considerable degree of linguistic creativity (see chapters 1 and 
3 for examples as well as the analysis below), which they utilize to battle out online arguments 
under conditions of (perceived) anonymity. 
As a separate modality in language use, repetition has been the topic of numerous studies 
(e.g., Johnstone, 1990, 1994; Tannen 1987, 2007; Darics 2013). Johnstone (1987) distinguishes 
four major lines of inquiry in hitherto research on repetition in discourse: 
(1) Repetition as a discourse-cohesive device; 
(2) Repetition as a rhetorical device; 
(3) Repetition and its semantic effects; 
(4) Repetition in language learning, linguistic socialization, and language teaching. 
 
The analysis in the present chapter is mostly concerned with the theoretical orientation found in 
the second category of studies of repetition. As a rhetorical device, Johnstone argues, repetition 
has the potential to “create rhetorical presence, the linguistic foregrounding of an idea which can 
serve to make it persuasive even without logical support. Presentation, be it through 
metaphorical uses of deictic words like here, now, or this; through the use of historical present 
tenses to describe past events; or through repetition, makes things believable by forcing them 
into the affective field of the hearer and keeping them there” (1987, 208). Needless to say, this 
ability to construct a desired discourse reality is widespread and commonly used in political 
communication. As I show later in the chapter, such strategic usage of repetition in online 
language-in-use is also the case in the Western Daily comments sections where repeated 
linguistic performances of anti-German sentiment contribute to the reproduction of the CGO 
discourse. This is even more so the case given that the local dynamics of interactions there are 
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based on the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between two warring camps consisting of pro- and 
anti-Silesian posters. 
These conditions of a permanent feud between those who see Silesian identification as 
legitimate and those who do not bring forth the issues of identity and power. Works on repetition 
that touch on such issues fall under the larger domain of intertextuality and as such are concerned 
with “social processes and political ideologies, for instance, examining the role of repetition in 
creating identities in interaction, connecting intertextuality with the notion of framing, and 
combining it with theories of power” (Hansson 2015, 180). As Tannen (1987) observes, 
repetitions create discourses, relationships, and whole worlds. In this capacity, repetition 
“evidences a speaker’s attitude, showing how it contributes to the meaning of the discourse” as it 
“not only ties parts of discourse to other parts, but ties participants to the discourse and to each 
other, linking individual speakers in a conversation” (583–584). Johnstone (1994) points out that 
repetition is oriented to the past and that it can reinforce community values. For instance, by 
repeating certain formulas in religious rituals, people are “reframing them, unconsciously 
factoring out what they have in common, and constructing a more abstract representation” (8). 
This community-building feature of repetition is also prevalent in the Western Daily forum as 
examples of anti-German sentiment contribute to the (re)production of negative stereotypes 
about self-identified Silesians as “camouflaged Germans.” In this manner, repetition in political 
communication and political discourse can become instrumentalized to insinuate and/or construct 
scapegoats through blame-shifting. Thus, “[r]epeating a motif can result in establishing links of 
causality which frame someone as accountable for some problematic event or situation by means 
of semantic prosody and lexical cohesion instead of argumentation” (Hansson 2015, 183). The 
same is true about repetition at the level of meaning, or semantic repetition, that functions as 
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“one of the major strategies to draw attention to preferred meaning and to enhance the 
construction of such meanings in mental models (van Dijk 1997, 37; emphasis mine). Since 
semantic repetition is tied to linguistic form, this brings forth the issue of naming through 
language. 
Naming in political discourse 
Naming represents one of the key linguistic practices as it is through naming that people give 
sense to the world around them. The practice of naming is also prevalent in repetition, especially 
the type of repetition concerned with politics, power, and propaganda. In the Western Daily 
comments sections, naming became the local way of making sense of the social world (see 
chapter 1). It has also, however, contributed to widespread feelings of distrust, prejudice, and 
discrimination, the best example of which is the CGO discourse that pervades the discussions 
held there. In this chapter, I connect the idea of “camouflaged Germans” with calculated 
overcommunication through one of its strategies, repetition, by looking at selected examples of 
linguistic naming in online discourse to show how, in anonymous digital spaces, you can do 
politics with language. 
As repetition, naming comes with serious consequences in public and everyday 
communication (e.g., Galasiński and Skowronek 2001; Chang and Holt 2011; Ish-Shalom 2011; 
KhosraviNik 2010; Tracy 2011). Hannoum (2015, 21) calls naming a “potent form of power” 
and gives the example of Muslim residents of France who are prevalently identified based on 
their confession (musulmans de France) while no equivalent for other religious groups in the 
country exists. For Charmaz (2006), names possess an analogous power/knowledge (Foucault 
1980) component. Consequently, names “provide ways of knowing—and being,” “construct and 
reify human bonds and social divisions,” and, finally, “are rooted in actions and give rise to 
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specific practices” (Charmaz 2006, 396). Similarly, Titscher et al. (2000, 193) propose that 
repeated instances of naming de facto constitute naming itself as repetition becomes a tool that 
confirms and condenses distinction while Ish-Shalom (2011, 479) argues that naming is “no 
longer considered a neutral, naive process, but a political act of appropriation, inclusion, and 
exclusion.” As an efficient tool in the struggle over the commonsense (ibid.), political actors 
perform the work of naming through images, symbols, and signs that represent what (Chang and 
Holt 2011, 397) call “metaphorical devices providing conceptual casing summarizing complex 
sociohistorical circumstances.” 
From this perspective, acts of naming represent powerful tools in the hands of political 
actors, both professional and layperson, as well as evidence of their stances toward individuals, 
groups, and ideas reflected in their internal mental processes. Further, studying such acts can also 
help uncover “the ideological underpinnings of discourse and of speakers’ images in discourse” 
(Galasiński and Skowronek 2001, 65). These ideas are also present in some definitions of 
discourse. For instance, Chilton describes discourse as consisting of “coherent chains of 
propositions which establish a ‘discourse’ ‘world’, or ‘discourse ontology’ – in effect, the 
‘reality’ that is entertained by the speaker, or meta-represented by speaker as being someone 
else’s believed reality. There are various meaning ingredients that go into these discourse 
realities, but the essential one is the projection of ‘who does what to whom, when and where’” 
(2004, 54). This is also the case in the Western Daily forum where anti-German sentiment goes 
hand in hand with bottom-up reproduction of the CGO discourse, realized in creative forms of 
linguistic naming. Thus, the CGO discourse effectively constructs a discourse world in Chilton’s 
terminology, one in which German identification and/or orientation, either adopted or alleged, is 
put at odds with some unnamed interests of the Polish state considered to be vital for members of 
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the anti-Silesian camp who (re)produce such discourse about self-identified Silesians. In doing 
so, anti-Silesian posters draw abundantly from the complex sociohistorical background of the 
region of Silesia (see Introduction) as they perform repeated acts of naming to construct what 
Galasiński and Skowronek (2001, 63) call “an ideologically preferred reality.” 
Nowhere is this desire to construct ideologically preferred realities stronger than in 
contemporary Poland whose political scene is characterized by an increasing divide between two 
major political camps, polarization, and often hostility toward those who hold different beliefs 
about politics, society, and culture (Krzyżanowski 2017). Since political discussions there tend to 
yield much hostility, they inevitably turn into unilateral, politicized expressions of preferred 
realities that require defending from the possibility of even considering divergent perspectives on 
the social world. As a result, political discourse on the professional and layperson level becomes 
an exercise in avoiding what psychology calls cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), a condition 
in which people avoid information that has the potential to increase the discord between 
cognition, that is, “any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or 
about one’s behavior” (3). This is best evidenced in the Western Daily comments sections where 
posters come to argue in favor of their pre-established positions in the debate on Silesian 
identity. Galasiński and Skowronek (2001), who analyzed the usage of names in political 
addresses, found that Polish politicians did not use proper names of prominent historical figures 
for merely referential purposes. Instead, their use of proper names was political and came from 
their desire to stage partisan performances to gain political and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1991). 
The same is true about discussions about self-identified Silesians, in which the 
conservative, collectivist vision of the Polish nation (represented by the anti-Silesian camp) 
clashes with the more liberal, individualist idea of Poland as a country where unity in diversity is 
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possible (the pro-Silesian camp). Because the most ground-level discussion on Silesian identity 
gets often derailed and is superseded by larger questions of the meaning of ethnicity, nationality, 
and belonging, such conversations become quickly politicized by explicit mentions or implicit 
allusions to political ideas, ideologies, and their representations in the social world. This is 
precisely where the idea of self-identified Silesians as “camouflaged Germans,” to paraphrase 
the document that became the founding stone of the CGO discourse, comes into play. Since this 
discourse represents a readymade encapsulated in a catchy phrase that is easy to remember (and, 
thus, to deploy in political discussions), the tropes of Germans, “camouflage,” and apparent 
danger soon emerge. These sentiments, felt profoundly in the anti-Silesian camp and made 
visible by its members in the course of ongoing discussions, stem from broader sociological 
imaginations about Silesians, and in particular their ambiguity toward their ethno-national 
identification15 (cf. Bjork 2008) as well as their lukewarm attitude toward policies of the central 
government aimed at their region. In a study of blends in Polish political discourse, Thielemann 
(2016, 77) observes that political debates have the potential to produce keywords, with which 
they remain closely associated after they become “semantically and pragmatically charged.” 
Thus, in political discourse, such keywords “convey explanative patterns in a very condense way 
and suggest evaluative perspective,” signaling “affiliation with a specific group and/or position 
which again turns them into controversial lexical markers” (78). This is precisely the case for the 




15 Cf. the detailed results of the 2011 census, in which self-identified Silesians declared (1) Polish and 
Silesian, (2) German and Silesian, or (3) exclusively Silesian nationality, in the “Silesia, Silesian, Silesians” 
subsection of the Introduction. 
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The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) is one of the methods of critically analyzing 
discourse that is well-positioned for the study of such and similar referential strategies in elite or 
nonelite political talk. As an analytic approach to discourse, DHA concentrates on three 
dimensions: content and topics, discursive strategies, and linguistic means and realizations used 
(Reisigl and Wodak 2016). Here, a key role is played by the discursive process of nomination, 
directed at the “discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes 
and actions” (33). When it comes to the analysis of nomination strategies in line with DHA 
principles, nouns and nominal phrases are central to this enterprise, including such linguistic 
devices as membership categorization devices or anthroponyms. While DHA proposes to orient 
critical analyses of discourse to five major questions, in this chapter I mostly concentrate on how 
persons are named and referred to linguistically. This allows for an in-depth examination of the 
presence of anti-German sentiment in the Western Daily forum on one hand, and to establish a 
connection between such examples and the wider CGO discourse that becomes reproduced in 
this digital space. 
The present analysis is based on selected examples of anti-German sentiment produced in 
the Western Daily comments sections, in the form of derivation (posts 3–6) and compounding 
(posts 7–10), produced between 2011 and 2016. While the idea of self-identified Silesians as 
“camouflaged Germans” came to life in 2011 (see the section on CGO discourse in 
contemporary Poland), my analysis shows that this particular, pejorative way of representing and 
talking about members of the self-proclaimed Silesian identity is not limited to the 2011 
parliamentary campaign only, but extends well into the 2010s. A Google Trends search for the 
phrase zakamuflowana opcja niemiecka (Pol. for ‘camouflaged German option’) displays no hits 
for the phrase before 2011 and a sudden spike in early 2011 (see Figure 2 below). While the 
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interest in the phrase has gradually declined in the following years, the interest over time has not 
entirely disappeared, which seems to confirm my qualitative findings on the persistence of such a 
portrayal of self-identified Silesians in the 2010s. Thus, the ultimate goal of my analysis is to 
demonstrate that such chronotopic (Bakhtin 1981; Blommaert 2015) persistence of the CGO 
discourse in this particular space and time is not coincidental. Instead, the ongoing reproduction 
of this discourse in the Western Daily forum reinforces this prejudiced way of thinking about 
self-identified Silesians as alleged “representatives of the German world” on Polish soil, 
provoking anti-German sentiment in contemporary Polish society. 
 
 
Figure 2: Screenshot of a Google Trends graph for the phrase zakamuflowana opcja niemiecka, 2004–present 
(image source: 
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=%22zakamuflowana%20opcja%20niemiecka%22). Google is 
a trademark of Google LLC. 
 
The presence of anti-German sentiment in the online debate on Silesian identity is visible in 
example (3) whose author employs the phrase “German lords.” 
 
(3) W wyniku burzliwej historii Górnego Śląska powstała podklasa / 
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- grupa folksdojczowskiego lumpenproletariatu słowiańskiego pochodzenia, którego 
aspiracje sprowadzały się do bycia wiernym służącym niemieckich panów. 
 
‘As a result of a turbulent history of Upper Silesia, an underclass emerged / 
— a group of Volksdeutsch16 lumpenproletariat of Slavic origin whose aspirations boiled 
down to being a faithful servant of [its] German lords.’ 
 
Here, the poster provides a subjective and highly prejudiced representation of Silesians, alluding 
to their alleged identity as a representative of the German world (hence the idea of Silesians as 
“faithful servants of [their] German lords.” This example of othering language does not stop here 
as the poster describes Silesians with the now-pejorative term Volksdeutsch (see footnote 16), 
which implies their pro-German orientation. By proposing that their origins are, however, Slavic, 
and not German, the author emphasizes Silesians’ alleged ethno-national lability. This rhetorical 
feat, aimed at promoting distrust toward Silesians, is also closely connected with the comment-
final proposition, which advocates further suspicion about the motives of Silesian identitarian 
activists from the perspective of (defending) Polish national interests adopted by the author. 
Nowhere, however, is this distrust more fully expressed than in the Polish nativized 
adjective folksdojczowski. While the term Volksdeutsch (or folksdojcz in its nativized form) is 
present in Polish language dictionaries, the form folksdojczowski is exceptionally rare,17 although 
morphologically correct for adjectives derived from proper names (cf. orwellowski < Orwell, 
 
16 A Nazi-era term used with reference to ethnic Germans, people of German ancestry living outside 
Germany; in contemporary, metaphorical usage, it denotes pro-German traitors to the host nation. 
17 The Polish National Corpus (Pol. Narodowy Korpus Języka Polskiego, NKJP) yields only 1 result for the 
form “folksdojczowski” (cf. http://nkjp.uni.lodz.pl/?q=y33no5s3). This form, however, can be found in online 
discussions, which points to the ideological importance of the idea of a Volksdeutsch as well as its conceptual 
availability for politically oriented discussions in the context of modern-day Poland. As of early August 2019, a 
Google.pl search for folksdojczowski yields 139 hits. 
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noblowski < Nobel, and similar derivatives). This is precisely the case here as the poster coins the 
form folksdojczowski using the possessive suffix -owski (Kuć 2007; Sieradzki 2016) to construct 
a insult against members of the pro-Silesian camp in the forum. The author’s proposition that 
Silesians were Slavs but changed their orientation to Germany feeds into and connects with the 
major idea behind the CGO discourse, facilitating its further promotion in the public arena. 
Similar anti-Silesian undertones can be found in (4). 
 
(4) RAŚ to organizacja antypolska / 
Poloki, dejcie pozor na kryptoRAŚoli we instytucjach kulturalnych, mediach i kajs 
indziyj. Stop oberszlezjerskiemu szowinizmowi. 
 
‘The SAM [Silesian Autonomy Movement]18 is an anti-Polish organization. / 
Hey Poles, be aware of crypto-SAMists in cultural institutions, media, and elsewhere. 
Stop Oberschlesier19 [Upper Silesian] chauvinism.’ 
 
In this example, the author constructs an anti-Silesian message by condemning the activism of 
the Silesian Autonomy Movement (SAM) and accusing its members of being anti-Polish. In 
doing so, the poster taps into the CGO discourse by warning the forum community to pay 
attention to how SAM activists, called “crypto-SAMists,” infiltrate public institutions in the 
country. This reference to covert (here: “cryptic”) political activity bears similarity to the idea of 
“camouflaged Germans” operating in Silesia for the detriment of Poland’s vital interests, as the 
 
18 See footnote 12. 
19 Germ. Oberschlesien ‘Upper Silesia’. 
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CGO discourse proposes. The nonnative status of these activists is further stressed through the 
newly created form oberszlezjerski ‘Upper Silesian’, from Germ. Oberschlesier ‘idem’. 
Unlike the adjective folksdojczowski, this form has no longer history behind it in the 
Polish language. However, its significance here is of prime importance as the neologism 
provides an ideological frame, along with the initial accusation of being anti-Polish, that allows 
the author of the post to construct SAM activists (and, by extension, self-identified Silesians in 
general with anti-Polish stances) as foreign, working against the interests of the Polish state, and 
representatives of the German world. This feature is most obvious in the poster’s choice of the 
words. Since the post is written in Polish, with an added Silesian element (kajś indziyj 
‘somewhere else’, cf. Pol. gdzieś indziej), the poster could have chosen the form górnośląskiemu 
(< Pol. górnośląski ‘Upper Silesian’). Instead, the poster decided to coin a new word using the 
adjective’s German equivalent, nativizing it later into Polish. Such linguistic move allows the 
author of the post to establish an implicit connection between Silesian activism, self-identified 
Silesians, and the trope of Germany. By inserting the trope of the German threat to Poland’s 
interests, the poster shifts the discussion to the SAM activists’ alleged motivations while 
simultaneously perpetuating the CGO discourse (hence the covert, Oberschlesier activism, in the 
author’s parlance). 
Language-driven ridicule is a frequent trope in online discussions on Silesian identity and 
is also present in example (5). 
 
(5) ksiądz biskup ma u was przechlapane a kim wy jesteście żeby miał się tym 
przeimować ? / Dużo was nie ma ot kolejna sekta pewnie Świadkowie Jehowy w 
województwie mają podobną liczebność jak wyznawcy szlyzjeryzmu. Ja tam twierdzę, 
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że powinniście dokonać prawidłowego przekładu bibli. Naród wybrany to oczywiście 
NARUT SZLYZJERSKI. Pierwszy człowiek to oczywiście Jorguś a nie jakiś Adam, 
Eden ( raj ) znajdował się gdzieś pod Szopienicami. A jeden Abramuś wyprowadził narut 
z gorolskiej niewoli i rozstąpiły się przed nim wody Brynicy i przyprowadził do ziemi 
obiecanej czyli Bundesrepublik. Babilon przecież to jasne oznacza Warszawkę. Mesjasz 
to nasz umiłowany przywódca Dr G. Wkrótce zacznie wyświęcać własnych kapłanów 
żeby głosili prawdziwe słowo Boże a nie te gorolskie przekręty. 
 
‘His Excellency the Bishop20 is toast – and who are you all to make him care about that? / 
There aren’t many of you, just another sect, Jehovah’s Witnesses in this province are 
probably as numerous as adherents of Schlesierism. I, on the other hand, believe that you 
should carry out a proper translation of the Bible. The chosen people were obviously the 
SCHLESIER PEEPULL (sic). The first man [on earth] was obviously Georgie,21 and not 
an Adam, Eden (paradise) was located somewhere near Szopienice.22 And one Abe led 
the peepul (sic) out of non-Silesian captivity and the waters of Brynica23 parted before 
him and he brought them along to the Promised Land, that is, the Federal Republic [of 
Germany]. It’s obviously clear that Babylon denotes Warsaw [pejoratively]. Our beloved 
leader, Dr. G.,24 is the Messiah. Soon he will start ordaining his own priests so that they 
preach the real Gospel and not those non-Silesian scams.’ 
 
20 Wiktor Skworc, Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Katowice. 
21 Georgie, a reference to Jerzy Gorzelik (see footnote 13). 
22 Szopienice is a present-day district of Katowice, the capital of the Silesia Province, and the birthplace of 
Kazimierz Kutz, a film director and self-identified Silesian who has portrayed the region and its residents in his 
films. 
23 Brynica is the river that separates the historical region of Silesia from the Dąbrowa Basin; 
metaphorically, it denotes a boundary between Silesia (‘Us’) and non-Silesia (‘Them’). 




This entry represents one of the many comments left under an interview with Wiktor Skworc 
(the Roman Catholic archbishop of Katowice in Silesia Province), in which Skworc stated the 
following: “We live in Silesia, but we are Poles” (Pustułka 2011). These words were received 
with incredulity, distrust, and even outrage by members of the pro-Silesian camp who, as their 
responses to it suggest, interpreted it as a potential threat to their freedom to express Silesian 
identity. Given this, and the historical experience of reducing ethno-national difference in 
communist Poland after World War II (see Introduction), the reception of this proposition among 
self-identified Silesians in the forum was skeptical at best and hostile at worst. In response—and 
to stir negative emotions including anger and/or fear—members of the anti-Silesian camp used 
this opportunity to side with Skworc while launching a critique of pro-Silesian posters. 
The same is the case in (5). In this comment, the poster ridicules the behavior of pro-
Silesian posters by calling them “adherents of Schlesierism.” Through this ascription of 
ideological zeal, the poster marks the Archbishop’s critiques as radical ideologues willing to 
rewrite history (and the Bible, hence the suggested re-translation) to further their goals. In doing 
so, the commenter employs the neologism szlezjeryzm, derived from the ethnonym Schlesier 
(Germ. ‘Silesian’) and created with the addition of the suffix -yzm (similarly to Engl. -ism) used 
to coin names for ideologies or systems of thoughts. Together with oberszlezjerski in (4), this 
neologism shares a common derivation root—the word szlezjer/szlyzjer, used pejoratively in the 
Western Daily comments sections to refer to members of the pro-Silesian camp, self-identified 
Silesians, or Silesian activists who disagree with the idea that Silesians are merely a regional 
inflection of Poles. (For an analysis of how this neologism is used to exert social control over 
pro-Silesian posters as well as narrate their identity, see chapter 4.) 
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As in (4), the naming strategy concerning pro-Silesian posters here is based on a German-
language form. In academic and nonexpert discussions on self-identified Silesians, the charged 
name ślązakowski ‘Silesianist’ (for instance, ruchy ślązakowskie ‘Silesianist movements’) is 
sometimes used instead of the more neutral form śląski ‘Silesian’. Because the latter has in the 
recent three decades become somewhat fuzzy given the emergence of Silesian activism in post-
1989 Poland, the former would be more appropriate should any anti-Silesian poster decide to 
employ a pejorative name for members of the opposite camp. This is, however, not the case in 
examples (4) and (5) where post authors’ choices gravitate toward their German-language 
equivalents instead. In doing so, posters perform the work of instilling a division by linguistically 
othering pro-Silesian commenters whose identity is discursively constructed as (1) connected 
with the German world, and, thus (2) represented as nonnative, given where the discussion is 
held. The decision to nativize the original German word in each case and to insert it in the 
otherwise Polish-language text results in the introduction of a contrastive device (neologism vs. 
the rest of the text) that upsets the style of the posts. Further, by drawing attention to the 
“imported” word, such rhetorical move produces emphasis, irony, and eventually, mockery as 
addressees (members of the pro-Silesian posters) are ridiculed for their alleged association with 
Germany (hence the use of Germanisms instead of native Polish words). Put together, all these 
factors uphold contribute to the reproduction of the CGO discourse as anti-German sentiment 
becomes instrumentalized as a rhetorical tool against the alleged anti-Polish, ideologically 
saturated stance exhibited by members of the pro-Silesian camp. 
The trope of ideological zeal among pro-Silesian commenters continues in (6). 
 
(6) Ta nachalna schlonzakizacja Śląska staje się już irytująca. / 
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Ja rozumiem, że są tacy ludzie, którzy jak Pan Roczniok wymyślili sobie sztuczny język 
(który nazywają śląskim) i opisują go w książkach (zwanych ślabikorzami). Tylko 
dlaczego tacy ludzie chcą, żeby inni uczynili się tego schlonzackiego esperanto? 
Dlaczego pouczają Ślązaków, że my liczymy "ajnc, cwaj, draj"? Dlaczego "hazok 
przynosi geszynki"? Kto tak godo poza Roczniokiem? Co to za bełkot? Nadchodzi 
nieubłagana fala kontrschlonzakizacji, która zmiecie różnych mutantów i macherów 
narodowościowych. 
 
‘This pushy Schlonsackization25 of Silesia is becoming irritating now. / 
I understand that there are people who, like Mr. Roczniok,26 invented an artificial 
language (which they call Silesian) and [that they] describe it in books (called primers). 
But why do such people want others to learn this Schlonsack Esperanto? Why do they 
lecture Silesians that we count eins, zwei, drei? Why “das bunny brings präsents”? Who, 
aside from Roczniok, talks like that? What kind of gibberish is that? There comes a time 
of inevitable counter-Schlonsackization that will wipe out various mutants and makers 
of nationalities.’ 
 
In this example, the author of the post launches an attack on Silesian activists, criticized for their 
attempts to promote what the poster calls a “Schlonsack Esperanto,” that is, a nonnative, 
German-oriented variety meant to be used as a single medium of communication between 
 
25 Schlonsack is one of the German terms used as an adjective meaning ‘Silesian’ and, as such, represents a 
Slavic form nativized into German (cf. cognate Pol. form Ślązak). Here, Schlonsack and Schlonsackization are used 
with reference to self-identified Silesians with an assumed anti-Polish and pro-German orientation, hence the 
process of Schlonsackization carries a negative, pejorative association, implying a process of de-Polonization of the 
region. 
26 Andrzej Roczniok, Silesian activist and politician, author of a Polish-Silesian dictionary (Roczniok 2007) 
and a set of Silesian orthographic rules (Roczniok 2016) that failed thus far to gain wider acceptance. 
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Silesians. In doing so, the poster alludes to pro-Silesian grassroots initiatives aimed at 
introducing a permanent distinction between Polish and Silesian as related yet distinct Slavic 
languages. As evident in the comment, the author’s position is that Silesian as a separate 
language on its own does not exist (hence the idea of “an artificial language” that “they [= self-
identified Silesians] call Silesian”). From this perspective, Silesian language activism in large 
and the related struggle for the recognition of Silesian as a language become more about 
ideology than facts. This prompts the poster to criticize such ideological activity among self-
identified Silesians by mockingly naming it Schlonsackization, from German Schlonsack (see 
footnote 25) and the suffix -izacja (similarly to Engl. -ization) that implies an ideological 
process. 
As previous examples of naming practices presented in this chapter, this instance is also 
based on an original German word (Schlonsack), later nativized into Polish. Similarly, the author 
of this post did not choose to use a perfectly viable term Ślązak (and the cognate ślązakizacja) 
but decided to represent Silesian activists as Schlonsacks instead. I believe that this opposition is 
not incidental, but reflective of wider cognitive schema represented in this particular naming 
practice. Namely, the implicit message conveyed in this comment is that there are at least two 
“types” of Silesians: those who see being Silesian as an identity position that makes part of the 
larger framework of being Polish (which seems to be the author’s perspective) and those who 
reject such an approach, opting instead for a more exclusivist vision of what it means to be 
Silesian or at least one that is based on instilling a permanent difference between self-identified 
Silesians and Poles, even at the cost of internal frictions. The author’s perspective in this post 
deserves further attention because it differs from previously cited comments in that the position 
of the author here is also partly Silesian (cf. “Why do they lecture Silesians that we count eins, 
115 
 
zwei, drei?”). Quantitatively, such a stance (Silesian, but also Polish) is less commonly 
represented in the Western Daily forum. Presented here in the debate on the Archbishop’s words, 
this Polish Silesian position becomes rhetorically forceful through an overt self-classification as 
someone native to the region who, despite that, stands strongly against the local language 
activism that seeks to gain recognition for the Silesian variety. 
This conviction is best evidenced in the enumeration and simultaneous questioning of 
some of the propositions put forward by non-specialist activists. In a series of rhetorical 
questions, the commenter undermines such efforts by stressing the dissonance between those 
propositions and the linguistic reality, best exemplified in the sentence that includes an ad 
personam attack (“Who, aside from Roczniok, talks like that”?). Added to that is the accusation 
that Roczniok (see footnote 26) and unnamed others (“such people”), in their almost-ideological 
zeal to “prove” the distinction between Polish and Silesian, gravitate toward non-Polish 
vocabulary by borrowing extensively from the German language (cf. the numerals, hazok 
‘bunny’, geszynki ‘presents’). While on the most overt (linguistic) level this argument tackles the 
issue of loanwords, it can also be analyzed on a more covert (political) level as a voice against 
concealed (or camouflaged in the parlance of the CGO discourse) efforts to change the 
sociopolitical reality in Silesia. 
In the choice to criticize precisely such attempts at increasing the (linguistic) distance 
between the center and the periphery, Silesia and the rest of Poland, the author of the post taps 
into the CGO discourse by (1) calling out a potentially suspicious behavior (“Why does this 
‘Silesian’ include so many non-Slavic, German words?”), (2) exposing its shortcomings and 
inadequacies given the subjectively perceived linguistic reality in the region, (3) rejecting such 
language activism altogether (“gibberish,” “only one person talks like that”), and (4) including a 
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call for collective action to counter the apparent, politics-through-language, change being 
effected in Silesia. Using the newly created word Schlonsackization as well as focusing on 
apparent Germanisms in the proposed Silesian standard, the poster thus skillfully exposes local 
language activists as potential German agents on Polish soil who allegedly seek to disturb the 
status quo by doing politics with the means of language. As a remedy, the poster proposes that 
this kind of activity is met with a forceful response (hence the wave metaphor in the Polish 
original) called ‘counter-Schlonsackization’. By repeating the neologism Schlonsackization twice 
within the course of this relatively short comment, the author of the post attempts to cement this 
highly subjective representation of Silesian activists and self-identified Silesians in general as 
potentially dangerous agents of change, acting against the Polish national interests, features that 
position this comment well within the larger CGO discourse. 
These tropes continue in example (7) where they further gain in intensity. 
 
(7) Gris Got Schlonzaken. Wyważony artykuł pani Wieczorek wywołał u was paroksyzm 
wściekłości, hehehe / 
Wasz idol Kupka chciał "państwa górnośląskiego" jak było oczywiste, że Niemcy Śląska 
nie utrzymają. Tak wtedy Niemcy mogliby się zgodzić na takie "państwo" tylko po to, 
żeby Śląsk nie wrócił do Macierzy. To wtedy Niemcy zaczęli piepszyć w bambus o 
jakimś tam "narodzie górnośląskim", który nigdy wcześniej nie istniał. I do dziśiej nie 
istnieje. Bo Ślązak to Polak (a ściślej mówiąc Polok) a Schlesier to Niemiec. A Ślonzojcz 




‘God bless, Schlonsacks. A balanced article by Ms. Wieczorek caused an attack of fury in 
you, ha ha ha. / 
Your idol, Kupka,27 wanted “an Upper Silesian state” once it was clear that Germany will 
not be able to support Silesia. Yes, Germany would then say yes to such a “state” only so 
that Silesia does not make its return to the Motherland [Poland]. It was then when 
Germans started lying about some kind of “an Upper Silesian people,” which never 
existed before. And doesn’t exist until today. Because a Silesian is a Pole (or, strictly 
speaking, a Pole28), and a Schlesier is a German while a Ślonzojcz29 is neither a Pole nor 
a German, it’s simply nothing.’ 
 
As evident from several examples examined above, the issue of Silesian identity that stands in 
contrast to Polish national identification causes much controversy in the Western Daily 
comments sections. My data in this and other chapters clearly show that a nonsingular ethno-
national identification is beyond the social imagination of an average resident of Poland. In terms 
of tolerance practice, as Buchowski and Chlewińska (2012) suggest, political recognition and 
participation of Silesians meet “intolerance at the state level” and only “partial tolerance on the 
local level” (91). Thus, the Silesian struggle for recognition often becomes portrayed as an 
attempt to leave, both in the literal and figurative sense, the larger framework of Polish national 
identification to weaken the Polish state and, presumably, side with Germany instead. 
 
27 Teofil Kupka (1885–1920), Upper Silesian activist with a pro-Silesian stance on the future of the region. 
28 While the poster uses a locally flavored, Silesian version of the word, it does not change its meaning, 
hence the double use of the form “Pole” in the translation. It can be argued that the use of the locally flavored 
ethnonym is not accidental but represents an ideological choice on part of the poster who attempts to present oneself 
as one of the locals, one of the residents of Silesia, whose idiom contains elements typical for the Silesian variety. 
The insertion of the locally flavored ethnonym allows the poster to discursively decrease the distance. By inserting a 
locally flavored equivalent, the poster does the ideological work of appealing to residents of Silesia. 
29 A compound created from Ślonzak/Ślonzok ‘Silesian [male]’ and the nativized form dojcz ‘German’ 
[adj.] (nativized from Germ. Deutsch ‘idem’). 
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Unsurprisingly, this kind of cognition brings forth fear and anxiety caused by the Silesian 
ethnolinguistic activism in the offline and online worlds. Finally, such a strongly singular 
perspective on identity (“be a Silesian, be a Kashubian, as long as you also are a Pole in the 
greater scheme of things”) is also the very reason why official recognition of Silesians as a 
separate ethnic and/or linguistic community in contemporary Poland appears impossible. As a 
result, both pro- and anti-Silesian posters in the forum—as well as pro- and anti-Silesian 
individuals in the offline world—are caught in a Catch-22 situation that, like a perpetuum 
mobile, continues to fuel the Polish-Silesian and lack of mutual understanding. 
This type of black-and-white thinking about issues of ethnicity and nationality is nowhere 
better seen than in example (7). Elsewhere, I have pointed to this and analogous comments to 
argue how such a simplistic cognition has the potential to exert social control over pro-Silesian 
posters in the Western Daily forum and, by extension, self-identified Silesians in general 
(Borowski 2018a). Here, I concentrate instead on how the author of the post partakes and 
reproduces the CGO discourse by tapping into the anti-German sentiment that infiltrates Polish 
public discourse in the late 2010s (cf. Gójska-Hejke, Sakiewicz, and Lisiewicz 2017; Press 2018; 
Sitnicka 2019; Mierzyńska 2019). That the comment is written from an anti-Silesian perspective 
comes as no surprise, given the initial greeting, nativized into Polish from South German Grüß 
Gott ‘God bless’ and appended with the Germanized ethnonym Schlonzaken (cf. 
schlonsackizacja < Germ. Schlonsack in the analysis of example (6)). In doing so, the poster sets 
the scene for a straightforward, black-and-white argument about Silesian identitarian activism 
that ensues. In the comment, the poster rejects the proposition of Silesians as a separate people 
(“a people that has never existed before”), claiming that this idea has no historical precedence 
other than German-backed propaganda. Instead, the commenter puts forward a binary that leaves 
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its addressees (members of the pro-Silesian camp) with two options for ethno-national 
identification: Polish or German. Each of these options is represented through equivalent 
linguistic forms, Polish Ślązak and German Schlesier, respectively. The third, final option is the 
least prestigious one (“a simple nothing”) and it is here where the crux of the matter lies in this 
particular instance. 
By debunking those from among self-identified Silesians who refuse to adopt a 
simultaneous Polish (or German) national identification, the author of the post mocks those from 
among the Silesian community who want to self-identify as Silesians and Germans. As I 
explained in the previous paragraph, this is because such cognition goes against the singular way 
of imagining and thinking about ethno-national identification among Polish residents. The 
poster-specific practice of naming presented in the closing two sentences of this comment 
deserves further attention. From the sociolinguistic perspective, two of the first four ethno-
national labels included in this comment are neutral, greater national containers—on one hand, 
there are Poles, on another—Germans. This is, however, not the case for the final, fifth one, 
which in itself is newly coined by the poster. The neologism ślonzojcz, created by compounding 
the Polish words ślonzak/ślonzok (‘Silesian’, mimicking in its form the Silesian orthographic 
approach to spelling nasal vowels) and dojcz (‘German’ [adj.], nativized from Germ. deutsch 
‘idem’), is one of the prime examples of linguistic creativity in the Western Daily forum. 
Attested in four more instances in my corpus (both as a noun and as a cognate adjective, 
ślonzojczowski), ślonzojcz in this very context can be interpreted as a mocking description of 
someone who wants to claim a nonsingular, double ethno-national identification as a Silesian 
and German, but not a Pole. 
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Since this comment was written from a staunchly anti-Silesian position, it comes as no 
surprise that a singular ethno-national identification is allowed and that a double, non-Polish 
identification is criticized. This pro-Polish perspective is also evidenced in the order in which 
ethno-national labels appear in the closing two sentences (Polish first, German second, non-
Polish Silesian last). As previous examples, this comment proposes that Silesian activism (this 
time in its historical, not contemporary form) appeared to have backing from Germany who was 
trying to seize the opportunity provided by the Silesian Uprisings (1919–1921) to disturb the 
stability of the interwar Polish state by exacerbating internal divisions. Since the topos of 
Germany as a potential threat, ready to meddle into Poland’s internal affairs, is a recurring motif 
in the anti-German sentiment, the example in (7) represents yet another instantiation of the CGO 
discourse, portraying Silesian activism (be it contemporary or historical) as a Trojan horse within 
the Polish state. 
A similar trope can be found in (8) where the concept of Ślonzojczs is further developed 
through a cognate adjective ślonzojczowski, derived with the help of the possessive suffix -owski. 
This time, the idea of German-oriented Silesians is extended to Jerzy Gorzelik, the Silesian 
Autonomy Movement leader (see footnote 13). As previously, this type of ethno-national 
identification (perceived negatively by members of the anti-Silesian camp) is contrasted with 
opposition in the form of “true” Silesians. Unlike the latter (“made-up phantoms”), the former 
group is represented as a legitimate choice for those who adopt Silesian identity. Analogously to 
prior instances in this chapter, such a proposition has its linguistic grounding. Commenting on an 
interview with Tomasz Pietrzykowski, professor at the University of Silesia and former governor 
of the Silesia Province, the author of the post in (8) suggests that he would never employ as 
many Germanisms in his Silesian, which makes Pietrzykowski a “real” Silesian, as opposed to 
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“made-up German-oriented Silesians” like Gorzelik. Given this critique of German influence 
present in the variants of some Silesian speakers, this comment fuels further distrust toward 
Silesian activists (here exemplified by Gorzelik) and, by extension, other self-identified 
Silesians. In this manner, the author of the post reproduces the CGO discourse while at the same 
time tapping into the anti-German sentiment that serves as a foundation for this way of talking 
about Silesians as “camouflaged Germans.” 
 
(8) Aha. I chciołech pedzieć, że Pietrzykowski w przeciwieństwie do Gorzelika, to 
porzadny Ślonzok. / 
Nigdy by się Pietrzykowski nie zhańbił powiedzeniem "momy sto tałzynów 
unterszriftów". Bo on jest Ślazakiem a nie wydumanym ślonzojczowskim upiorem jak 
Jorguś Gorzelik... 
 
‘Aha. And I wanted to say that unlike Gorzelik,30 Pietrzykowski is a fine Silesian. / 
Pietrzykowski would never disgrace himself by saying “we have one ‘tausend 
unterschrifts.’” Because he’s a Silesian, and not a made-up Ślonzojcz phantom like 
Georgie Gorzelik…’ 
 
The motif of the Silesian Autonomy Movement continues into the example in (9). 
  
(9) Kolejny dzień RAŚtapowskiej nagonki na Semik i Pietrzykowskiego / 
 
30 Jerzy Gorzelik, see footnote 13. 
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Trwa kolejny dzień nagonki RAŚtapo na Redaktorke i Profesora. Jeśli ktoś miał 
wątpliwości, czy RAŚtapo w sposób zorganizowany i systematyczny wykorzystuje fora 
internetowe do wpływania na opinie publiczną, to teraz te wątpliwości znikają. 
Wystarczy poczytać kilka poniższych wpisów, które są podobne w treści i wymowie. 
Podobna nienawiść do tych, którzy mają inne poglądy niż raśiole-gorole, co to robią za 
dupnych Ślonzoków. Dostaniecie sto tałzynów kopów wrzić za to wasze raśiolsko-
gorolskie chamstwo. Będziecie cierpieć RAŚtapowcy, buuuuuahahahahaha 
 
‘Another day of the RAŚtapo31 manhunt on [Teresa] Semik32 and [Tomasz] 
Pietrzykowski.33 / 
Another day of the RAŚtapo-sponsored manhunt on the editor and the professor 
continues. If anyone had doubts if RAŚtapo, in an organized and systematic manner, uses 
internet forums to influence public opinion, then those doubts are now disappearing. It’s 
enough to read through some of the entries below, similar in content and meaning. 
[There’s] similar hate to those with views different than RAŚists-foreigners who pretend 
to be lousy Silesians. You will receive one ‘tausend’ kicks in the butt for this RAŚist-
foreigner boorishness of yours. You will suffer, RAŚtapoers, buuuuuahahahahaha.’ 
 
Here, the author of the post continues the discussion on Silesian activism by constructing a 
subjective representation of the Silesian Autonomy Movement and its members, including those 
present in the Western Daily comments sections. According to the poster, activists of the 
 
31 A compound created from RAŚ (Silesian Autonomy Movement, Pol. Ruch Autonomii Śląska) and 
Gestapo (Germ. Geheime Staatspolizei), the secret police of Nazi Germany. 
32 Teresa Semik, Western Daily (Pol. Dziennik Zachodni) journalist. 
33 See the analysis of example (8) above. 
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Movement deliberately use the discussion space provided by the forum to shape and influence 
public opinion with regards to the debate on Silesian identity. The poster suggests that negative 
comments, left under an interview with Tomasz Pietrzykowski, the former governor of the 
Silesia Province, are not incidental but represent yet another instance of the organized pro-
Silesian activity in the forum. The commenter’s negative evaluation of this type of digital 
activism is combined with the post-final threat that includes a warning for Silesian activists. 
In making all these pronouncements, the commenter employs the neologisms RAŚtapo as 
well as its cognate form RAŚtapowcy several times. While creative from the morphological point 
of view, these coinages also represent the ideological foundation for the perspective presented in 
this comment. The former instance of naming, the portmanteau RAŚtapo, originates from the 
combination of the acronym RAŚ (Pol. Ruch Autonomii Śląska, Silesian Autonomy Movement) 
blended with Gestapo, the Nazi secret police force. However, the author of the comment does 
not stop there and produces four more neologisms within the same entry: the adjective 
RAŚtapowski, the group name RAŚtapowcy, another group name raśiole, and the cognate 
adjective raśiolski. As evident from their form, all these coinages stem from the compounding of 
the acronym RAŚ with another, pejoratively or negatively tainted semantic element. In the case 
of the first two of the four, it is the Nazi secret police Gestapo; in the case of the last two forms, 
the poster combined the name of the Movement with the augmentative suffix -ol (+ -ski in the 
adjective) that in contemporary Polish bears disrespectful connotations toward the denotatum 
(Janik 2018) and is presented in such forms as kibol (from Pol. kibic ‘supporter’), Angol (from 
Pol. Anglik ‘Englishman’), and robol (from Pol. robotnik ‘worker’). All these instances of 
linguistic creativity, employed to denigrate the Movement and its (alleged) members, 
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simultaneously represents the most overt example of doing politics with language in this 
comment. 
As in previous instances, Silesian activism receives a starkly negative evaluation from 
anti-Silesian posters in the Western Daily forum. What is, however, unique to the example above 
and similar ones is that such representations of pro-Silesian posters and, by extension, self-
identified Silesians, are firmly grounded in the Poland-versus-Germany dichotomy (see the 
discussion under example (7)) that fuels much of Polish-Silesian conflict discourse in this digital 
space. In such instances, Silesian activism is perceived as deleterious for the Polish national 
interest, represented by independent anti-Silesian commenters who speak from centralist, 
singularist, and often anti-German positions. The author of the post in (9) reproduces this line of 
thinking and exacerbates it by incorporating several examples of linguistic creativity into 
skillfully constructed naming practices presented in this example. Thus, readers learn that 
Silesian activism and the issue of self-identified Silesians should be rejected altogether because 
of its grounding in the negative behavior exhibited online, but also because of their implied—
through the naming practices described in the previous paragraph— link to Germany. This link is 
here exemplified in the discursively constructed association with Nazi Germany and the zeal 
with which the Gestapo fought its ideological opponents. Such trope is also embedded in the two 
neologisms present in this comment—raśiole and raśiolski—both of which, due to their 
phonological similarity with the Polish word rasista (Pol. ‘racist’) and the cognate adjective 
rasistowski (Pol. ‘racist’ [adj.]). 
As evident, all these maneuvers in creative naming practices tap into the anti-German 
sentiment rooted in the CGO discourse, reproducing the latter for political gains. The same is 




(10) To, co sie wylało z szajsoRaśtapowoferajnodojczowych jadaczek / 
Zasluguje oczywiscie na potępienie. Ślonska otwartość i tolerancja to czas przeszły. 
Zostały małe, zasrane, brunatne karzełki jak [several people’s (nick)names excluded] i 
reszta tej czarnosecinnej beluwy. 
 
‘What has spouted from Scheiß34-RAŚtapo-Ferajna35-German yaps / 
obviously deserves condemnation. Silesian openness and tolerance are in the past. What 
is left are small, crapped, brown36 midgets like [several people’s (nick)names excluded] 
and the rest of this black-hundredist37 cesspool.’ 
 
In this extreme example of doing politics through language, the poster draws on previous 
examples of anti-Silesian naming practices and takes them to the next level by coining the four-
stem form szajsoRaśtapowoferajnodojczowy. Morphologically, this fourfold insult can be 
analyzed as follows: szajs ‘crap’ + RAŚtapo [< RAŚ + Gestapo] + ferajna ‘gang, bunch’ + dojcz 
‘German’, put together with the infix -o- and the adjectival possessive ending -owy. Of the anti-
Silesian comments examined in this chapter, this one represents the most advanced example of 
tapping into the anti-German sentiment and linking it with the existing CGO discourse for 
political purposes. In this instance, the author of the comment constructs a pejorative 
 
34 Germ. ‘shit’ or ‘nonsense, bullshit, horseshit’; in colloquial Polish, the nativized form szajs denotes 
‘something worthless and ugly’. 
35 A reference to Ślōnskŏ Ferajna ‘Silesian bunch/gang’ (http://www.ferajna.eu/), an association 
established in Upper Silesia to promote all things Silesian. 
36 In original: brunatny ‘russet’, a reference to “Brownshirts”, as the Nazi Party paramilitary SA (Germ. 
Sturmabteilung) were also called. 
37 The Black Hundred was a nationalist movement in early twentieth-century Russia, known for its 
radicalism and xenophobic beliefs. 
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representation of the Silesian identitarian movement by portraying its activists as a numerically 
small, intolerant group with pro-German and/or Nazi inclinations (hence the brown-shirts motif, 
see footnote 36). This association with Germany is most evident in the linguistic forms included 
in this entry as each of the four stems used to coin the neologism 
szajsoRaśtapowoferajnodojczowy has its origins in the German language. The alleged pro-
German orientation of Silesian activists in the Western Daily forum is further stressed with the 
neologism-final form dojcz-owy (nativized from Germ. Deutsch ‘German’ [adj.]) that serves as 
the classifying descriptor for the community addressed with this insult. As previously, all these 
naming practices draw from the anti-German sentiment apparent in the CGO discourse, 
reproducing and further promoting the idea of self-identified Silesians as “camouflaged 
Germans” who reject a simultaneous Polish national identification and, thus, position themselves 
in direct opposition to ethnic Poles and the implied yet unnamed interests of the Polish state. 
Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, I have examined linguistic creativity-based naming practices in the Western Daily 
comments sections. I have looked at how Silesian online activism is framed as “cryptic,” 
“camouflaged,” therefore potentially dangerous to the Polish state, and how Silesian activists 
among pro-Silesian posters in the forum are discursively rendered as foreigners on the Polish 
soil. I have also analyzed the strategic use of language-driven ridicule, intensified by anonymous 
posters’ linguistic creativity, which leads to the instrumentalization of language for political 
purposes. In this process, German-origin insertions play a key role as they produce emphasis, 
focus, irony, distance, and mockery addressed at members of the pro-Silesian community in the 
forum and beyond. I have also studied related naming practices that ultimately suggest that there 
is more than one way of being Silesian according to the cognitive schemas exhibited in the anti-
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Silesian posters’ comments. In this schema, there is a good and a bad way of being Silesian, and 
while the former is connected with the adoption of the Polish national identification as the 
greater identity umbrella, the latter is closely associated with foreignness and the German world. 
By introducing such an implicit dichotomy, members of the anti-Silesian camp can effortlessly 
shift the topic of the discussion, reducing it to a simple Polish-versus-German binary, and exploit 
it for exerting social control, as I have argued elsewhere (Borowski 2018a). Finally, I have 
investigated the portrayal of the Silesian Autonomy Movement as an anti-Polish, ethnically 
dogmatic organization with its own “cult” of Silesian identity, ideology (hence the linguistic 
references to Gestapo and Nazi Germany), and a separate system of beliefs. I have also pointed 
to how, according to anti-Silesian arguments, Silesian covert ethnic activism goes hand in hand 
with Silesian covert linguistic activism, both of which make part of bottom-up Silesian activism 
as an organized political movement in the Western Daily comments sections. 
In doing so, I have framed my analysis in Hansson’s (2015) framework of calculated 
overcommunication to investigate anonymous comments that take up, rework, and further 
promote the “camouflaged German option” discourse in contemporary Poland. I have shown 
how examples that tap into this particular manner of representing and discussing Silesian identity 
(even though they were produced in the 2011–2016 timeframe) demonstrate a remarkable 
ideological uniformity in their portrayal of self-identified Silesians as ethnocultural Others 
associated with the German world, as the argument goes. Finally, I have also pointed to specific 
strategies of building names and nominal phrases referring to self-identified Silesians to analyze 
how suffixation as a prime means of encoding meaning in a synthetic language like Polish aids 
the process of stigmatizing and stereotyping a regionalist movement and its ideological adherents 
in one of the most ethnically and culturally homogeneous countries in Europe. 
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My analysis in this chapter demonstrates that the “camouflaged German option” 
discourse, constructed by the Law and Justice political party milieu in 2011, has been extended 
to, consolidated, and reproduced in the Western Daily comments sections by anti-Silesian 
posters. In doing so, members of the anti-Silesian camp used semantic repetition as the preferred 
strategy to draw the public attention to their preferred representation of Silesian activism (cf. van 
Dijk 1997) and as a rhetorical tool to intensify their anti-Silesian message in general. (For an 
account of how accumulation leads to narrative accrual, which in turn leads to the construction of 
larger, anti-Silesian narratives, see chapter 4.) Investigating repetition in discourse, Johnstone 
(1994) pointed to how repetition in religious rituals enhances the communal dimension of the 
process. The repeated instances of the CGO discourse in my data, exemplified through the 
several neologisms examined in this chapter, can be viewed in that manner as well. From this 
perspective, the presence of repeated instances of anti-Silesian talk can be approached as a ritual 
that, like the religious ones (Johnstone 1994), allows the anti-Silesian community in the Western 
Daily forum to foster mutual involvement and group cohesion. As a result, each repetitive 
performance of anti-Silesian identity “keeps involvement going and coordinates everybody 
around the ritual” (8), with the final effect of (re)inforcing the values of this community. 
This community-building characteristic of anti-Silesian talk has also broader implications 
for the processes of discourse spread and development of discourse spaces on the internet. As 
Krzyżanowski (2017) proposes, spaces “uninhabited” by public discourse can with time become 
populated with novel ways of discussing and representing groups, individuals, and ideas. This is 
precisely the case in the Western Daily comments sections where two warring groups, pro-
Silesian and anti-Silesian posters, fight for discursive power to promote their preferred vision of 
the social world. In Bourdieu’s (1991) terms, these two communities struggle over “the 
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monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to 
impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and 
unmake groups” (221). Thus, the emergence and spread of anti-German sentiment that founds 
the larger CGO discourse is a case worth investigating as it points to the ongoing fluctuation in 
terms of power and power relations in this particular digital space. From this perspective, the 
CGO discourse promoted in the forum represents an example of “strategic enactment,” that is, “a 
process of the discursively formed imaginaries being purposefully created and strategically 
spread as part of an orchestrated move” (Krzyżanowski 2017, 2). As I have demonstrated in this 
chapter, representing self-identified Silesians as members of the “camouflaged German option” 
has become a powerful way of talking about Silesian ethnolinguistic activism, an ideological 
constant that remains the same diachronically and diatopically. As a result, comments written at 
different times under different news articles retain their anti-Silesian rhetorical edge, grounded in 
the creative naming practices that exploit linguistic derivation for political purposes as pro-
Silesian posters fight back in their attempt to neutralize such negative portrayal of their in-group 
members. 
I allude to this permanent state of discursive struggle early on in chapter 3, which begins 
with two antithetical comments that set the scene for the analysis of hateful speech that ensues: 
 
(11) The Western Daily forum is the last one to tolerate Schlesier38 sabbaths. Hence, 
supporters of RAŚism continue to occupy this forum” (an anti-Silesian commenter) 
 
 
38 The word szlezjer (also: szlyzjer), translated in my data as Schlesier (Germ. ‘Silesian’), is a neologism 
used pejoratively in the Western Daily forum to refer to members of the pro-Silesian camp, self-identified Silesians, 
or Silesian activists who disagree with the idea that Silesians are merely a regional inflection of Poles (see chapter 4 
for an in-depth analysis of this neologism and its functioning in the Western Daily comments sections). 
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(12) “This is our forum. Let’s discuss each other on matters related to our Silesia” (a pro-
Silesian commenter) 
 
Digital territorialism of this kind is not uncommon in the Western Daily forum, especially that 
computer-mediated communication and the rapid development of digital technologies have 
provided internet users with the potential to digitally “inhabit” (and, consequently, “maintain” in 
their discursive power) such spaces. According to Tsuria (2018), the internet as a technological 
discursive domain is best conceptualized as “a variant of other democratic institutions, the agora, 
the voting booth.” As my data suggest, this novel affordance of participatory social media 
(KhosraviNik 2018) has radically altered the face of politically charged debates like the one on 
Silesian identity in contemporary Poland. Previously, such debates would exist on a singular, 
chronotopic plane only. Now, with the explosion of social media and user-generated content in 
Web 2.0, this is no longer the case since each political debate has the potential to be initiated and 
played out in every single type of online space time and time again. For instance, it is no longer 
enough to argue one’s point of view under one New York Times article—instead, it becomes 
necessary to have other like-minded individuals to digitally “populate” and “claim” digital space 
under every single online forum and comments section in order to create the impression of 
having discursively prevailed the opponents, whatever their ideological position(s) may be. I call 
this phenomenon “digital discursive expansion,” the process of ideological subjection of digital 
spaces facilitated by technological and discursive affordances made available in situ and 
exploited by users to further their ideological goals. 
The chapter has also shown the usefulness of the calculated overcommunication 
framework for critically oriented analyses of nonexpert political activism in online forums. In the 
131 
 
context of the Western Daily forum, overcommunication is based on repetitive, anti-Silesian 
linguistic performances that inform the public opinion about the harmfulness of Silesian activism 
in the online and offline worlds. Similarly, this is also the case for strategic use of irrelevance as 
pro-Silesian posters or Silesian activists have their identities constructed through a plethora of 
nominal phrases and nominalization strategies, all of which bring forth and stress their alleged 
association with Germany. In this manner, online reproduction of the CGO discourse in this 
forum has the effect of shifting the public debate on Silesian identity by minimizing the 
importance of meta-identitiarian discourse while maximizing the significance of a secondary, 
marginal thread that gains exposure and rises to top-level prominence through the creative 
naming practices performed by anti-Silesian commenters. As a result, open discussion on self-
identified Silesians is substituted by a narrow conversation on the potential threats of Silesian 
activism given the assumed German association. Consequently, individual members of the anti-
Silesian camp in the forum collaborate on reproducing this trope in their comments. In doing so, 
they also obtaining a powerful argument against any emancipation of Silesians through the 
instrument of legal recognition of their ethnicity or language, thus securing what they see as a 
dangerous conflict of interests within the Polish state that threatens the country’s stability. 
In this chapter, I have provided plenty of evidence to support the hypothesis that being 
represented as a German is one of the most powerful insults used nowadays in Polish political 
discourse. In doing so, I have shown how the discourse of “camouflaged German option,” 
constructed in the offline world, leaks into the online space as anonymous posters connect this 
idea with elements of anti-German sentiment to reproduce the CGO discourse in the Western 
Daily forum. Ultimately, what my analysis and the media vignettes presented at the beginning of 
this chapter indicate is that the ethnonym “German” has transformed into an insult, a pejorative 
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label appended to political or ideological opponents in contemporary Poland (cf. Mierzyńska 
2019). 
My qualitative findings, encompassing the 2011–2016 period, find confirmation in recent 
quantitative data as well. According to a recent report on Poles’ attitude toward other nations and 
nationalities by CBOS (Pol. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, Center for Public Opinion 
Research), the number of Polish residents who like Germans decreased in two years by 10%, 
from 46% in 2017 to 36% in 2019. Similarly, the number of Poles who dislike Germans 
increased in the same period from 22% in 2017 to 34% in 2019 (Omyła-Rudzka 2019, 3–4; see 
figures 3 and 4). While this evident change in the perception of Germans and Germany in 
contemporary Poland is most probably linked to the anti-German rhetoric preferred by the ruling 
Law and Justice party (cf. Krzyżanowski 2017), my data clearly show that the anti-German turn 
in public discourse is not incidental but that it reflects wider societal fears and anxieties related to 
the turbulent Polish-German past. While these negative emotions have been mobilized by the 
conservative Law and Justice government for political purposes, they have also served as the 
ideological foundation for the construction, reproduction, and promotion of the “camouflaged 
German option” discourse as a key manner of discussing and representing Silesian identity, self-
identified Silesians, and Silesian activism in the online spaces. As the next chapter will show, 
these negative representations of self-identified Silesians often co-occur with overt examples of 





Figure 3: Percentage of Poles who like Germans. Source: Omyła-Rudzka (2019, 3) 
 
 




Chapter 3: Verbal violence 
 
“The Western Daily forum is the last one to tolerate Schlesier sabbaths. 
Hence, supporters of RAŚism continue to occupy this forum” 
(an anti-Silesian poster) 
 
“This is our forum. Let’s discuss each other on matters related to our Silesia” 
(a pro-Silesian poster) 
 
In previous chapters, I have looked at how creative use of language results in mutual othering 
(chapter 1) as well as the extension and consolidation of the “camouflaged German option” 
discourse in the online world (chapter 2). In this chapter, I continue exploring these topics by 
showing how othering is implicated in linguistic expressions of hateful speech and how the 
“camouflaged German option” discourse plays a vital role in the critical discourse analytic 
deconstruction of meaning and social action in such examples. In doing so, I examine how 
expressions of and metaphors for centrifugal movement make part and parcel of instances of 
verbal violence and hateful speech. I argue that deproximizing discourse, prevalent in the 
Western Daily discussion forum, facilitates the production of othering, prejudicial, 
discriminatory representations of members of the pro- and anti-Silesian camps, and, effectively, 
incites aggression between members of these two communities of practice. As I consider their 
import for linguistically expressed instances of verbal violence, I approach them from the 
perspective of proximization theory (PT). 
Verbal violence and hateful speech represent yet another stancetaking strategy attested in 
the collected data. In comparison to othering, associating, or naming, this particular strategy is 
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the most violence-inducing and violence-conductive form of interaction in the Western Daily 
forum. Due to its inherently dissociative, distancing, and divergent character, it is also one more 
manner in which posters can express their disagreement in the course of the discussion. Unlike 
some of the previous strategies discussed in this dissertation that tend to be the domain of either 
pro- or anti-Silesian posters, verbal violence as a stancetaking strategy is equally used by 
members of both camps. Once it becomes apparent that no agreement, however distant, can be 
reached, hateful speech becomes the last resort for posters seeking to perform their identities and 
keep their ideological underpinnings intact. Since numerous examples analyzed in this chapter 
include violent content that many will find offensive or even disturbing, all readers are 
forewarned. At the same time, it has to be stressed that shocking the reader is not the goal here at 
all. Rather, the goal is to critically approach a particular snapshot in the history of digital 
communication and to investigate the phenomenon of verbal violence and hateful speech from an 
analytical perspective, with the hope that such and similar research helps better understand and 
mitigate the roots of this worldwide phenomenon in the future. 
In political communication and beyond, proximization represents “a discursive strategy 
of presenting physically and temporarily distant events and states of affairs (including ‘distant’ 
adversarial ideologies) as increasingly and negatively consequential to the speakers and her 
addressee” (Cap 2017a, 21). In political discourse, this can easily lead to discriminatory and even 
dehumanizing representations of groups or individuals. As language users engage in the work of 
representation, they can choose to describe entities (groups, individuals, institutions, ideologies, 
etc.) as narrowing their distance toward the deictic center (located with the language user), thus 
construing them as tangible, approaching threats that need to be neutralized. Visually, 
proximization in discourse space can be represented by one large circle (denoting the discourse 
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space), which includes one small circle in the middle (HERE) and one small circle on the 
perimeter (THERE). Of the two, the former represents the deictic center (extended in discourse to 
the ideas of SELF and GOOD) while the latter stands for the deictic periphery (conveying in 
discourse the ideas of THERE and BAD) (cf. Cap 2018a). 
Thus, the work of proximization involves a reduction of distance between the inner and 
the outer circles, which in discourse can be executed through, among other, metaphors of spatio-
temporal proximization that involve some centripetal movement. For instance, a common trope 
in such instances is using water metaphors, and particularly that of a flood. Consider the 
following titles (both emphases mine): 
1. “Caravan migrants flood southern Mexico, tugging suitcases and hopes of reaching U.S.-
Mexico border” (Agren 2018) by USA Today; 
2. “As Europe battles over border policy, migrants flood to Spain” (PBS 2018) by PBS. 
 
Both news stories are concerned with the topic of migration. The first one reports on people 
trying to arrive in the United States from Central America, the second one focuses on migratory 
movement from Africa toward Spain. In both cases, the metaphor of the flood is used to describe 
the movement of people toward the U.S. and Spain, respectively. The flood metaphor is 
linguistically ascribed to the migrants in the phrase “migrants flood,” used in both titles. While 
such sensationalist headlines are typical for these forms of communication, they nevertheless 
represent people on the move in a strongly negative manner, comparing them to a type of natural 
disaster (flood), and construing them as a potential threat that, like natural disasters, needs to be 
ameliorated. Such language has become common in the political discourse of the first two 
decades of the twenty-first century and was instrumental for mobilizing supporters against 
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migration in some key political votes in recent years (to mention the Trump vote in the United 
States or the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom). 
While this issue has generated much research in the field of critical discourse studies, it 
goes beyond the thematic scope of this chapter and therefore will not be further developed here. 
It has to be noted, however, that proximization theory remains a useful approach to studying the 
topic of migration in political discourse and communication in general. That is partly due to the 
expressiveness of the language of migration and partly due to the goals behind the devising of 
this theory. As Cap (2017b, xi) writes, proximization theory “has been developed to account for 
the ways in which the discursive construction of closeness and remoteness can be manipulated in 
the public sphere and bund up with fear, security and conflict.” Due to these foundational 
characteristics, proximization theory can be used to uncover how actions are legitimized in 
discourse (Cap 2018b; Molek-Kozakowska 2018). Since proximization as a discursive strategy 
can be used for legitimization purposes, can instances of de-proximization, that is, of discursively 
increasing distance between the speaker and the hearer, have the same result? This is the research 
question that drives the analysis included in this chapter. As I will demonstrate below, an 
inverted model of proximization (what I call de-proximization) represents a useful theoretical 
approach to the study of verbal violence and hateful speech. 
Instances of hateful speech and verbal violence abound on the internet. The widely 
accessible medium of the World Wide Web has made it increasingly easy to access publicly 
available forums and to publish one’s uninhibited thoughts there. The same is true of the Polish-
language internet, where offensive comments aimed at public personae or other internet users 
have become the bread and butter of online comments sections. This is also attested in the 
language. In contemporary Polish, such abusive behaviors are labeled with the neologism hejt (< 
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Engl. hate), defined as “an offensive or aggressive comment placed on the internet” (SJP 2018). 
According to a 2014 study of Poland, every third Pole and 70% of young people were exposed to 
examples of racist speech on the internet (Bilewicz et al. 2014). The same study found that 10% 
of adults and 19% of teens rate the following internet comment permissible: “At most, 
Ukrainians know how to murder defenseless women and children”39 (5). These data suggest that 
aggressive language and hateful speech represent a commonplace issue in the online world and 
that the expected level of aggression is fairly high, which results in a plethora of hateful 
expressions posted on the Polish internet. 
The same is true of the Western Daily forum where hejt proliferates. There, two warring 
camps (pro-Silesian posters and anti-Silesian commenters) meet to argue their viewpoints, 
attempt to convince members of the opposite camp, and, if all else fails, spar verbally once it 
becomes clear to that no agreement can be reached. Aggressive language in the Western Daily 
forum has become so widespread that the amount of abuse produced in this forum could easily 
serve as a basis for a separate book-length study. Since this dissertation project is concerned with 
online debates on Silesian identity from the perspective of sociolinguistics and critical discourse 
studies, an overall qualitative or quantitative analysis of instances of hateful speech in this part of 
the internet lies outside of the scope of the present study. Instead, I focus specifically on 
examples of de-proximization (by which I understand discursively executed instances of 
increasing distance between the speaker and the hearer) to examine the relationship between 
linguistic form and perlocutionary effect. 
 
39 The authors of the study found that acceptance of anti-Ukrainian hate speech was linked among Polish 
adults to exhibiting an anti-Ukrainian stance (Bilewicz et al. 2014), which in the context of contemporary Poland is 
mostly connected with the collective trauma and memory of what is referred to as “the Volhynian slaughter” (Pol. 
rzeź wołyńska). This term refers to massacres of Polish civil populace in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia that took 
place under the Nazi German occupation of Poland during the Second World War and that were carried out by 
members of Ukrainian nationalist movements.  
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The proximization model introduced above views the relation between (linguistic) form 
and (extralinguistic) function as intertwined and dependent on each other. Thus, linguistic 
metaphors of movement toward the deictic center result in discursive reactions that may 
advocate the necessity of taking action in the wake of an approaching entity. This entity, as Cap 
(2018b) explains, need not be spatio-temporal but may be axiological as well, as in the case of 
ideas reaching new areas. In the Western Daily forum, this is the case with linguistic attempts at 
increasing the distance between the speaker and the hearer, on both the individual (poster-to-
poster) and collective (camp-to-camp) level on one hand and the linguistically expressed 
violence that ensues on the other. 
While studies rooted in proximization theory tend to focus on a discursively realized 
distance between two entities (e.g., people in the receiving country and people who wish to 
arrive in the receiving country), the spatio-temporal arrangement of entities in the case of debates 
on Silesian identity in the Western Daily is the opposite — both pro- and anti-Silesian 
commenters already inhabit the same space, both in the offline and the online world. Given this, 
I believe the de-proximization approach is well-suited for the study of hostility between two 
groups located in direct proximity to each other and competing for similar resources (power, 
prestige, social capital), both in the forum and in everyday life. This leitmotiv of competition is 
best expressed through various instances of territorialism present in the discussions I have 
analyzed. 
According to Chilton (2004), any discourse is inherently positioning in that it always 
originates in a specific deictic center and that the representational world is arranged from the 
perspective of that center. This is because every piece of discourse is produced from a pre-given 
perspective, be it of a person or institution. As a result, “in processing any discourse people 
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‘position’ other entities in their ‘world’ by ‘positioning’ these entities in relation to themselves 
along (at least) three axes, space, time and modality” (57–58). What this means for the Western 
Daily forum is that both pro- and anti-Silesian posters engage in the ongoing construction of 
social realities that are construed from a starkly pro- or anti-Silesian perspective. These 
representational construals concern issues of space as well. While commenters have clear ideas 
about Silesia (both the historical region and the province with its capital in Katowice) and the 
way it should be arranged, including its desired demographic makeup, their territorialism goes 
beyond that and extends to the Western Daily forum as well. Consequently, this results in 
attempts to design the Silesian space according to their liking, both in the offline and the online 
world (hence the comments about the forum in the epigraph and example 1, emphasis mine). As 
I show below, both these strategies result in overt verbal violence and hateful speech. 
 
(1) 
Co za bezsens / 
RAŚ to V kolumna Niemiec w Polsce. Im prędzej to rozpędzą tę bandę tym lepiej. Niech 
Polska bierze przykład z Kataloni, gdzie też była grupka szajbusów chcących się 
odłączyć. Pozamykać tych Gorzelików i innych Messerschmitów. Jak się nie podoba, to 
wyp......ć do Niemiec. P.S. Gdzie jest Młodzież Wszechpolska i ONR - robić porządek i 
to już ! 
 
‘What nonsense / 
The Silesian Autonomy Movement is the German fifth column in Poland. The sooner 
they break up this gang, the better. Poland should follow the examples of Catalonia where 
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there also was a small group of wackos who wanted to secede. Lock those Gorzeliks40 
and other Messerschmitts41 up. If you don’t like it, then get the f**k out to Germany. 
P.S. Where’s the All-Polish Youth42 and the National Radical Camp43 – put it in order, 
now!’ 
 
So far, I have consciously avoided using the term hate speech and opted for a somewhat related 
phrase, yet one that is devoid of legal connotations: hateful speech. The issue with the former is 
that it lacks a uniform definition that could be used by researchers across space, time, and 
different disciplines. While both specialists and laypersons intuitively comprehend what “hate 
speech” might entail, its definitions will vary from one individual to another. Consequently, what 
one may consider a clear example of hate speech may not necessarily seem like it for someone 
else. This situation is further complicated by the fact that “hate speech” also exists as a legal 
term, albeit it is not used in all countries and territories. For instance, there is no legal definition 
of what hate speech might entail in Poland, leaving the identification of hate speech open to 
interpretation and penalized under paragraphs that cite individuals’ right for respect regardless of 
their particular identities or identity expressions. The Council of Europe, an organization devoted 
to the protection of human rights in the continent, promotes a broad definition and proposes that 
hate speech “covers all forms of expressions that spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, 
 
40 Jerzy Gorzelik, the Silesian Autonomy Movement leader, member of the Silesia Province regional 
assembly. 
41 Messerschmitt was a German type of fighter aircraft used in the Second World War. Here, the term is 
pejoratively attributed to Silesian activists. 
42 The All-Polish Youth (Pol. Młodzież Wszechpolska) is a Polish youth organization founded in the 1920s, 
banned a decade later, and revived after the collapse of communism, that promotes a Catholic and nationalist 
perspective on how Poland should be organized as a society and nation. 
43 The National Radical Camp (Pol. Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR) is a far-right Polish organization 
founded in 1934, banned a decade later, and revived in the 1990s. Both the All-Polish Youth and the National 
Radical Camp are currently affiliated with the National Movement (Pol. Ruch Narodowy), registered as a political 
party in 2014, deleted from the register of political parties in 2017 and registered anew in 2018. 
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xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance” (Council of Europe 
2019). Since the goal of this chapter is to approach instances of aggressive language from a 
linguistic, and not legalistic, point of view, I will refer to examples of “hateful speech,” for 
which I adopt the Council’s definition and which I understand in purely descriptive, and not 
legally binding, terms. 
Analysis 
While hateful speech comes in many shapes and forms, the mechanism of its production in the 
Western Daily forum is straightforward in that it usually follows the same pattern: 
1. Offer your perspective on the topic of the discussion or a related topic, 
2. Be presented with a counter-claim, 
3. Respond to (2), negate it, and explain why the counter-claim or its author is wrong (here 
the potential for hateful speech starts), 
4. Be presented with a negation of (3), one that is expressed more forcefully and that further 
supports the point made in (2) (further potential for hateful speech), 
5. Respond to (4) in a manner that is consonant with the claim made in (3) and that further 
supports your initial point (further potential for hateful speech). 
 
Needless to say, not all examples of hateful speech require as many as five instances to result in 
aggressive language; sometimes, only two exchanges suffice to manufacture hostility that can be 
qualified as hateful speech. This is especially the case if two commenters know each other by 
their respective nicknames, are familiar with each other’s past contributions in the forum, and 




Below, I present selected examples of hateful speech arranged in single, double, or 
multiple instances (for extended threads involving two or more posters insulting each other one 
time after another). The data in this chapter come from comments written in response to a news 
story about the 2018 Autonomy March organized in downtown Katowice by the Silesian 
Autonomy Movement (Marsz 2018). The story was published with the following title: 
“Autonomy March Passed Through Katowice: Silesian Flag and Early Performance of the 
Silesian Anthem” (Pol. Marsz Autonomii przeszedł przez Katowice: śląska flaga i prawykonanie 
hymnu śląskiego), with an annotation that the story contains additional photo and video 
materials. The story, written in less than 300 words overall, contains an extensive gallery of 
photos (145 items in total) and three videos: two featuring the march as it progressed through the 
streets of Katowice and one featuring an early performance of the Silesian anthem, written in 
four language codes (including Silesian), with music written by a professional composer. 
The choice of this particular article and the reactions left in the comments section is 
based on several reasons that point to the importance of this event in the ongoing debate on 
Silesian identity in modern-day Poland. I have theorized these factors following my observation 
of the Autonomy March in 2016 (see Figures 5 and 6 below) and thanks to my ongoing research 
on online discussions in the Western Daily forum. These factors are as follows: 
1. The Autonomy March represents the most overt manifestation of Silesian identity in 
the public space in Katowice and all of Poland; 
2. The Silesian Autonomy Movement, its organizer, uses the event to construct and 
promote pro-Silesian discourses that challenge the status quo in Poland; 
3. Due to factors (1) and (2), the March represents a high-profile event that elicits 
reactions and comments from members of the anti-Silesian camp; 
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4. The 2018 edition of the March was unique in that it features a pre-performance of the 
Silesian anthem, which represents another addition to the already existing pool of 
markers of Silesianness;44 the fact that the anthem was written in four different 
language codes (unlike national anthems, which are usually written in one language 
and, thus, intended for one specific national audience), which represents a challenge 
to the typical for Poland isomorphism of language, nation, and state (Kamusella 
2009); 
5. The event provides a “safe space” for self-identified Silesians to perform their 
identity in the public space and, in that regard, can be considered an offline equivalent 
of the Western Daily forum; 
6. As the most pronounced manifestation of Silesian identity in contemporary Poland, 
the event tends to attract attention from right-wing and nationalist milieus that 
organize simultaneous (yet numerically small compared to the March) counter-
manifestations; 
7. Finally, the multimodal character of the news story reporting on the March 
encourages reactions and discussions about the event itself as well as its particular 
elements, including the slogan used or the performance of the Silesian anthem. 
 
 
44 As of March 2019, it is difficult to gauge whether, and if so, to what extent, the anthem has been adopted 




Figure 5: Getting ready for the 2016 Autonomy March to start on July 16, 2016 





Figure 6: The 2016 Autonomy March entering the Silesian Parliament Square on July 16, 2016 
(photo by the author) 
 
In total, the story elicited 331 comments from posters, many of whom engaged repeatedly in the 
discussion. This was propelled both by the multimodal character of the story as well as the oldest 
(and pronouncedly anti-Silesian) comment left under the article (see example 1), which itself 
elicited 51 responses (about 15% of all comments). In my initial analysis of all the entries written 
under the 2018 Autonomy March story, I have first identified instances of hateful speech in the 
comments section. Upon noticing a major trend in those instances, I narrowed my pool to 
examples with hateful speech that have to do with linguistic expressions of increasing distance 
between the speaker and the hearer. Next, I conducted a micro-linguistic analysis of these 
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examples, with particular attention to the class of words used, their morphological structure, and 
their import for discursive attempts at increasing the distance between the speaker and the hearer. 
Finally, I classified and categorized my examples according to the level of directness and verbal 
violence conveyed by each post and divided them into instances of (a) INDIRECT, (b) DIRECT-1 
(more direct), and (c) DIRECT-2 (most direct) hateful speech. In deciding whether to include 
examples in the DIRECT-2 or DIRECT-2 group, I focused on the intended level of directness. For 
instance, tokens of hateful speech that included 2.SG imperative forms were classified as DIRECT-
2 while those that contained imperatives directed at groups or nonverbal forms (for instance, 
adverbs or interjections) were included in the DIRECT-1 group. Following this classification, I 
begin my analysis with indirect examples and proceed to more direct instances of verbal 
violence. I mention different classes of tokens of direction-related instances of hate speech for 
each category but only focus on one or two tokens in my analysis as sufficient illustration for 
each of the (sub)category identified. 
Indirect examples of hateful speech 
The indirect category represents the smallest subset of the examples analyzed (only 4 tokens out 
of 31) and it consists of comments containing indirect references to physical movement. The de-
proximizing effect in this category is achieved through an impersonal construction, an adverb, a 
question (niy lepij wyjechać ‘wouldn’t it be better to leave’), and a modal expression (jak 




Co za bezsens / 
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Chuj ci w d***, Polska pizdo 
 
‘What nonsense / 
Dick up your a**, you Polish twat.’ 
 
(3) 
Do Niemieckiej ściery / 
Posłuchaj - ty plugawo szkopsko pindo. Takie jak ty, które dawały niemcom d*** 
w czasie wojny golili na łyso. Więc uważaj, bo jak cie znajdę to osobiście ogolę. 
Nie po to moi dziadkowie walczyli w Powstaniach Śląskich, żeby teraz takie 
bezmózgowce lecące tylko na Ojro plotły o Niemcach na moim Śląsku. Tęknisz 
być niemiecką ścierą - to kto ci broni tam jechać. Schnell, schnell. Tak czekają na 
takich skundlonych niewolników. 
 
‘To the German rag / 
Listen, you filthy Kraut cunt. Others like you – who spread their legs for Germans 
during the war – had their heads shaved bald. So, watch out because I’ll shave 
you personally when I find you. My grandfathers didn’t fight in the Silesian 
Uprisings so that such Euro-wanting numbskulls talked nonsense about Germans 
in my Silesia. Miss being a German rag – then who’s preventing you from going 




The post in (3) was written by the same poster who started the discussion under the news story 
reporting on the 2018 Autonomy March (see example 1). Here, this poster (as evidenced by the 
nickname used) returns to the conversation and constructs a violent response to the entry in (2), a 
rejection of the anti-Silesian claim presented in (1). In doing so, the poster genders the response 
using the fact that the comment in (2) was written under a female name as a nickname (hence the 
number of female-oriented and sexual insults). As it becomes immediately clear that the two 
posters cannot come anywhere near a consensus, the author of the post in (3) represents the 
addressee as servile to German interests (hence the “German rag” phrase, repeated twice in the 
comment), and encourages the commenter to leave the region for Silesia: Schnell, schnell 
‘Quick, quick’. 
The choice of German in this otherwise Polish post is, I believe, not incidental but 
ideologically motivated (“Let me put it in your language”) by the intent to strengthen the 
representation of the pro-Silesian author of the comment in (2) as working for the benefit of 
Germany, possibly due to monetary incentive. In this manner, the poster in (3) discursively 
increases the (physical, but also psychological) distance between the deictic center and the 
addressee who is consequently othered as an out-group member. As a result, while the 
commenter in (3) presents oneself as an advocate of Polish rule over Silesia using familial 
memories, the addressee is represented as someone who facilitates German interests in the region 
and, by doing so, is branded as a traitor to his own country (“German rag”). The indirect, 
adverbial instance of de-proximization in this post conveys the intention on part of the poster in 
(3) to drive the comment’s addressee out of the region. The ground, however, for this instance of 
de-proximization is prepared beforehand in the previous sentence already: “then who’s 
preventing you from going there?” The centrifugal movement from Silesia toward Germany is 
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presented as a possible scenario should the commenter in (2) refuse to change their pro-German 
stance, the argument goes. 
This violent “invitation” to leave is met with a response in (4). 
 
(4) 
wyczuwom gorola !!! / 
chamie , a skond twoje dziadki !!! ( u NOS zawsze boł OPA I OMA) przijechali do 
NOS??? za Buga??? Napisze ci po polsku bo możesz nie zrozumiec !!! jestes zwykłym 
chamem, który czerpie radosc z obrażania ludzi którzy myśla inaczej niż ty, tak jak 
kiedyś władza polsko -sowiecka wywozila ludnośc Śląska na wschód, tak ciebie powinni 
wywiezc po za Ślonsk , najlepiej za koło polarne !!! 
 
‘I’m sensing a non-Silesian!!! / 
You boor, and where did your grandfathers!!! (in OUR speech, it was always OPA [Sil. 
‘grandfather’] and OMA [Sil. ‘grandmother’]) come to US from??? From beyond the 
Bug???45 I’ll write it in Polish because you may not understand!!! You’re a simple boor 
who takes joy in insulting people who think differently than you. Just like the Polish-
Soviet authorities used to drive out the population of Silesia to the east, so you, too, 
should be driven out of Silesia, preferably beyond the polar circle!!!’ 
 
 
45 The Bug River makes part of the modern-day border between Poland and Belarus. Here, the poster 
references the fact that ethnic Poles who used to live east of the Bug in the interbellum were resettled in northern 
and western Poland after the Polish Eastern Borderlands (Pol. Kresy Wschodnie) became part of the Soviet Union 
after the end of the Second World War. 
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In this example, it is the author of (3) who is discursively othered as a non-Silesian, as evidenced 
from the form gorol used and the linguistic remarks that follow (“We say opa and oma,” “Let me 
say it in Polish, so that way you understand”). The presumed lack of indigeneity to the region is 
further scrutinized as the commenter in (4) suggests that the addressee’s ancestors may be 
newcomers to Silesia, despite the language claiming the region as native (“in my Silesia” in (3)). 
Finally, the author of (4) proposes that the addressee be driven out of the region in a manner that 
resembles forced relocations perpetrated by Soviet authorities. In doing so, the commenter uses 
an indirect, impersonal construction powinni wywieźć ‘should be driven out,’ which in Polish is 
subjectless and uses a 3.PL form of the main verb (literally: “[they] should drive you out”). Such 
and similar constructions make part of a larger class of subjectless expressions in the Polish 
language and they can be used to construct the modality of order or request while foregrounding 
the expected action but syntactically omitting the perpetrator(s) of that action. As a result, the 
commenter in (4) constructs the addressee as guilty of intolerance toward self-identified Silesians 
that deserves the punishment of forced relocation. Nevertheless, the same commenter shies away 
from indicating who is to perpetrate this action and employs an impersonal construction to 
magnify the offense that the addressee has committed toward the poster in (2) and, indirectly, 
self-identified Silesians in general, to condemn the offense, and to emphasize its immoral 
character. The use of the impersonal construction helps the commenter in (4) to frame the 
offense in universalistic terms as a behavior worthy of condemnation who deserves punishment 
(hence the suggestion that authorities, a universal source of power that is to be generally 
respected, execute the already provided judgment).46 
 
46 Due to this characteristic, impersonal constructions as a type of discourse can be frequently found in 
narratives of trauma to, for instance, indicate limited agency or to point out the helplessness of victims in the face of 
the events they or their relatives had to go through under oppressive regimes. 
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More direct examples of hateful speech (DIRECT-1) 
The DIRECT-1 category represents the second-largest group of examples in the data analyzed for 
this chapter (13 out of 31 tokens in total or about 42 percent). Unlike the indirect category, 
instances in this category include direct references to physical movement in the form of an 
adverbial phrase (nazot na drzewo ‘back to the tree’) and interjections (wyjazd, wynocha, wypad, 
all of which are different forms of saying ‘get out’), of which the latter class was more frequent. 
An example featuring an interjection is presented in (5a). 
 
(5) 
Pies bez rodowodu w chałupie z hasioka. / 
Volkslista podpisywały tylko takie świnie ja ty. Czyli tchórze i moralne karły o mentalności 
niewolnika - bez wiary, kultury, tradycji i honoru, pseudo niemieckie ścierwa i zafajdałe 
przestraszone folksdojcze. 
Ale jest was garstka, a my wiemy gdzie was szukać. W Rawie jest na tyle miejsca, że zmieści 
się cały ten wasz RAŚ z Gorzelikiem na czele 
 
‘A dog without a pedigree in a hut [built from] dump. / 
Only pigs like you signed the Volksliste.47 That is, cowards and moral dwarves with a slave 
mentality – with no faith, culture, tradition, or honor, pseudo-German scums and pants-
shitting, scared Volksdeutschs. 
 
47 A Nazi German institution established to classify residents of German-occupied territories according to 
their usefulness for furthering the interests of Nazi Germany and introduced during the Second World War in 
western parts of occupied Poland (see footnote 94). 
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But there’s a bunch of you, and we know where to look for you all. There’s so much space in 
the Rawa48 river, that all that S[ilesian] A[utonomy] M[ovement] of yours will fit there, with 
[Jerzy] Gorzelik leading the way.’ 
 
(6) 
ŚLĄZACY PATRZECIE ... TAK WYGLĄDA TYPOWY POLSKI ZWIERZ / 
WŚCIEKŁE, IMPERTYNENCKIE, OBŁUDNE, AGRESYWNE ... NIBY CZŁOWIEK 
... ALE TYLKO Z KSZTAŁTU. FUJ ! PRECZ ! DO KLATKI Z NIM ! 
 
‘Silesians, look… This is what a typical Polish animal looks like / 
Mad, impertinent, hypocritical, aggressive… As if a human… but only in shape. Phooey! 
Away! To the cage with him!’ 
 
In this exchange, a typical clash between a pro-Silesian (6) and an anti-Silesian poster (5) occurs. 
Since an agreement between these two commenters is out of the question, verbal violence ensues 
as commenters reinforce their ideological viewpoints and entrench themselves in their respective 
camps. This centrifugal discursive dynamic is also reflected in how they address each other. The 
anti-Silesian poster in (5) indirectly suggests throwing supporters of the Silesian Autonomy 
Movement (including the addressee) into a nearby river while the pro-Silesian poster in (6) 
proposes that the author of the comment in (5) be put in a cage. In both cases, animalistic 
metaphors and examples animalization abound (“a dog without a pedigree,” “pigs who signed 
 
48 A river flowing through Katowice, the capital of Silesia Province. Rawa is the largest right tributary of 
the Brynica, which part constitutes the historical boundary between Upper Silesia and the Dąbrowa Basin. In 
contemporary pro-Silesian political discourse, Brynica functions symbolically as a boundary between “Us” (Silesia) 
and “Them,” and is attributed emotional weight in the Silesian community. 
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the Volksliste,” “a typical Polish animal”), which amplify the violent messages conveyed in these 
examples. 
The second comment in this exchange includes an instance of de-proximizing discourse 
as the poster dehumanizes the addressee who is portrayed as an aggressive, wild animal that 
needs to be locked in a cage. To make this argument, the poster employs the interjection precz! 
‘away!’ that, coupled with the directional phrase that follows (“to the cage with him”), makes for 
a linguistic representation of centrifugal movement. As previously, in its character the discursive 
increase of distance between the two commenters is both physical (as indicated by the suggested 
movement away from the deictic center toward the cage) and psychological (as indicated by the 
discursive transformation from a human into a nonhuman in (5)). 
Another feature worth mentioning here is the emotional gradation in (6). In this example, 
the author of the post (1) introduces the addressee, (2) proceeds to describe the addressee’s 
characterological traits, (3) suggests that the subject of this representation is a human only on the 
surface, and (4) proposes a solution to this ad-hoc constructed problem (“Away! To the cage 
with him!”). In such a Kafkaesque, Metamorphosis-like manner, the commenter thus (1) 
introduces an issue, (2) makes it into a problem, (3) and argues for its resolution by increasing 
the distance between the addressee and the deictic center, viewed from the perspective of the 
commenter as well as the whole idealized/imaginary Silesian community (hence the initial 
apostrophe). In doing so, the commenter intentionally employs dehumanizing rhetoric from the 
start (the comment starts with an animomorphic introduction of the addressee), which amplifies 
the ideological message conveyed in this entry. As a result, these discursive moves allow the 
author of the comment to make a valid case, within the logic of his discourse, for distancing the 
addressee from the whole community, and, consequently, serve as inspiration for further hateful 
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speech. These findings suggest that discursive increasing of distance between the speakers and 
the hearer can also be used in discourse as a legitimation tool for performing intended actions. 
The two most commonly used interjections in my data (with four occurrences per each) 
to increase the distance between the speaker and the hearer are the German borrowing raus! and 
the native Polish form won! (both of which mean ‘[get] out!’ and function as spatial metaphors). 
The latter is found in the below exchange and used by both pro- and anti-Silesian posters: 
 
(7) 
Jesteś głupi jak Polak / 
Podstępnie to Polska obiecała Ślązakom autonomię, i mimo tego przegrała! 
 
Twoich bzdetów nie warto nawet komentować. 
 
‘You’re stupid like a Pole / 
Deceitfully, it was Poland who promised autonomy to Silesians and despite that lost!49 
 
Your nonsense is not even worth commenting on.’ 
 
(8) 
Jesteś głupi jak folksdojcz / 
Żal dupę ściska to wydup..j do swoich Niemiec. Won z naszego Śląska Tam ci 
wyznawcy Allaha dupsko zryją, to może zmądrzejesz. 
 
49 A reference to the 1921 Upper Silesian plebiscite, organized to determine the Polish-German border in 




‘You’re stupid like a Volksdeutsch50 / 
For pity’s sake, then get lost to your Germany. Out of our Silesia. Followers of 
Allah will plow your butt there and maybe you’ll grow wise.’ 
 
(9) 
Won gorolski szczurze z naszego hajmatu. Przybłędo pasożytnicza polska ... 
imigracyjna mendo ... / 
.. 
 
‘Get out, you non-Silesian rat, from our local homeland. You parasitic, Polish 




Do pseudo Ślązaka / 
Jestem u siebie ty jeb...y przygłupie, skundlały folksdoiczu. Pseudo Ślązaku, to 
żeś na grubie robił rylu pierdolony nie znaczy żeś jest Ślązak. Reszta 
społeczeństwa musi utrzymywać takich pasożytów co w wieku 44 lat na 
emeryturce. Nierobie, żulu śmierdzący. Prymitywna małpo. 
Won z mojego Śląska Wydupiaj do niemiec lizać dupska starym Niemrom. 
Możesz mi obciągnąć fiucie. 
 




‘To the pseudo-Silesian / 
I’m at home, you f**king moron, you mongrel Volksdeutsch. That you, pseudo-
Silesian, has worked in a mine, you fucking miner [pejoratively], doesn’t mean 
that you’re Silesian. The rest of society must support such parasites who retire at 
the age of 44. You idler, you stinking sot. You primitive ape. 
Out of my Silesia, get lost to Germany to lick old Krauts’ asses. You can blow 
me, you dick.’ 
 
This exchange represents yet another example of how discussions in the Western Daily forum 
evolve. As commenters find themselves unable to find any common ground on the topic(s) 
discussed, they retreat to their initial positions and amplify them while producing numerous 
instances of aggressive language and verbal violence per exchange or even single post. Here, the 
exchange involves two pro-Silesian posters (7, 9) and two anti-Silesian posters (8, 10). As the 
initial insult (“You’re stupid like a Pole”) is met with a paraphrased rebuttal (“You’re stupid like 
a Volksdeutsch”), the author of the post in (6a) interprets the initial comment in this exchange as 
anti-Polish and, consequently, is discursively “invited” to leave Silesia using the interjection 
won! (“Out of our Silesia!”). This instance of de-proximizing discourse is coupled with another 
example that includes a 2.SG imperative form of a newly-created verb (wydup..j do swoich 
Niemiec ‘get lost to your Germany’, from Pol. dupa ‘butt, ass’). In response, the commenter in 
(9) employs the same interjection, followed by a string of insults. Finally, in (10) the author of 
(9) is addressed, called a “pseudo-Silesian” and a “primitive ape,” and again discursively driven 
out of the region with the same forms as in (8). 
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In both (8) and (9), both posters construct Silesia as the deictic center, as evidenced in 
their use of the possessive forms z naszego Śląska ‘from our Silesia’ and z naszego hajmatu 
‘from our Heimat [that is, local homeland; from German]’. Further, the two comments include 
similar ideological representations of their respective addressees who are discursively othered 
and constructed as not indigenous to the region (hence the reference to “your Germany” and 
being a Volksdeutsch in (8) and emphasis on the addressee’s status as a newcomer to Silesia in 
(9)). Their indigeneity, however, rests on varying assumptions: while the commenter in (8) and 
(10) cannot be considered a Silesian because he represents a relative newcomer to the region and 
thus Silesia cannot be considered the commenter’s local homeland, the argument goes, the poster 
in (9) is called a “pseudo-Silesian” due to the implicit foreignness best conveyed in the phrase 
“to your Germany.” This and numerous similar posts suggest that Silesia is being discursively 
claimed by members of both the pro- and anti-Silesian camps in the Western Daily forum, and 
that these claims rest on claims grounded in dissimilar logics of belonging that emphasize local 
homeland as the deictic center of the constructed world (the pro-Silesian camp) versus national 
belonging that supersedes regional belonging and that arranges these two in a vertical, 
hegemonic hierarchy that cannot be undermined (the anti-Silesian camp). The data from this and 
other chapters in this dissertation suggest that once this vertical hierarchy of power relations that 
puts Polish national belonging above any other type of affiliation (with the province, city, or 
historical region) is challenged, strong opposition and verbal violence follows. A parallel 
framework of conceptualizing social space and intergroup relations in post-communist Poland, 
but concerning confessional and religious groups and denominations, was elaborated by Pasieka 
(2015) who coined the term “hierarchical pluralism.” 
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A similar logic of arranging ethnic relations in modern-day Poland, containing the 
interjection raus!, is presented in (11): 
 
(11) 
Raaaus do Niemiec !!!!!!!!!!!! / 
Raus stąd pseudo niemiecka świnio. TU jest Polska - byłą, jest i będzie. 
Wy oszkliwe wredne rude paskudne mordy o mentalności niewolnika nie zasługujecie na 
to żeby żyć na naszej śląskiej ziemi. 
Jesteście jak psy bez rodowodu - ni to szkopy, ni Ślązacy - takie homo niewiadomo. 
Wiejskie pajace ze znajomością paru słówek po niemiecku - obszczymury. 
Raaaus do Niemiec !!!!!!!!!!!! 
 
‘Get ouuut to Germany!!!!!!!!!!!! 
Get out from here, you pseudo-German pig. It’s Poland HERE – where it was, it is, 
and where it will be. You hideous, mean, red-haired, nasty mugs with slave mentality 
don’t deserve to live on our Silesian land. 
You’re like dogs with no pedigree – neither Krauts nor Silesians – a homo incognito. 
Rural clowns with the knowledge of a few German words – bums. 
Get ouuut to Germany!!!!!!!!!!!!’ 
 
Here, the social motivations for linguistically executed hatred are made more explicit than in 
previous comments. In this post, the author calls an unnamed poster a “pseudo-German pig,” 
questioning the addressee’s ethno-national ambiguity (or: reluctance to unequivocally self-
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identify in strictly national terms as either Germans or Poles, a stance that has at least one 
century of history behind it, cf. Bjork 2008). This stance, best expressed in the mass adoption of 
Silesian self-identification, is criticized here through the biological metaphor of self-identified 
Silesians as dogs without pedigree, defined as “neither Krauts nor Silesians – a homo incognito” 
(Pol. homo niewiadomo). 
While there is palpable confusion about the degree of Germanness of Silesians (as 
evidenced in their allegedly poor knowledge of the German language), the author nevertheless 
constructs the addressee, as well as members of the larger Silesian community, as positioned 
(ideologically, sociologically) closer to Germany than Poland. Their assumed ideological 
incompatibility with the Polish national perspective on the region (“It’s Poland HERE – where it 
was, it is, and where it will be”) makes it easier for the author to demand that they leave Silesia 
and move out to Germany. This view is best encapsulated in the German-borrowed interjection 
raus, used thrice in the comment to magnify the perlocutionary effect of the pronouncement and 
expressed in writing in conjunction with two dozen of exclamation marks. As in (3), I believe the 
choice of a German-origin interjection over a native, Polish one, represents an intentional 
ideological choice that increases the discursive action of othering the addressee (as well as the 
addressee’s larger community) as non-native to Poland, which becomes another way of 
increasing the distance between the speaker and the hearer in this online forum. While both won! 
and raus! do not evoke physical movement per se, they nevertheless act as deictic markers that 
help organize the constructed world by serving as directional guideposts for the speaker and the 
hearer. As such, these instances of de-proximizing discourse increase the distance between two 
entities and, thus, provide an incentive for aggressive language and verbal violence that, as this 
and other examples demonstrate, ensues. 
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Before I go into analysis, a short discussion of polite and impolite forms of address in 
Polish is in order. As a rule, formal address including 3.SG/3.PL constructions is used when 
talking to strangers or unfamiliar people whose social status is unknown (e.g., Czy ma pan bilet? 
‘Do you have.3.SG a ticket?’; Gdzie państwo mieszkają? ‘Where do you, Sir and Madam, 
live.3.PL?’). Otherwise, informal, 2.SG forms are in use among family members, friends, 
colleagues, coworkers, and other peers (unless specified otherwise). This distinction is also 
reflected in the use of personal pronouns: 
 
“The 2nd-person sg. pronoun ty you is used in informal address among family members, 
close friends, school-mates and, often but not always, among co-workers. Using ty with a 
person amounts to being on a familiar first-name basis with that person. Otherwise, one 
prefaces the person’s first name with pan Mr., sir, pani Ms., lady, madam, or some other 
title” (Swan 2002, 153). 
 
As this and other chapters show, these rules do not apply to the Western Daily forum as 
anonymity does not forbid users from employing informal address forms. These, however, can 
take on a variety of different forms that can be looked at as a spectrum – from those conveying 
familiarity and reducing social distance to those expressing outward hostility. The present 
analysis suggests that the more posters disagree with each other, the more direct and blunt their 
conversations become. This observation can also be formulated in the following manner: 
disagreement produces even more disagreement, which in turn produces verbal violence and 
hateful speech. 
Most direct examples of hateful speech (DIRECT-2) 
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The DIRECT-2 category represents the largest group of examples in the data analyzed for this 
chapter (14 out of 31 tokens or about 45 per cent) and consists exclusively of instances that 
include 2.SG (ciś, jedź, pitej, spadaj, wydupiaj, wydupiej się, wyd...j) and infinitive imperatives 
(wracać, wydu...ć, wyp......ć). Of all these, 2.SG imperatives constitute the majority of examples 
(10 out of 14 tokens) while wy-prefixed forms account for 9 out of 14 tokens overall. Below, I 
present comments that represent most direct examples of hateful speech, proceeding from more 
colloquial to more vulgar forms. The first exchange in this subsection includes a de-proximizing 
instance of the former type. 
 
(12) 
Do [nickname omitted] / 
Mógłbyś mi cwelu naskakać. Dawać to może dawała twoja stara w oborze tej chołocie 
mongolskiej. Teraz taka zjebana kur** oddycha. A ôgolić to se możesz rzyć, żeby Ci 
polaczek mógł kakałko wysukać. 
 
‘To [nickname omitted] / 
You can bite me, you cocksucker. Putting out, maybe your old woman was putting out in 
a barn to that Mongolian rabble. Now she’s f**king breathing exhaustedly. And what you 
can shave is your ass so that a little Polack could suck your anus.’ 
 
(13) 
Do [nickname omitted] / 
163 
 
Samo imię [nickname omitted] świadczy już o tym, że ty jakaś niedojebana jesteś. Co 
stary już nie może cie dymać i piejesz jak kwoka ? Idź se na targ, poproś grzecznie, to cie 
może jakiś murzyn wydyma za twoją dopłatą, bo nikt normalny by nie ruszył takiej 
szkopską wywłoki. A propos matki - to twoja stara musiała nieźle obciągać całej 
kompanii niemieckich cweli, aż w końcu zaciągła niemiecką ciompę. Fuj, ale cóż - 
możesz mieć pretensję tylko do swojej starej. Pozdrawiam szpetna ropucho ! 
 
‘To [nickname omitted] / 
The name itself [nickname omitted] is already evidence for you being somewhat 
underfucked. What, [your] old guy can’t fuck you anymore and you’re crowing like a 
sitting hen. Why don’t you go to the market, ask politely, then maybe a black man will 
fuck you but only if you pay him because no normal person would touch such a Kraut 
trollop. Speaking of your mother – your mother must have nicely sucked off a whole 
company of German cocksuckers until she finally sucked in some German snot. Phooey, 




Do [nickname omitted] / 
Niedojebany to ty masz mózg, opasła polska świnio. O dymaniu, to ty pewnie wiesz 
tylko z obrazków. 
Poza tym polaczku, nie mam z Niemcami nic wspólnego. 
Jestem z Ukrainy. 
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Dla twojej wiadomości, takich warchlaków, to myśmy siekierami traktowali. 
 
‘To [nickname omitted] / 
Underfucked is your brain, you fat Polish pig. And you probably know about fucking 
only from pictures. 
Aside from that, you little Pole [pej.], I have nothing in common with Germans. 
I’m from Ukraine. 
For your knowledge, we treated young boars like you with axes.’ 
 
(15) 
Do [nickname omitted] / 
Jeśli to prawda żeś ukrainka, to podaj adres zdziro, to osobiście przyjadę ci wypłacić za 
Wołyń. I wiesz gdzie ci te siekiere wsadzę suko. Ukrainki przyjeżdżają tu tylko po żeby 
sprzątać Polakom i dawać d... Ty prymitywie zza Sanu, wieprzu nieczysty - spadaj na 
swoją Ukrainę, która i tak niedługo zdechnie. Już Wam Putin podziękuje za kolaborację 
z Niemiaszkami, zdepcze was jak gówno, a my będziemy patrzeć na to z przyjemnością. 
Pogonimy również stąd Ukraińskie ścierwa. Won z Polski. bezdomne psy, bo siekiery to 
się u nas już ostrzą. 
O Krymie i Donbasie możecie sobie pomarzyć, nieudacznicy. Nic nie umiecie, nawet 
obronić ziemi. Tchórzliwy naród, który podstępnie w nocy mordował Polaków - kobiety i 
dzieci. Chamy nie miały odwagi w dzień, boście zawsze wpierdol dostawali od Polaków. 





‘If that’s true that you’re Ukrainian, then provide your address, you whore, I’ll come 
to pay you for Volhynia.51 And you know well where I’ll stick that ax, you bitch. 
Ukrainian females come here only to clean Poles’ houses and to spread their legs. You 
primitive from beyond the San,52 you dirty hog – get lost, to your Ukraine, which will 
soon kick the bucket anyway. [Vladimir] Putin will sure thank you for collaborating with 
Krauts, will crush you like crap, and we’ll be watching that with pleasure. We’ll drive the 
Ukrainian scoundrels out of here as well. Get out of Poland, you homeless dogs, because 
our axes are already getting sharpened. 
You can [only] dream about Crimea and Donbass, you losers. You can’t do a thing, not 
even defend the land. A nation of cowards who deceitfully murdered Poles – women and 
children – at night. [Those] boors had no courage to do it in the daylight because Poles 
would always kick your asses. Keep in mind bitch that no one will ever give a damn 
about such shithole like Ukraine. You’re zero, nothing.’ 
 
This extended exchange of insults, a continuation of the feud presented by two posters in (2) and 
(3), ranks among the most violent examples of hateful speech in data analyzed for this chapter. 
Here, it quickly becomes clear that no agreement between the two commenters is possible, hence 
the continued exchange of insults in the form of constant verbal violence. As the exchange 
progresses and neither poster is willing to concede by leaving the conversation, they effectively 
come up with novel ways of insulting each other. The exchange reaches its apogee in (15) where 
 
51 Reference to the massacres of Poles in Volhynia (now western Ukraine) perpetrated by the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army from 1943 to 1945 in Nazi German-occupied Poland. It is estimated that the massacres (Pol. rzeź 
wołyńska, ‘Volhynian slaughter’) have cost the lives of some 40,000-60,000 residents. 
52 The San is a river in southeastern Poland; its stretch serves as the Polish-Ukrainian border. 
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its author establishes that the addressee has a Ukrainian background and produces an elaborate, 
two paragraph-long insult. In it, the poster uses the impersonal interjection won! (see also 
example 8) and, before that, tells the addressee to leave for Ukraine using the colloquial personal 
form spadaj ‘get lost.’ 
This form of hateful speech is prefaced with a denigrating representation of the addressee 
who is othered as a Ukrainian. As a result, the addressee is assigned a host of negative 
characteristics linked to stereotypes about Ukrainians in Poland or past examples of Polish-
Ukrainian animosities (see footnote 51). In the fourth sentence of the comment, the author sets 
up the tone for the instance of de-proximizing discourse that is about to follow and calls the 
addressee a “primitive from beyond the San.” Because the San river separates Poland from 
Ukraine, such a nomination represents an overt instance of othering. The addressee is 
represented as an outsider to Poland who is consequently “invited” to leave the region in the 
imperative form spadaj. The use of the phrase “your Ukraine” further emphasizes the 
addressee’s non-native status in the country. 
This phrase is also instrumental for constructing hateful speech through de-proximizing 
discourse in (15) because the words “your Ukraine” allow the author of this post to create a 
constructed world in which Ukraine (associated with the addressee) becomes, in Cap’s words, 
the deictic periphery. Such a discursive move facilitates the creation of the deictic center in 
Poland in opposition to the deictic periphery. As a result, the binary “my Poland” – “your 
Ukraine” becomes the ideological foundation of the post in (15) as its author develops a complex 
argument aimed at the addressee. Once uncovered, this ideologized schema can be used to 
deconstruct the de-proximizing roots of hateful speech in this and preceding posts in this 
particular exchange. This is also the approach that I adopt in analyzing this example. 
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From the perspective of the deictic center (Poland) – periphery (Ukraine) binary, the 
perlocutionary import of (15) becomes easier to explain. The key phrase “your Ukraine” is 
encircled here by two instances of hateful speech that include references to physical space: 
spadaj ‘get lost’ (of which it makes part) and won ‘get out’. Both of these examples of de-
proximizing discourse are prefaced with instances of discursive othering that have to do with 
either physical distance (“you primitive from beyond the San”) or physical movement (“we’ll 
drive the Ukrainian scoundrels out of here”). The latter hortative, it can be argued, represents a 
call for discriminatory action that may lead to violence. What emerges from this post is a 
discursive attempt at creating a constructed world with the help of the reflexive-possessive 
pronoun swój (‘one’s own’) that serves as the directional guidepost helping identify and delimit 
spaces that can be labeled as US (here: Poland) versus THEM (here: Ukraine). This usage is 
consonant with the two examples of de-proximizing discourse in this post (both in bold), which 
helps magnify the violent message conveyed. As a result, this binary has the effect of 
discursively increasing the distance between the speaker (here: the author of the post) and the 
hearer (here: the addressee), which in turn provides the former with an incentive to use 
aggressive language. The addressee’s non-native status in the space designated as the deictic 
center allows the author of the poster to craft an argument entrenched in spatial ideologies 
(prejudiced ideas about a space that yield prejudiced ideas about people inhabiting that space). 
This is further intertwined with nationalist thinking, which is characteristic of blood-and-soil 
arguments about communities, belonging, and, ultimately, power. Due to their outsider status, 
the addressee thus does not deserve any more empathy than a fellow compatriot, so empathy 
toward the addressee is reduced to a minimum, or, eventually, becomes even negative. As of 
early 2019, it is estimated that there are between one and two million Ukrainians currently living 
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in Poland (Gajek 2019). Thus, my results point to the necessity of considering the intricate ways 
in which hateful speech and calls for violence are grounded in othering representations of out-
group members that position them as somewhat distant to Poland, despite their residence in the 
country, knowledge of the language, etc., because such representations provide fertile ground for 
overt or covert examples of aggressive language. 
While this example of de-proximizing discourse is based on spatial distance (as the 
author of the post discovers that the addressee is Ukrainian/of Ukrainian heritage), it need not 
always be the case, as apparent in examples (16–19) below. 
 
(16) poster G 
Do polskiej swini / 
Niestety Adolf nie zdazyl zeobic ordnungu z twoimi dziadkami i teraz takie myndy jak ty 
chodzom po tym swiecie Schade Jo osobiscie leja na glupoli tgz powstancow slonskich i 
ich pomioty ale tys jest wybitnie oszkliwy 
 
‘To the Polish pig / 
Unfortunately, Adolf [Hitler] didn’t manage to make Ordnung53 with your grandfathers 
and now such louses like you wander through this world. Schade [Germ. ‘Too bad’]. 
Personally, I piss on those fools, so-called Silesian insurgents and their litter, but you’re 
remarkably repugnant.’ 
 
(17) poster H 
 
53 Germ. ‘order’. 
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Do pseudo niemieckiej świni / 
Ty pseudo niemiecka świnio, skundlały volksdojczu, pomiocie Adolfa - wydupiaj do 
Niemiec. Tam możesz grzecznie arbaiten dla chorej Angeli, co zrobiła z waszego kraju 
kolejny arabski Emirat. teraz tam jest 7 milionów Turków + najechało ostatnio 2 miliony 
hołoty muzułmańskiej. To już 9 milionów. Oni się szybko rozmnażają w przeciwieństwie 
do Niemców. Za 5 lat będzie ich 20 milionów, a za 10 lat wyznawcy Allaha będą tam 
większość. Wtedy zajmą się Wami Niemiaszki, będziecie błagać o pomoc i zgodę na 
wpuszczenie do Polski. Ale nic z tego, my będziemy grzecznie patrzeć jak wam łby 
poobcinają i będą se śpiewać dojczland dojczland liber ales. 
 
‘To the pseudo-German pig / 
‘To the pseudo-German pig: you mongrel Volksdeutsch, Adolf [Hitler]’s litter – get lost 
to Germany. There, you can politely arbeiten for sick Angela [Merkel] who made 
another Arab emirate out of your country. Now, there are 7 million Turks there, plus 2 
millions Muslim rabbles invaded it recently. That makes it 9 million already. They, 
unlike Germans, reproduce quickly. In 5 years, there will be 20 million of them, and in 10 
years followers of Allah will be in majority there. Then they will take care of you, you 
Krauts, you’ll beg for help and permission to enter Poland. But nothing of the kind, we’ll 
be politely watching them cutting your heads off and singing Deutschland, Deutschland, 
über alles54.’ 
 
(18) poster G 
 
54 Germ. ‘Germany, Germany above all’; the beginning line of the German national anthem. 
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Polski ciulu / 
ale poradzisz byc wsciekly jestem pod wrazeniem ha ha czyli cos do tepego czerepa 
dotarlo mimo wszystko Po steku bluzg widze ze mam do czynienia z sarmata polakiem 
najlepszego sortu z takim nastawieniem jestescie w stanie przesrac wasz land w kilka lat i 
nie jestem pseudo niemiecki ale niemiecki dumny Oberschlesie 
 
‘You Polish prick / 
Just how mad you can be, I’m impressed ha ha, so something reached that dumb head [of 
yours] after all. [Judging] from your pack of insults I reckon that I’m dealing with a 
Sarmatian,55 a Pole of the best sort;56 with an attitude like that, you’re able to flush your 
land down the drain/the toilet in a few years. And I’m not pseudo-German, but a proudly 
German Oberschlesie[r].’ 
 
(19) poster H 
Do [nickname omitted] / 
Chciałbyś być niemiecki, dumny. A jesteś żałosny folksdojcz. Wiedz kundlu, że dla nich 
nie jesteś Niemcem. Nie jesteś też Polakiem. Tylko zwykłym, piskliwym kundelkiem, 
obszczymurem, który poszczeka, poszczeka i zaraz spierdala jak ktoś nogą machnie. Tak 
to już jest jak się nie szanuje swojej wiary, kultury, języka i zostaje się w końcu takim 
 
55 A reference to the concept of Sarmatism, according to which Polish nobility in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth (1569–1795) descended from Sarmatians, a people of Iranic origin. Because Sarmatism separated 
the nobility from the common people, the term Sarmatian can be used pejoratively to denote those who exalt 
themselves. As such, the term represents a semantic antonym of the idea of “the worst sort of Poles” (see the next 
footnote). See Thielemann (2016) for a positively-tinged antonym, “upper cultural shelf” (Pol. wyższa półka 
kulturowa). 
56 A reference to a 2015 interview in which Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the Law and Justice (Pol. Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość) political party, used the phrase “the worst sort of Poles” (Pol. najgorszy sort Polaków) to refer to 
his ideological and political opponents. 
171 
 
nikim bez żadnej tożsamości. Potem się chleje piwsko w barze, posłucha jakiś debili z 
RAŚ, którzy mówią że to wszystko wina Polakken. Bo jak byli Nimce to było alles ist 
gut. No i omamy czasem wracają. Wydupiaj ciulu do Niemiec bo Angela już czeka na 
takich kundli. 
 
‘To [nickname omitted] / 
You’d like to be German, proud. But you’re a pathetic Volksdeutsch. Know, you 
mongrel, that you’re not a German for them. You’re not a German either, just a simple, 
squeaky little mongrel, a stinker who will bark, bark for a while, and then get the fuck out 
of there once somebody shakes their leg. That’s the way it is when somebody doesn’t 
respect one’s faith, culture, language, and in the end, becomes such a nobody without an 
identity. Then one ends up drinking beer [pejorative] in a bar, listening to some idiots 
from the Silesian Autonomy Movement who claim that everything is the Polacks’ fault. 
Because when Germany was here, it was alles gut [Germ. ‘all good’]. And then 
hallucinations sometimes do come back. Get out, you prick, to Germany, because 
Angela [Merkel] is already awaiting such mongrels.’ 
 
The exchange above took place between two commenters, a pro-Silesian (17 and 19) and an anti-
Silesian one (16 and 18). It was initiated by the anti-Silesian commenter (whom I call “poster 
H”) in an earlier post not reproduced above, in which the poster stated: “My grandfathers didn’t 
fight in the Silesian Uprisings so that such Euro-desiring numbskulls can talk nonsense about 
Germans in my Silesia. Miss being a German rag – then who’s preventing you from going 
there.” The pro-Silesian poster (whom I call “poster G”) and author of (16) addresses these 
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claims and expresses a lack of interest in Silesian Uprisings or their participants. In doing so, the 
poster calls the addressee a “Polish pig.” In response, poster H calls poster G a “pseudo-German 
pig” and a “mongrel Volksdeutsch”57 who needs to leave for Germany (17). In (18), poster G 
refuses to be called a pseudo-German and self-identifies as a proud German Upper Silesian, 
rendering the regional identification in German. Finally, in (19) poster H refuses to accept this 
argument by stating that the addressee is neither a German nor a Pole and again tells poster G to 
leave for Germany where “Angela [Merkel] is already awaiting such mongrels.” 
Unlike in the previously discussed exchange (12–15) where the discussion revolved 
around Poland (deictic center) and Ukraine (deictic periphery), here this binary is transformed 
into a different, yet related, one: Poland (deictic center) versus Germany (deictic periphery). My 
choice to render the conflictual exchange in 16–19 in such way as to base it on the following 
considerations: 
(1) it is the anti-Silesian poster (poster H) who uses examples of de-proximizing discourse; 
(2) poster G’s self-identification as a Germany-oriented Upper Silesian; 
(3) and the context of a conversation that evolves in a comment section provided by a 
regional daily based on the territory of Poland. 
 
To deter poster G from a further conversation (and, by extension, propagating certain views), 
poster H creates a neologism derived from the colloquialism dupa (Pol. ‘butt, ass’, see also 8), 
using its imperative form (wydupiaj < wydupiać). In both cases (17 and 19), poster H constructs 
the addressee as ideologically connected to Germany, although they ridicule this connection by 
denying poster G the right to call oneself a “true German.” This is best evidenced in the oft-
 
57 See footnote 16. 
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repeated words “mongrel” and “Volksdeutsch,” which are to represent poster G as someone who 
is not fully German. Nevertheless, Germany-related tropes are present in the proximity of the 
two instances of de-proximizing discourse. In (17), poster H constructs an ideologized, 
pejorative, and deeply negative from the nationalist point of view representation of poster G 
whose national (mis)identification is stressed in the phrases “pseudo-German pig” and “mongrel 
Volksdeutsch.” To complement this inherently negative ideological work, the author of the post 
discursively links the addressee with Adolf Hitler, exploiting the indirectly expressed wish in 
(16) for extermination from the hands of Nazis (“Unfortunately, Adolf [Hitler] didn’t manage to 
make Ordnung58 with your grandfathers”). The example of de-proximizing discourse that 
follows (“get lost to Germany”) is encircled by another pejorative representation related to poster 
G. The sentence that follows the instance of de-proximizing discourse is also key for 
understanding the spatial dynamic inherent for poster H’s viewpoint and, consequently, the 
aggressive language produced as a result. In it, the author of the post characterizes Germany as a 
place where poster G can “politely work” for Angela Merkel who has turned the country into 
“another Arab emirate.”59 
What is most important, however, in this sentence are two deictic markers that help 
deconstruct the ideological viewpoint from which the author of the post is coming: the initial tam 
‘there’ and wasz [kraj] ‘your [country]’. The use of these indicates that poster H constructs 
Poland as the deictic center, while Germany consequently becomes the deictic periphery, 
referred to through the distal marker tam. Overall, the comment in (17) contains six examples of 
 
58 Germ. ‘order’. 
59 This type of rhetoric that construes Germany (here represented with the example of its Chancellor) as a 
negative Other that Poland needs to distance itself from due to, among others, the way Germany has embraced 
multiculturalism, is typical for the discourses produced by right-wing, conservative milieus associated with the Law 
and Justice political party that won the 2015 parliamentary elections. 
174 
 
deictic markers that set Germany, and, as a result, poster G, as the deictic periphery in the 
conversation. These include three tokens of tam, two instances of the personal pronoun wy 
(wami, wam), and one possessive pronoun wasz [kraj]. Combined with the request to leave for 
Germany, these markers strengthen the rhetorical power of the comment as the author of the post 
creates a constructed world in which the distance between posters G and H is significantly 
increased and seemingly insurmountable, especially given the ideological dissonance between 
the two. In doing so, poster H’s attempt at relegating poster G to the deictic periphery leaves the 
door open for the aggressive and hateful language that follows because, as in previous examples, 
the commenter acts as if talking about a distant person, from outside of the cultural milieu 
marked by the deictic center, and not someone living in the same country or even the same 
region. Such othering rhetoric that leads to hateful speech is also present in (19) where poster G 
is again constructed as an outsider — this time, neither a German nor a Pole (see also 11 above). 
This discursive increasing of (ideological, spatial) distance is marked there with yet another 
instance of wydupiaj, combined with animalization (poster G is compared to a dog without a 
pedigree) and augmented through the use of the word ciul ‘dick, prick’, a term considered a 
major insult in the Silesian variety. 
The final exchange in this subsection consists of the very first comment written in the 
discussion under the story covering the 2018 Autonomy March and two responses (20–22). 
 
(20) 
Co za bezsens / 
RAŚ to V kolumna Niemiec w Polsce. Im prędzej to rozpędzą tę bandę tym lepiej. Niech 
Polska bierze przykład z Kataloni, gdzie też była grupka szajbusów chcących się 
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odłączyć. Pozamykać tych Gorzelików i innych Messerschmitów. Jak się nie podoba, to 
wyp......ć do Niemiec. P.S. Gdzie jest Młodzież Wszechpolska i ONR - robić porządek i 
to już ! 
 
‘What nonsense / 
The Silesian Autonomy Movement is the German fifth column in Poland. The sooner 
they break up this band, the better. Poland should follow the examples of Catalonia where 
there also was a small group of wackos who wanted to secede. Lock those Gorzeliks60 
and other Messerschmitts61 up. If you don’t like it, then get the f**k out to Germany. 









60 Jerzy Gorzelik, the Silesian Autonomy Movement leader (see footnote 13). 
61 Messerschmitt was a German type of fighter aircrafts used in the Second World War. Here, the term is 
pejoratively attributed to Silesian activists. 
62 The All-Polish Youth (Pol. Młodzież Wszechpolska) is a Polish youth organization founded in the 1920s, 
banned a decade later, and revived after the collapse of communism, that promotes a Catholic and nationalist 
perspective on how Poland should be organized as a society and nation. 
63 The National Radical Camp (Pol. Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR) is a far-right Polish organization 
founded in 1934, banned a decade later, and revived in the 1990s. Both the All-Polish Youth and the National 
Radical Camp are currently affiliated with the National Movement (Pol. Ruch Narodowy), registered as a political 
party in 2014, deleted from the register of political parties in 2017 and registered anew in 2018. 
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A jo cie mom w d**** skundlały folkdoiczu. 
 
‘And I don’t give a damn about you, you mongrel Volksdeutsch! 
 
In (20), which is a reproduction of the comment presented early on in this chapter in (1), the 
author proposes that the Silesian Autonomy Movement, the organizer of the annual Autonomy 
March in Katowice, represents “the German fifth column in Poland.” This proposition sets the 
tone for the discussion that follows, framing it in national(ist), black-and-white, Poland-versus-
Germany, terms. Such ideological treatment of the issue is also evident from the overt mention 
of two nationalist organizations: The All-Polish Youth and the National Radical Camp. In doing 
so, the author of the post places oneself in the anti-Silesian camp and advocates that Silesian 
activism be put under control, either by dispersing or locking up local activists. While the 
“German fifth column” idea can be interpreted as a covert reference to and continuation of the 
“camouflaged German option” (see the previous chapter on szlezjer-narratives), it also represents 
the most dominant ideologically way of talking about Silesian identity and activism in 
contemporary Poland among members of the anti-Silesian camp in the Western Daily forum and 
beyond. Here, such representation serves additionally as a preface that sets the scene for the 
instance of de-proximizing discourse in the second-to-last sentence. By proposing that Silesian 
activism covertly benefits Germany, the poster constructs members of the Silesian Autonomy 
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Movement as Others and outsiders whose activity must be put under scrutiny. This call for action 
is further strengthened in the clause preceding the part in bold where the poster concludes that if 
Silesian activists do not like the idea of close investigation and possible use of force, they can 
then simply leave Poland for Germany (hence: “get the f**k out to Germany”). 
Unlike previously, here this idea is expressed in the most direct (and, thus, violent) way 
as the author of the post uses the infinitive form of the verb wypierdalać (vulg. ‘to throw 
someone out’) in the function of imperative. While previous examples (spadaj, wydupiaj) were 
more colloquial style-wise, the form wyp......ć conveys the author’s emotionality most forcefully 
because of its vulgar (hence the ellipsis) status that stems from the word’s roots in the verb 
pierdolić ‘to fuck’. At the same time, the elliptic form reproduced above expresses the desired 
event from the perspective of the author who, in doing so, discursively increases the distance 
between the deictic center and Silesian activists who are construed as an internal threat that must 
be neutralized (hence the direct address to two nationalist organization in the coda). In this 
aspect, the comment in (20) is a typical example of de-proximizing discourse that feeds 
aggressive language in the conversation about the 2018 Autonomy March. 
What is, however, atypical of this and few other tokens of de-proximizing discourse 
examined in this chapter, is that their pragma-morphological characteristics set them aside as a 
class on its own when it comes to the interface of linguistic form and sociopragmatic function. 
This special status of wyp......ć and similar instances stems from their morphology. In Polish, the 
directional prefix wy- has an ablative meaning and derives verbs that encode movement from the 
inside to the outside, e.g., wyjść ‘to leave’, wypłynąć ‘to sail/swim out, to come to the surface’ 
(Wróbel 1984, 481). To translate this into the framework of proximization theory adopted in this 
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chapter: the prefix wy- connotes movement from the deictic center to the deictic periphery. This 
comes with nontrivial consequences for the examples of hateful speech examined in this chapter. 
In proximization theory, Cap (2018b) argues that deixis does not need to be approached 
in the narrow sense of the word, but rather viewed as a broader amalgam including larger phrases 
and pieces of discourse (386). Among the linguistic renditions of spatial proximization are, for 
instance, verb phrases of motion and directionality. Consequently, these “acquire a deictic status, 
(…) denoting the default D[iscourse] S[pace] entities” (387) and they also index “their 
movement, which establishes the target perspective construed by the speaker” (ibid.). The same 
is the case for wy-prefixed verbs in my data. As I have shown, these co-occur with linguistic 
expressions of hateful speech. This is especially the case in this subsection with examples that 
belong to the DIRECT-2 (most direct) category where they account for more than 60 percent of all 
tokens of de-proximizing discourse identified. These are wydupiaj (4 occurrences), wydupiej się, 
wydu...ć, wyd...j, and wyp......ć (all 1 occurrence). Cap’s idea about linguistic instances of 
proximization was that they can eventually become “an instrument for legitimization, persuasion 
and social coercion” (Cap 2018b, 386). Adopting this line of thinking for examples of distancing 
discourse, I conclude that wy- ‘out-‘ prefixed verbs of movement serve as instruments of threat 
construction that incite further violence (in the form of aggressive language and hateful speech) 
due to their propensity to construct persons and entities as Others and outsiders to the deictic 
center where discourse is produced. 
Finally, it also needs to be stressed that this is true in my data for verbs denoting 
centrifugal movement from the perspective of the speaker who authors examples of hateful 
speech. It is then not a coincidence that instances of most aggressive and violent language co-
occur in the comments thread analyzed with tokens of wy-prefixed centrifugal verbs of motion. 
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Given the intrinsic relationship between language use and mental space construction (Cap 
2017a), such usages connote and encode relationships of distance between the speaker and the 
hearer that consequently, as I have shown in this subsection, give license for extensive and 
pervasive use of hateful speech due as reduced perception of spatial proximity necessitates 
limited emotional proximity. This is facilitated by posters’ othering representations of each other 
as a broader in-group membership (Polish nationals) gives way to particular, insular out-group 
memberships (“true Poles” vs. “suspicious Poles” or national outsiders: Germans, Ukrainians, 
etc.). As I have shown repeatedly throughout this chapter, verbal violence and aggressive 
language are contingent upon othering in discourse that result in othered representations of 
ethnic, national, or political character, which points to the significance of using inclusive 
language and weighing one’s words in a discussion, whether private or public, bipartisan or 
nonpartisan, online or offline. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have tackled the problem of aggressive language and hateful speech in online 
discussion forums and comments sections on the Polish-language internet from the perspective 
of proximization theory. Using a comments thread developed under a news story covering the 
2018 Autonomy March as a case study (331 comments left in total), I have examined instances 
of verbal violence between members of the pro-Silesian and anti-Silesian camp. In doing so, I 
have accounted for both their micro-linguistic choices (including overt usage of aggressive 
language and hateful speech) and the ideological implications of such choices. Upon selection of 
my data, I have then theorized such examples from the perspective of proximization theory by 
adapting it for the analysis of distancing, de-proximizing discourse. Finally, I have examined 
selected comments and exchanges and theorized the import of discursively realized increasing of 
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distance (spatial or ideological) in conflictual exchanges between posters for the linguistic 
production of verbal violence in such and following comments. 
My findings suggest that the process of othering, pervasive in the Western Daily 
comments section, is instrumental for the emergence and production of hateful speech in this 
online discussion forum. As I have shown, verbal violence does not occur in a vacuum but co-
occurs when other posters are othered or rendered as outsiders. Thus, verbal violence in this 
digital space seems to be correlated with linguistic instances of othering that effectively construct 
the represented as distant — ethnically, nationally, ideologically, spatially, or otherwise. While 
this mechanism is present in all examples analyzed in this chapter, it is particularly effective in 
the last subsection (DIRECT-2 category) where its perlocutionary power is magnified by the 
cognitive underpinnings of wy-prefixed verbs of centrifugal motion. Such theorization of 
aggressive language and hateful speech in the Western Daily discussion forum provides a 
starting point for a broader inquiry on the nature of verbal violence on the internet in general. 
While each digital space needs to be examined against its specific sociocultural context with all 
its affordances, the intertwinement of (ideological, spatial, cultural, etc.) distance and license for 
violence deserves further attention, partly because it provides a junction from which this issue 
can be taken further by other scholars, from evolutionary biology and psychology (e.g., the out-
group – in-group dynamic) to communication studies. 
My results also suggest that, as in Cap’s investigations of proximization discourse, 
discursive increasing of distance between the speaker(s) and the hearer(s) can become a powerful 
tool used in discourse to legitimate performing intended actions. Discursive instances of othering 
are, again, implicated in this process, as othering facilitates distancing, which helps construct 
prejudicial representations of groups and individuals as threats, which in turn encourages 
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unrestricted expressions of violent thoughts (including calls for action). Schematically, this chain 
of discursive moves that is pervasive in the data examined in this chapter and the Western Daily 
forum more broadly, can be presented in the following manner: disagreement → othering → 
distancing → violence. Impressionistic perceptions of online users aside, this schema allows for 
a close, micro-linguistic analysis of the emergence of hateful speech in digital spaces by 
employing a chain-like approach to theorizing and analyzing the behavior of internet users. As 
comments in the DIRECT-2 and other subsections demonstrate, the four modalities of 
linguistically produced online behavior (disagreement, othering, distancing, violence) are not 
mutually exclusive and can co-occur next to each other. 
Another dimension of hateful speech on the Western Daily forum also has to do with the 
co-occurrence of various flavors of one modality. While de-proximization is prototypically 
conceived of in strictly spatiotemporal terms, it need not be so. As I have demonstrated in this 
chapter, just as there are different types of reasons behind instances of othering, the same is true 
about discursively realized examples of distancing. In an online discussion, two or more posters 
can become distant to each other due to their physical location (space) in the past or present 
temporal plane, because of their dissimilar worldviews (ideology), because of some variance in 
their cultural practices (cultural), or due to other considerations. Thus, de-proximization can be 
of spatial, ideological, cultural, or another character. Regardless of its type, such distancing 
always necessitates the construction of in-groups and out-groups, classified by the very factor 
that was used to distinguish them in the first place, and the linguistic mechanism used for that 
purpose is consistently repeated throughout my data. As I have shown repeatedly in this and 
previous chapters, the major ideological faultline in the Western Daily forum runs along the 
ideological alignment with either the pro- or anti-Silesian camp. It is safe to assume that most 
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users of the forum are nevertheless connected by their collective residence (past or present) in 
the region of Silesia, hence the main reason behind reading the Western Daily online edition and 
participating in the discussions in the comments sections. Since they can be collectively lumped 
in the larger category of residents of Silesia, this label which works against the bipartisan, 
polarized environment that has become the dominant interactional paradigm of this digital space. 
Thus, both pro- and anti-Silesian posters, seeking to perform their identity in this online 
discussion forum, strive for attaining difference through a variety of linguistic and discursive 
means. Once an opportunity for conflict arises (as in the case of the controversial for many 
Autonomy March where Silesian flags and emblems are openly displayed), posters from both 
sides of the ideological fence take it to the comments section to express their opinions. In doing 
so, they mobilize linguistic techniques that allow them to dissociate themselves from the 
controversial Other, increasing the distance between the self and the addressee, and, 
consequently, giving license for overt use of aggressive language and hateful speech. While 
particular instantiations of verbal violence differ widely, the discursive moves that produce such 
instances are not unstructured or chaotic, but scripted and highly predictable. The Western Daily 
forum users execute the work of de-proximization by employing a range of deictic markers and 
expressions that function in a deixis-like manner, both of which help organize such constructed 
world by providing directional guideposts for the speaker and the hearer. Once the (cultural, 
ideological, spatial) distance is established, hateful speech abounds. 
Considering selected linguistic instantiations of distal perceptions, I have contributed to 
the existing scholarship on the role of space in the construction of violent discourses. Departing 
from Cap’s proximization theory and working my way in the opposite direction, I have extended 
its scope and shown the usefulness of the proximization framework — in its inverted alteration – 
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for linguistically oriented analyses of hateful speech and aggressive language in online discourse. 
My analysis of comments from the Western Daily forum suggests that the proximity – distance 
modality represents a useful theoretical and methodological approach for critically oriented and 
socially relevant investigations of political (that is, concerned with power) discourse in general. 
As human beings rooted in nature and their environment, people have a deeply seated need to 
organize their experiences and the world around them from a subjective, individualistic point of 
view. Proximization theory represents one of the numerous approaches to discovering such 
perceptions, and my approach to de-proximizing discourse is yet another instantiation of this 
enterprise. In the data analyzed, this translates into the intention to map past and present ideas 
about communities onto subjective spatiotemporal arrangements of physical space, thus making 
the “Silesia, thus former Germany, thus ‘suspect Poles’ (see chapter 2), thus ‘leave for 
Germany!’” line of thought possible. In the next chapter, I consider the third major trend in the 
data collected, narrativizing, which leads to the production of violent yet skillfully disguised 




Chapter 4: The Szlezjer narrative 
“The average age of the Schlesierdom is 60 years. 
It’s mainly them who write comments here. 
Something tells me that you'll be leaving this world 
with the consciousness that the majority of Silesia lays in Poland hehe” 
(an anti-Silesia poster) 
 
In the previous chapters, I have analyzed instances of linguistic othering (chapter 1) and their 
extension in the form of political othering through the “camouflaged German option” discourse 
(chapter 2). In chapter 3, I have built on these chapters to examine the production and spread of 
verbal violence in the Western Daily forum. In this chapter, I continue tracing the intensification 
of the othering process in Polish-Silesian online political discourse by focusing on the 
narrativizing trend in the collected data. Subsequently, I introduce the concept of mini-narrative 
and investigate it in the context of the neologism szlezjer and its various derivatives used in the 
forum. In doing so, my goal is to entertain the idea that single words or phrases—while not 
narratives per se—can function in a narrative-like manner. This is, I believe, due to the inherent 
narrative-bearing potential that allows single words or phrases (e.g., bad hombres, cf. Moreno 
2016) to carry and disseminate meaning associated with them across time and space, and 
especially so in the digital world. This is also the key defining feature of mini-narratives. 
Aside from othering (chapter 1) and associating (chapter 2), naming represents another 
strategy of stancetaking present in the collected data. While naming can be the simplest form of 
taking a stance in the discussion (e.g., Those shoes are magic! > ‘magic shoes’), it can take a 
variety of forms. In the Western Daily forum, anti-Silesian posters have taken stancetaking 
through naming to another level by engaging their linguistic creativity and exploiting the 
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derivational flexibility of Polish as a synthetic language. As a result, they saturate the discussions 
with both the base linguistic form as well as its numerous derivatives, all of which perform a 
pronounced ideological and referential function. In doing so, anti-Silesian posters have 
successfully crafted a whole anti-Silesian narrative that taps into the “camouflaged German 
option” discourse (see chapter 2) and reproduces it through a network of newly created words 
used to name members of the pro-Silesian camp. This is the topic of this chapter, in which I 
critically approach and examine the emergence and perseverance of one such naming strategy 
that has the neologism szlezjer at its base. 
Henceforth, whenever I refer to szlezjer mini-narratives, what I mean are local, single, 
and fractional iterations of the grand szlezjer narrative that uses ideas embedded in the 
camouflaged German option discourse (see the previous chapter) as its ideological backbone. 
Socio-pragmatically, mini-narratives are representational in that they describe the reality from a 
particular perspective (anti-Silesian in the case of the szlezjer larger narrative) and persuasive in 
that they purport to convince the forum audience that these representations are ideologically 
“correct” and “true,” hence should be adopted in discussions about Silesian identity as axiomatic. 
The most apparent characteristic of these mini-narratives is that each one of them includes one or 
more tokens of the word szlezjer or its derivative(s), which signals the informational content of 
each mini-narrative and which I call sociolinguistic labels. In the Western Daily forum, these 
mini-narratives are produced and interacted with in specific comment threads. Combined, these 
mini-narratives aid the discursive work of co-constructing a larger conglomerate of szlezjer mini-
stories — a grand szlezjer narrative. Schematically, the relationship between szlezjer mini-
narratives (MN), the grand szlezjer narrative (N), and sociolinguistic labels (SL) can be 
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symbolized with one large set (N) of smaller subsets (MN), each of which contains one or more 
tokens of SLs. 
I use the term grand szlezjer narrative as a catch-all that encompasses all iterations of 
singular szlezjer mini-narratives produced in the Western Daily forum that, considered together, 
construct one larger story about pro-Silesian posters and self-identified Silesians in general. 
Because this story is told and retold time and time again in the forum (as evident from the 
plethora of examples examined; see also the meta-szlezjer comment in 20 below), it effectively 
becomes a narrative, an ideologically constant story, according to which self-identified Silesians 
(represented in the forum by pro-Silesian posters) are so critical about the Polish state and nation 
that they, in fact, represent an anti-Polish point of view, the argument goes. Because their 
rhetoric is perceived as detrimental to the Polish national interest (at least by the anti-Silesian 
camp) and because references to German culture and nationhood are often used by pro-Silesian 
users to build their arguments, such correlation leads members of the anti-Silesian camp to 
produce an assumption that Silesian activism is seeking to benefit Germany and German national 
interests in the long run. This belief, conjoined with a disparaging attitude toward repeated 
discursive renouncements of Polish national identification, is then expressed through the 
neologism szlezjer and/or its various derivatives. Due to its referential characteristic, the term 
szlezjer becomes indexical in the Western Daily forum of the grand szlezjer narrative through the 
combination of repeated use and ideological associations tied to it in the minds of anti-Silesian 
posters. As a result, these labels help forum users easily discern the ideological leaning of both 
each post and its author. 
In this chapter, my focus will be mostly with mini-narratives as the building blocks of the 
grand szlezjer narrative that persists in modern-day Poland, shaping societal thinking about 
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Silesian identity. The ideological power of mini-narratives stems from the fact that mini-
narratives contain sociolinguistic labels used as discursive guideposts to recall larger narratives 
behind them (e.g., szlezjer in the data examined in this chapter). Sociolinguistic labels are 
inherently socio-linguistic because they combine linguistic form with social effect in that they 
immediately summon previously established narratives about people, objects, ideas, or 
phenomena that continue to be shaped by various narrators who engage in narrative co-
construction. Simply put, mini-narratives are narrative indices that index larger narratives in a 
concise manner. 
Consider the term hipster, which the Oxford English Dictionary dates for the early 1930s. 
The word has made its comeback in the last decade or so, becoming synonymous with people 
knowledgeable about recent cultural trends but considered cool and hip because positioned 
outside of the cultural mainstream (OED, 2019). While the label hipster is not a narrative, it 
nevertheless possesses a narrative potential that becomes immediately available to all familiar 
with the term. By calling someone a hipster, we readily invoke a whole gamut of assumptions 
and expectations about that person’s likes, favorite food, and preferred pastimes. Through 
repeated use, the idea of hipsters has entered individual lexicons, and this is precisely why it has 
accrued narrative potential that goes beyond the referential function each word possesses. In that 
manner, hipster as a sociolinguistic label has acquired another, narrative function. 
This function, as I show in this chapter, consists of two intertwined yet separate layers as 
it combines the purely narrative (in the descriptive sense of the word as a narrative referent, a 
point of reference to a larger narrative in place) character that is passive and the narrativizing 
function that is active and allows for continuous retellings of the originally narrated story. This 
may happen in a fashion that is either close to the original story (for instance, hipsters as 
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prototypical nonmainstream, independent consumers of culture) or more distant altogether (for 
instance, hipsters as positions that imply an alternative approach to the world in place, not just 
culture). By calling hipster and other terms/phrases sociolinguistic labels, I intend to mirror in 
terminology their purely narrative (in the sense outlined above) and narrativizing character. This 
is also the reason for employing a narrative-centered framework in this chapter to deconstruct the 
sociolinguistic significance of a sociolinguistic label, attested in and typical for the Western 
Daily forum, one which has relevance for the larger Polish-Silesian conflict over Silesian 
identity. Using the ideas of narrative accrual and narrative co-construction, I show how 
seemingly insignificant terms can effectively become powerful ways of talking about and 
representing a whole community—here, that of pro-Silesian posters (locally) and self-identified 
Silesians in general (more globally). 
Below, I display this mechanism in more depth by focusing on one specific example of 
mini-narratives and its derivational offshoots in the Western Daily forum, the neologism szlezjer 
(nativized into Polish from Germ. Schlesier ‘resident or native of Silesia’). In the context of this 
online space, szlezjer can be defined as a pejorative reference to a self-identified Silesian who 
rejects a simultaneous Polish national identification. While this neologism was coined and has 
been since used exclusively by anti-Silesian posters, its referents recruit solely from among 
members of the pro-Silesian camp. This is also the definition I adopt in this chapter. 
In the previous chapter, I have considered how the “camouflaged German option” (CGO) 
discourse pervades contemporary debates on Silesian identity on the internet. In this chapter, I 
investigate the narrative function of the neologism szlezjer by focusing on the ongoing co-
construction of a larger, anti-Silesian narrative (the grand szlezjer narrative) that is grounded in 
the CGO discourse. In doing so, I draw a connection between the two chapters in order to 
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demonstrate gradual progression in ways of representing self-identified Silesians as the process 
of labeling (the CGO discourse chapter or, as I call it, OTHERING-2, that is, the othering process 
taken to the second level) gives way to narrating (OTHERING-3, or, third-level). Ultimately, my 
goal is to establish a link between the previous chapter and the data examined in this chapter by 
showing how the CGO discourse provides referential ground for the co-construction of anti-
Silesian narratives through the term szlezjer. 
In this chapter, I examine the role that the neologism szlezjer and/or its derivatives play in 
the co-construction and distribution of szlezjer mini-narratives across time and space. I show 
how the neologism accumulates ideological load and, employed by different commenters at 
various time and space, effectively becomes what I call a mini-narrative. I demonstrate that, 
through its repeated use, szlezjer consequently acquires indexical characteristics and transforms 
into an index of individual or group stance in the ongoing debate on Silesian identity. As I 
analyze the social import of szlezjer mini-narratives, I argue that anti-Silesian posters 
instrumentalize narrative for social control, utilizing szlezjer mini-narratives as an instrument of 
enforcing national homogeneity. From the anti-Silesian perspective, such homogeneity is 
understood in a totalizing manner, that is, both ethnically (thus, Poland should be a country 
where ethnic Poles possess dominant authority) and ideologically (thus, being ethnically Polish 
necessitates being a Polish patriot and acting accordingly in order to further the goals of Poland’s 
national interests). 
Such expectations emerge in the course of several discussions in the Western Daily forum 
as members of the anti-Silesian camp engage in narrative co-construction marked by repetitive 
use, in a hashtag-like manner, of the neologism szlezjer. The collaborative feature of digital 
narratives—what Page, Harper, and Frobenius (2013) call “networked narratives”— represents 
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the theoretical framework of this chapter. In their analysis of how narratives are constructed and 
disseminated on Facebook, the authors propose that narratives can be co-produced by 
participants in interaction, and that “[t]his is emphatically so in the context of social media where 
narrative production is dialogic in form” (194). Page and colleagues also observed that narrative 
production on Facebook “extends far beyond the simple, linear sequences of single teller stories” 
(211). 
The same observation is true about the Western Daily forum where pro- and anti-Silesian 
posters are in constant conversation with each other, effectively producing forms of “narrative 
co-tellership” (201). The relatively free spread of narratives in digital spaces brings forth the 
issue of narrative circulation. To describe the circulation of stories across time and media, 
Walker (2004) proposes the idea of “distributed story.” In this perspective, distributed stories 
“seek to be viral… looking for readers who will be carriers as well as interpreters” (20). As 
shown later in the chapter, these roles can overlap to a substantial degree as anti-Silesian posters 
function as both carriers and interpreters of szlezjer mini-narratives. In doing so, they provide 
forum audience with fragmentary examples of such narratives as well as their interpretations 
from a staunchly anti-Silesian perspective. Another concept useful in my analysis is that of 
“shared stories.” According to Page (2018), a shared story is “a retelling, produced by many 
tellers, across iterative textual segments, which promotes shared attitudes between its tellers” 
(18). Since shared stories are also co-constructed, what this means is that they are “distributed 
between the multiple contributions of different tellers” (20). The same is true about the narrative 
activity of posters in the Western Daily forum. 
Data and methodology 
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Below, I present selected examples of szlezjer mini-narratives collected from the Western Daily 
discussion forum. While many of the posts in the data used for this chapter come from the 
original dissertation corpus, I have also decided to expand my search beyond the corpus by 
including some additional examples from the forum. In both cases, my selection process was 
similar. First, I have performed a data-wide keyword search by inputting the root szlezj* 
(including its variations as attested in my corpus as well as misspellings, e.g., szlesj, szlej, szlys, 
szlyzj) to identify and localize szlezjer mini-narratives. Then, I have pre-screened the instances 
elicited in such a way for clarity and relevance. Given the relatively open and unmoderated 
environment of the Western Daily forum, this was to ensure that the examples selected for 
further analysis are pertinent to both the topic of this chapter as well as the larger theme of 
Silesian identity. After discarding irrelevant comments or those that carried unclear messages, I 
made the final selection of posts that comprise the data analyzed in this chapter. 
In previous research on narratives and identity, one of the strands was concerned with 
how narratively constructed storyworlds reflect beliefs about social categories (De Fina 2006). 
One way of approaching such analyses is to look at specific, micro-linguistic choices made in the 
course of (co-)constructing narratives to arrive at the deeper level of indexicalization processes 
embedded in and conveyed through such choices. To this end, I have oriented both the selection 
and analysis of my data around the neologism szlezjer (including its derivatives or alternate 
forms, see the previous paragraph) because of its double-layered relevance: as a linguistic index 
of social attitudes toward such referenced community and as a crucial linguistic chunk of 
narratives (co-)constructed in the Western Daily forum. 
Because of this local (in the context of the chapter) and global (in the context of the 
dissertation) significance, the use and spread of instances of szlezjer brings forth an opportunity 
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to trace how political discourse becomes saturated with clear ideological connotations and how 
narratives produced around this word help circulate and fortify the message compressed in the 
neologism or its further, creative elaborations. In this manner, tracking the emergence (in the 
relative, not the absolute sense) and the spread of szlezjer mini-narratives can help us better 
understand the source of negative emotions surrounding the ongoing discussion on Silesian 
identity. At the same time, my discussion of szlezjer mini-narratives bears relevance for current 
research on verbal violence, hateful speech, and radicalization carried out across various 
disciplines. 
Methodologically, my analysis of szlezjer mini-narratives is oriented in the following 
manner. First, I start with linguistically executed co-construction of identity through overt 
nominalization and categorization strategies to then proceed to how such constructs become 
foundational for szlezjer mini-narratives in order to demonstrate how such ways of speaking 
about pro-Silesian posters become de facto covert attempts at exercising social control over self-
identified Silesians from the hegemonic, Polish national point of view. As I progress with the 
analysis, I approach my examples from the critical perspective informed by the Discourse-
Historical Approach (DHA) as well as earlier work on language and social control, especially 
that conducted by Norman Fairclough and others. As Fairclough (1992) observed, “[i]t is 
increasingly through texts (notably but by no means only those of the media) that social control 
and social domination are exercised (and often negotiated and resisted)” (212). 
Analysis 
To simplify the analytic process as well as account for the linear development of szlezjer mini-
narratives, I present my examples in chronological order. While I anonymize posters’ nicknames 
in my data, in line with the approach adopted globally in this dissertation, I take note when the 
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same poster authors two or more comments due to the relevance of such information for the 
issues of narrative accrual, spread, and circulation in the Western Daily forum; the same goes for 
timestamp information, which I also include in the more general form of time periods. Because 
the neologism szlezjer has no equivalent in English, I translate it as Schlesier, in line with the 
original form that contains a German-language reference to someone residing in or hailing from 
Silesia, and treat it as the morphological base, to which derivational endings are applied. 
 
case study #1 (2011) 
My analysis of szlezjer mini-narratives in the Western Daily discussion forum begins the oldest 
attestations of the neologism szlezjer in my data. The posts included in this section come from a 
discussion that evolved from the controversial for many pro-Silesian users interview with Wiktor 
Skworc (Pustułka 2011), the Roman Catholic archbishop of the Katowice diocese, referenced in 
the chapter on mutual othering. In the interview, Skworc stated the following: “Indeed, we live in 
Silesia, but we’re Poles,” which also happens to be the title given to the interview by editors of 
the Western Daily. As expected, this triggered an outburst of comments on part of pro-Silesian 
posters who received Skworc’s words as a perceived threat to their identification as self-
identified Silesians and a veiled attempt to erase Silesian identity altogether. In total, the 
interview elicited 296 entries in the comments section.64 The interview was published on 
December 25, 2011, and all the posts analyzed in this section were written between December 
25th and 29th the same year by a user whom I call “poster F.” 
 
64 This was the number of comments attested when collecting the data for this chapter. As of April 23, 
2019, the total number of comments — per what is displayed on the page — is 278, which suggests that the 
comment section has been moderated. 
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 While a large number of commenters took an anti-Skworc stance, those from the anti-
Silesian camp used this opportunity to launch a critique of their ideological foes, accusing them 
of threatening a prestigious member of the Catholic Church in Upper Silesia. Because the region 
has traditionally been devoutly Catholic, even when part of Prussia and later Germany (J. E. 
Bjork 2008), this allowed anti-Silesian commenters to employ the idea of sectarianism 
concerning those disenchanted with Skworc’s statement. 
This is the case in example (1) where the author uses the metaphor of a sect to represent 
commenters with a staunchly pro-Silesian stance. 
 
(1) Ksiądz biskup stwierdził fakt. Śląsk to Polska a Ślązak to Polak ze Śląska / a to 
szlyzjerstwo to coś w rodzaju mody. Oj niespodoba się to internetowym RAŚistowskim 
sekciarzom. Zresztą sekta to sekta, głos hierarchy katolickiego i tak nie będzie miał dla 
nich znaczenia. Ciekawe kiedy Gorzałka zacznie wyświęcać włsnych biskupów ( 
precedens jest istnieje kościół tzw polsko - katolicki ) Wesołych Świąt 
 
‘His Excellency Archbishop stated a fact. Silesia is Poland, and Silesian is a Pole from 
Silesia. / And this Schlesierdom is kind of a fashion. Oh, the internet RAŚist65 sectarians 
are not going to like that. Besides, a sect is a sect, the voice of a Catholic hierarch won’t 
matter to them anyway. I wonder when Gorzałka66 will start ordaining his own bishops 
(there is a precedence, the so-called Polish-Catholic Church). Happy holidays!’ 
 
 
65 A play on the words RAŚ (from Pol. Ruch Autonomii Śląska, Silesian Autonomy Movement) and 
rasistowski ‘racist’. 
66 Actually: Jerzy Gorzelik (see footnote 13); Pol. gorzałka means ‘booze’. 
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Here, poster F uses the newly coined word szlyzjerstwo as a signal for a larger story about pro-
Silesian posters that is about to happen (see examples 2–7 below). Since the comment in (1) was 
written under a 2011 news story, the word szlyzjerstwo becomes the first attested token of using 
the szlezjer-/szlyzjer- stem as a sociolinguistic label in my data. The word szlyzjerstwo represents 
a neologism derived from another neologism, szlyzjer, used in its -y- variant here (that is, 
szlyzjer—in an attempt to mock the standard German pronunciation—instead of szlezjer).67 In 
Polish, the suffix -stwo can be used to form words that denote abstract names of qualities, 
activities, or states, e.g., chamstwo ‘boorishness’, lalkarstwo ‘puppetry’, dyrektorstwo 
‘directorship’ (Grzegorczykowa, Laskowski, and Wróbel 1984, 335), or collective masses of 
people, e.g., chłopstwo ‘peasantry’. Given this, the double neologism szlyzjerstwo included in 
this example refers to the activity or state of sharing and/or supporting ideas of the pro-Silesian 
camp. As in the popular colloquial phrase chamstwo i drobnomieszczaństwo ‘boorishness and 
narrow-mindedness’, the suffix -stwo allows poster F to incorporate a negative epistemic stance 
on the topic of the conversation (the idea that Silesian identity represents a concept that is 
altogether different from Polish identity), in which the form szlezjer/szlyzjer represents a direct 
expression of such stance. As it becomes apparent later on, szlyzjerstwo can also be employed as 
a collective reference to people with a pro-Silesian orientation while retaining its pejorative 
connotations combined with the expression of a negative epistemic stance toward the referenced 
group. 
 
67 While the exact form of the neologism oscillates between szlezjer (less common in the data selected for 
this chapter) and szlyzjer (more common in my data), with slight alternations due to misspellings possible for both 
forms (e.g., szlejz- or szlyjz-), I treat all these tokens as examples of one and the same form because they all shared a 
common reference—that of a szlezjer/szlyzjer. Because the form szlezjer (due to its resemblance with the German 
word Schlesier) is less opaque to decipher than szlyzjer (which includes a slight orthographic alternation that is 
phonologically motivated), I decided to use the label szlezjer (mini-)narrative(s). 
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Along these lines, in (1) poster F communicates a negative evaluation of the ideals 
promoted by members of the pro-Silesian camp, suggesting that critics of Skworc exhibit a 
sectarian mindset, best exemplified in the statement “a sect is a sect.” By doing so, the 
commenter discursively others members of the pro-Silesian camp as those belonging to a radical 
yet numerically smaller minority. Most importantly, however, such categorization labels pro-
Silesian posters as those who essentially deviate from the mainstream view in their opinion on 
Silesian identity. With the provocative title of the comment (Skworc’s statement is a fact, being 
Silesian equals being Polish) as well as a direct reference to members of the pro-Silesian camp, 
poster F thus draws critics of Skworc into the discussion. 
As the discussion develops, poster F does not stop there and contributes to the 
conversation five more times for the total of seven posts (!) written under the identical nickname 
in the period of five days. This, I argue, represents a significant moment in the construction and 
promotion of the grand szlezjer narrative because it puts in motion the mechanism of narrative 
accrual (Bruner 1991). According to Bruner, narrative accrual has to do with stories coming 
together to create a unified whole, eventually creating histories, traditions, and cultures. Poster 
F’s commenting activity launches the process of narrative accrual in the Western Daily forum, as 
evidenced by the total of 15 tokens of szlezjer or its derivatives. 
 
Table 6: Tokens of szlyzjer (including its derivatives) authored by poster F 
post original (NOM) gloss suffixation syntagma 
1 szlyzjerstwo Schlesierdom -stwo (abstract, 
collective) 
– 
2 szlyzjeryzm Schlesierism -yzm (set of beliefs) adherents of X68 
2 SZLYZJERSKI Schlesier -ski (adjectivization) X people 
3 szlyzjerski Schlesier (adj., sg.) -ski (adjectivization) X sabbath 
 
68 “X” stands for the form included in the second (“original”) column. 
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3 szlyzjerstwo Schlesierdom -stwo (abstract, 
collective) 
– 
3 szlyzjerki little Schlesiers -ki (non-virile pl., 
pejorative) 
my dear X 
4 szlyzjerskie Schlesier (adj., pl.) -ski (adjectivization) X sabbaths 
4 szlyzjerska Schlesier (adj., sg.) -ski (adjectivization) X race 
4 szlyzjeryzm Schlesierism -yzm (set of beliefs) time of X 
5 szlyzjerscy Schlesier (adj., pl.) -ski (adjectivization) X sectarians 
6 szlyzjerscy Schlesier (adj., pl.) -ski (adjectivization) X Nazis 
6 szlyzjerstwo Schlesierdom -stwo (abstract, 
collective) 
sectarian, Nazi X 
7 szlyzjerskie Schlesier (adj., pl.) -ski (adjectivization) X lies 
7 szlyzjerstwo Schlesierdom -stwo (abstract, 
collective) 
– 
7 Szlyzjerland Schlesierland -land (country, region) this X of yours 
 
This process then proceeds in the following manner: 
1. The idea of szlezjers, that is, self-identified Silesians who reject a one-to-one 
correspondence between Silesian and Polish identification, is born; 
2. Users of the Western Daily forum—both commenters and readers—are exposed to the 
narrative of szlezjers, portrayed as ethnic separatists who pose a threat to the Polish 
national interest due to their alleged affinity for and/or ideological allegiance with 
Germany, which automatically implies a stance that goes against what is perceived as 
Poland’s best interest; 
3. The narrative of szlezjers begins amassing narrative accrual; 
4. Narrative accrual is accompanied with the emergence and spread of various derivatives 
created from the neologism szlezjer (see further examples in this section); 
5. The term szlezjer becomes repeatedly used in the discussion on Silesian identity held in 
the Western Daily forum, which comes with significant consequences in terms of 
narrative co-construction and circulation in this digital space; 
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6. At the same time, each mention of the word szlezjer represents a performance of anti-
Silesian identity, ideologically saturated and predictable in the long run. Such 
performances are sustained by continued co-construction and reproduction, which 
eventually lead to the emergence of szlezjer mini-narratives. 
 
Since pro-Silesian posters remain active in the thread under the Skworc interview, the author of 
the comment in (1) returns to the forum and adds another entry the next day (2). 
 
(2) ksiądz biskup ma u was przechlapane a kim wy jesteście żeby miał się tym przeimować ? 
/ Dużo was nie ma ot kolejna sekta pewnie Świadkowie Jehowy w województwie mają 
podobną liczebność jak wyznawcy szlyzjeryzmu. Ja tam twierdzę, że powinniście 
dokonać prawidłowego przekładu bibli. Naród wybrany to oczywiście NARUT 
SZLYZJERSKI. Pierwszy człowiek to oczywiście Jorguś a nie jakiś Adam, Eden ( raj ) 
znajdował się gdzieś pod Szopienicami. A jeden Abramuś wyprowadził narut z gorolskiej 
niewoli i rozstąpiły się przed nim wody Brynicy i przyprowadził do ziemi obiecanej czyli 
Bundesrepublik. Babilon przecież to jasne oznacza Warszawkę. Mesjasz to nasz 
umiłowany przywódca Dr G. Wkrótce zacznie wyświęcać własnych kapłanów żeby 
głosili prawdziwe słowo Boże a nie te gorolskie przekręty. 
 
‘His Excellency Bishop is toast – and who are you all to make him care about that? / 
There aren’t many of you, just another sect, Jehovah’s Witnesses in this province are 
probably as numerous as adherents of Schlesierism. I on another hand believe that you 
should carry out a proper translation of the Bible. The chosen people were obviously the 
199 
 
SCHLESIER PEEPULL. The first man [on earth] was obviously Georgie,69 and not an 
Adam, Eden (paradise) was located somewhere near Szopienice.70 And one Abe led the 
peepul out of non-Silesian captivity and the waters of Brynica71 parted before him and he 
brought them along to the Promised Land, that is, the Federal Republic [of Germany]. It’s 
obviously clear that Babylon denotes Warsaw [pejoratively]. Our beloved leader, Dr. 
G.,72 is the Messiah. Soon he will start ordaining his own priests so that they preach the 
real Gospel and not those non-Silesian scams.’ 
 
Here, poster F co-constructs the grand szlezjer narrative (see point 6 above) further by adding 
two more phrases to the slowly growing inventory of all things Schlesier: Schlesierism as a 
doctrine followed by pro-Silesian posters and the category of the szlezjer people, here 
intentionally misspelled to produce a mocking effect. Both of these are involved in the 
production of a constructed narrative that takes up the sectarian trope included in (1) and 
develops it into an ironic short story about self-identified Silesians as the chosen people. This is 
accomplished in two ways: through the Biblical-like story of Schlesiers as well as the high 
concentration of religion-related words and phrases (e.g., “adherents of Schlesierism,” 
“translation of the Bible,” “the chosen people,” “Eden,” etc.). The sect metaphor repeated in this 
comment allows poster F to further promote the idea that self-identified Silesians represent an 
offshoot from the larger category of ethnic Poles, united and led by Jerzy Gorzelik (or, the 
“Messiah” in poster F’s parlance), the leader of Silesian autonomists. Consequently, members of 
 
69 Georgie (Pol. Jorguś), a reference to Jerzy Gorzelik. 
70 Szopienice is a present-day district of Katowice, the capital of the Silesia Province, and the birthplace of 
Kazimierz Kutz, a film director and self-identified Silesian who has portrayed the region and its residents in his 
films. 
71 Brynica is the river that separates the historical region of Silesia from the Dąbrowa Basin; 
metaphorically, it denotes a boundary between Silesia (‘Us’) and non-Silesia (‘Them’). 
72 A reference to Jerzy Gorzelik. 
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the pro-Silesian camp who disagree with this statement are cast together as followers of what 
poster F calls Schlesierism. 
The telling of the invented story about the szlezjer people does the ideological work of 
discrediting pro-Silesian ideas through repeated mockery. This effect is further amplified by the 
strategic referencing of people (e.g., Adam, Eden, Messiah, Dr. G.) and geographical names 
(e.g., Szopienice, Brynica, Bundesrepublik, Babylon) that provide the narrative of szlezjers with 
intentional and specific ideological ramifications. Thus, the proper names in this example serve 
as either deictic (locating the story in the local context of Silesia, e.g., Szopienice, Brynica, Dr. 
G.) or ideological (Bundesrepublik, Babylon) pointers that provide readers with a readymade 
evaluation of the social world being constructed. The ideas of Germany as the Promised Land 
and Warsaw as Babylon, that is, the oppressor against which self-identified Silesians must 
struggle in their mission for autonomy and recognition, represent the key ideological juncture of 
this post. This juxtaposition of “bad” Poland (the oppressor, here metonymically represented by 
its capital, Warsaw) with “good” Germany (the Promised Land) from the assumed viewpoint of 
pro-Silesian posters provides readers with a simplistic ideological matrix, which casts self-
identified Silesians against Poland and, simultaneously, alongside Germany. In narratological 
terms, poster F narrativizes the unresolved Polish-Silesian conflict over Silesian identity, 
effectively producing a storyworld with the implicit good (=Poland) and the explicit bad (= 
Silesians) characters by introducing a simplistic, evaluative connection between self-identified 
Silesians who perceive Poland as their collective enemy and choose allegiance with Germany 
instead. Such portrayal plays well into the larger, implicit trope of potential German threat due to 
Silesian ethnic activism (including the oft-repeated slogan of autonomy for the region) that 
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pervades much of public discourse in the ongoing debate on Silesian identity (see the previous 
chapter). 
Because subsequent comments authored by poster F again tap into the idea of a 
camouflaged German option and/or retell the narrative of szlezjers introduced in (1) and (2), 
below I reproduce in the chronological order the remaining five comments from the series of 
seven written in this thread and then provide an overall summary of the major themes present 
there. 
 
(3) Zlot czarownic czyli szlyzjerski sabat / Najlepsze jest to że ci co sami nikogo nie 
szanują domagają się szacunku do siebie. Biskup jest Ślązakiem i Polakiem dokładnie jak 
większość, zamiast się cieszyć że Ślązak stał na czele jednej z małopolskich diecezji to 
szlyzjerstwo mąci i robi problemy. Kutz/c którego kochacie mieszka w Warszawie a o 
Slasku przypomina sobie zazwyczaj gdzieś w okolicach wyborów. On jednak jest słuszny 
po bazie i po lini. Ci sami co opluwają abp. Skworca za Kuca daliby się pokroić. Ja 
zauważam elementarny brak logiki i typową mentalność sekciarską. Podobny stan 
faktyczny może być różnie interpretowany w zależności od tego czy dana osoba popiera 
sekciarzy czy nie. Nie wiem czy wielu małopolskich asystentów przywiózł ale jak był 
biskupem w Tarnowie to mógł tam przywieżź równie wielu albo i więcej śląskich 
asystentów. Stosujecie więc moje drogie szlyzjerki typowa dialektykę marksistowską ale 
pal was diabli. 
 
‘Witch rally, or a Schlesier sabbath. / The best thing about it is that those who respect no 
one demand respect for themselves. The bishop is a Silesian and a Pole, just like the 
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majority. Instead of being happy that a Silesian led one of the Lesser Polish73 dioceses, 
the Schlesierdom stirs and creates problems. Kutz/c,74 whom you love, lives in Warsaw 
and usually reminds himself about Silesia sometime around the elections. He, however, is 
right [unclear]. The same ones who spit on Abp Skworc would do anything for Kuc. 
What I’m noticing are an elementary lack of logic and a typical sectarian mentality. The 
same actual state can be differently interpreted depending on whether a given person 
supports the sectarians or not. I don’t know if [he] brought many Lesser Polish assistants, 
but when he was the bishop of Tarnów75 he could have brought with himself as many 
Silesian assistants, or even more. You’re using then, my dear little Schlesiers, a typical 
Marxist dialectic, but to hell with you.’ 
 
(4) Sekta to sekta. Wszyscy myślą tak samo a każdy myślący samodzielnie to odstępca. / DZ 
jest ostatnim forum tolerującym szlyzjerskie sabaty. Stąd wciąż zwolennicy RAŚizmu 
okupują to forum. Nie jest ich wielu regularnie powtarza się 20 - 30 "walczących" 
nicków ale są zmobilizowani i zdeterminowani. Nawet argumentów używają tych 
samych, ksiądz arcybiskup nie popiera ich sekty a nie można napisać że jest zdrajcą rasy 
szlyzjerskiej to rozlegają się jęki że "dzieli wiernych". Stare, prymitywne PRowskie 
sztuczki. Na tej samej zasadzie gdyby artykuł dotyczył np. Świadków Jechowy forum 
natychmiast byłoby opanowane przez ich wyznawców uparcie "ewangelizujących" ogół. 
Czas szlyzjeryzmu mija. Od lat kisicie się w tej samej grupie wyborców i osiągacie 
 
73 Lesser Poland is the historical region located in present-day southeastern Poland with Cracow as its 
major city. 
74 See footnote 22. 




podobne wyniki ( dowód ok 160 tys. głosów w 2001 i 2011 w wyborach do Senatu gdzie 
startowaliście pod własnym szyldem )Ja i kilku innych jeszcze z wami wojujemy ale na 
fanatyzm nie ma rady. Powinniście się kisić we własnym sosie. 
 
‘A sect is a sect. Everyone thinks similarly while those who think for themselves are 
renegades. / The Western Daily forum is the last one to tolerate Schlesier sabbaths, 
hence followers of RAŚism76 still occupy this forum. There aren’t many of them, 20-30 
“fighting” nicknames regularly repeat, but they’re mobilized and determined. They even 
use the same arguments, His Excellency Archbishop doesn’t support their sect, but you 
can’t write that he’s the traitor to the Schlesier race or moaning that he “divides the 
worshippers” is heard. Old, primitive PR tricks. Following the same pattern, if an article 
concerned, for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the forum would be immediately seized by 
their believers stubbornly “trying to evangelize” the whole community. The time of 
Schlesierism is gone. You’ve been stuck with the same group of voters for years and you 
reach similar results (proof: some 160,000 votes in 2001 and 2011, the Senate elections 
when you ran under your own name). I and a few more [people] keep on fighting with 
you, but there’s no help for fanaticism. You should stick to your own people.’ 
 
(5) [nickname omitted] nie zaniżaj danych nie 30 ale minimum 40 / 38,3 milionów w kraju ( 
minus mniejszości i ze 200 koła sekciarzy, razem ok. 0,5 miliona, może 0,6 )Polacy na 
wschodzie ( oficjalne dane ok. 1 miliona ale spokojnie razy 2 a być może nawet 3 )Plus 
kilkanascie milionów Poloni ( jakaś część to wciąż Polacy niech tylko milion czy dwa ale 
 




reszta też czuje więź z krajem przodków )Razem na spokojnie 40 milionów i dalszych 10 
- 12 naszej krwi. Sekciarze szlyzjerscy mogą sobie uważać się i za Marsjan w końcu jest 
wolność i demokracja. A koniec końcem są skazani na asymilację jeśli nie do pnia z 
którego wyrośli tj. Polaków to do narodu który im imponuje i który nieudolnie próbują 
małpować tj. Niemców. 150 a niechby nawet i 300 tysięcy nie ma szans na przetrwanie. 
To kwestia matematyki. 
 
‘[nickname omitted] don’t lower the data, not 30 but 40 [millions of Poles] minimum / 
38.3 million [of Poles] in the country (minus the minorities and some 200K sectarians, 
ca. 0.5 million in total, 0.6 perhaps), Poles east of Poland (about 1 million according to 
official data, but there are easily 2, and perhaps even 3 [millions of them]), plus more 
than 10 millions of Poles abroad (some part of them are still Poles, be it only a million or 
two, but the rest also feels connection with their ancestral home), in total 40 millions 
easily, with further 10–12 millions of [people] of our blood. Schlesier sectarians can 
even self-identify as Martians, freedom and democracy do exist, after all. But, at the end 
of the day, they’re doomed to assimilation, if not with the trunk they grew up from, that is 
Poles, then the people they’re impressed with and the people they clumsily try to ape, that 
is Germans. 150 – or may it even be 300 thousand [of self-identified Silesians] – have no 
chances of surviving. It’s a question of numbers.’ 
 
(6) Szlyzjerscy naziści i papieża gotowi zastąpić i dyktować mu co ma mówić / [nickname 
omitted] i kameraden przegnali was z forum GW ( nawet jak na ich standarty hitleryzm 
zbyt z was wystawał )Czy wogle jest na tym forum moderator ? Dlaczego pozwala na 
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obrażanie Polski, Polaków i ogólnie katolików ? Nadejdzie dzień kiedy za taką postawę 
także redaktor naczelny DZ zapłaci gorzką cenę. I garść sekciarskiego nazistowskiego 
szlyzjerstwa wcale mu wtedy nie pomoże. 
 
‘Schlesier Nazis are ready to even replace the Pope and to dictate to him what he’s 
supposed to say. / [nickname omitted] and [your] friends [German], you were banished 
from the Gazeta Wyborcza77 forum (your Hitlerism was, even for their standards, 
protruding too much). Is there a moderator on this forum at all? Why does [the 
moderator] allow Poland, Poles, and in general Catholics to be offended? There will 
come a day when the Western Daily editor-in-chief will also pay a bitter price for such an 
attitude. And a handful of sectarian, Nazi Schlesierdom won’t help him then at all.’ 
 
(7) Jak zwykle szlyzjerskie KŁAMSTWA. Zdarza wam się choć raz do roku powiedzieć 
prawdę ? / A ci Bawarczycy i Sasi to jakieś odrębne narody tak ? Bo moim zdaniem to po 
prostu Niemcy tyle, że z róznych regionów. Jeśli cytujecie cytujcie Długosza to proszę o 
całość a nie o fragment wypaczający sens całej wypowiedzi. "Nie ma bowiem ludu ani 
kraju, który by był tak skłonny do nienawiści wobec Polaków jak Ślązacy, którzy boleją, 
iż Królestwo Polskie cieszy się powodzeniem i jak odszczepieńcy i gorzej niż obcy 
patrzą niechętnie na pomyślny rozwój własnego narodu i języka. " Z tego wynika chyba 
jasno, że dla Długosza Ślązacy to część narodu polskiego, ale - niestety - pod wpływem 
niemczyzny występująca przeciwko Polsce. Czyli zupełnie jak dziś. Szlyzjerstwo 
 
77 A liberal newspaper published in Warsaw, Poland. 
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nienawidzi Polski i nienawidzi jej części Śląska. Na 3 argumenty 2 przeinaczenia czyli 
kłamstwa i manipulacje. Taki ma być ten wasz Szlyzjerland ? 
 
‘Schlesier LIES, as usual. Does it ever happen – at least once a year – that you tell the 
truth? / And these Bavarians and Saxons are some distinct peoples, yes? Because, in my 
opinion, they’re simply Germans, just from different regions. If you quote Długosz,78 
then please [include] the whole quote, not an excerpt distorting the sense of the whole 
utterance. “For there aren’t people who would be so prone to hating Poles like Silesians 
who grieve that the Kingdom of Poland enjoys its prosperity and, like dissidents and in a 
worse manner than foreigners, look at the successful development of their own people 
and language.” I guess what follows from that is that for Długosz, Silesians were a part of 
the Polish people but – unfortunately – one that comes out against Poland due to German 
influence. That is, just like today. Schlesierdom hates Poland and hates its part, Silesia. 
Out of three arguments [you get] two misrepresentations, that is, lies and manipulations. 
Is that how this Schlesierland of yours is supposed to be?’ 
 
Overall, the examples presented in this section oscillate around two major topical clusters: (1) 
truth, ideology, and reality, and (2) Poland and being Polish. As for the former, poster F implies 
repeatedly that ideas promoted by the pro-Silesian camp have nothing to do with reality of truth 
(here understood in absolute terms), hence the references to Schlesierism as a fashion (which in 
itself represents a temporally finite and transitory phenomenon) or the suggestion that pro-
Silesian commenters can even self-identify as Martians (but this, the argument goes, will not 
 




effectively make them Martians, or make others treat them as such). This belief is perhaps most 
aptly expressed in the call to carry out a “proper translation of the Bible,” followed by the 
poster’s creative re-interpretation of some of the key Biblical motives so that they fit pro-Silesian 
posters’ assumed outlook on the world. The metaphor of the chosen people, applied to self-
identified Silesians, serves as an ironic way of ridiculing pro-Silesian claims about 
discrimination and exclusion experienced in modern-day Poland.79 
The larger concept of truth is here tightly linked to that of ideology, touched upon here by 
the various religious references. According to the szlezjer mini-narratives constructed by poster 
F, members of the pro-Silesian camp are exaggeratingly dogmatic in their beliefs (hence the 
repeated allusions to sectarianism), to the point of being ready to override the Pope, the highest 
authority in the Roman Catholic church. This alleged ideological zeal is further amplified by the 
references to Nazis (e.g., “Schlesier Nazis,” “Nazi Schlesierdom,” but also “Schlesier race” with 
a clear separatist undertone) used in examples (1–7), who for the Polish public opinion represent 
an example of extreme ideological dedication, no matter the cost. At the same time, such 
syntagmas help entrench in the popular consciousness the often-implied association between 
self-identified Silesians and Germany, similarly to the idea of a “camouflaged German option.” 
 
79 While a broader analysis of the trope of the chosen people goes beyond the scope of this chapter, it opens 
up a new domain of inquiry, given the strong Romantic tradition of Messianism in the Polish culture (literature in 
particular). Viewed from this perspective, pro-Silesian attempts to build Silesian identity around the idea of 
martyrdom that self-identified Silesians have historically experienced from their more powerful overlords—and are 
experiencing now, the argument goes—represent a direct challenge to the Polish national narrative of martyrdom, 
which positioned Poles and Poland as the victims suffering from the hands of oppressive intruders and invaders, 
including Austria, Prussia, and Russia, the three monarchies that partitioned the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
in the late eighteenth century, as well as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Since 
these narratives position Poles as exclusively victims of turbulent Central European history, adopting a narrative of 
victims by self-identified Silesians would result in a direct challenge of the Polish victimhood narrative and imply 
that Poles were not passive receivers of suffering but also active producers of suffering, since contemporary 
narratives of Silesian victimhood tend to (over)emphasize Silesian powerlessness and Polish agency in dealing with 
Silesia over the course of the history (hence the idea of śląska krzywda ‘Silesian harm’). Hopefully, future research 
will address some of these questions more closely. 
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The trope of Germany is linked to the second major theme in poster F’s szlezjer mini-
narratives – that of Poland and Polish national interest. The poster’s stance on what it means to 
be Silesian is voiced in the first comment in the series, which equates being Silesian with being 
Polish (and living in the region of Silesia). The significance of this statement (“Silesia is Poland, 
and Silesian is a Pole from Silesia”) mostly lies in the inescapable binary proposed by poster F, 
according to which residents of Silesia are left with two choices in terms of their ethno-national 
identification: either Polish or non-Polish (that is, Schlesier), which in itself represents an anti-
Polish stance, the argument goes. This thought is best expressed in the poster’s belief that it is 
not Silesians but Schlesiers who hate Poland and the Polish part of Silesia. In advancing this 
idea, poster F builds on and skillfully incorporates Skworc’s pronouncement that people who live 
in Silesia are in fact Poles. Due to their numerical disadvantage, those who disagree are doomed 
for assimilation with either Poles or Germans, a nation that Schlesiers are impressed with and 
inaptly try to copy from, the poster suggests. 
Overall, poster F employs five different tokens of szlyzjer or its derivatives (szlyzjerstwo, 
szlyzjerski, szlyzjeryzm, szlyzjerki, and szlyzjerland), all of which are repeated fifteen times in the 
examples presented in this section. The choice of accompanying words in szlyzjer-syntagmas 
implies a consistent attempt at constructing a highly ideologized representation of self-identified 
Silesians (see the last column in Table 6), which further strengthens the overtone of such 
constructed messages. This szlezjer mini-narrative is co-constructed in the same comments 
thread by another poster, identified with a different nickname. The commenter enters the 
discussion under the interview with Skworc with a strong message (8) for those who criticized 




(8) Ale się szlyzjerstwo zagrzało Sekta bez moralności,jesteście silni tak jak piszecie to 
zademonstrujcie swoją siłę,któryś z was baranów napisał że [nickname omitted], 
[nickname omitted] itd. to jedna osoba naniosę wam poprawkę nas Polaków jest około 30 
milionów życzę powodzenia w rasistowskich działaniach raś-iści.Obrzydliwe 
szlyzjerstwo uszkodzony genom!!! 
 
‘Just [look at] how the Schlesierdom heated up! A sect devoid of morality, [if] you’re as 
strong as you write then demonstrate your strength, one of you idiots wrote that 
[nickname omitted], [nickname omitted], etc., are the same person. Let me amend that – 
there are some 30 million of us, Poles, good luck in [your] racist activities, you 
RAŚists.80 Disgusting Schlesierdom, damaged genome!!!’ 
 
In this example, the poster repeats previously voiced claims about the dogmatic way of thinking 
about Silesian identity exhibited by members of the pro-Silesian camp (hence the sect metaphor). 
Additionally, the commenter employs the notorious at this point neologism “Schlesierdom” 
concerning pro-Silesian posters who are called immoral, racist, and disgusting. In terms of tone 
and content, this post aligns well with the szlezjer mini-narrative constructed by poster F in the 
previous seven comments examined.81 In response (8a), a pro-Silesian commenter suggests that 
not all members of the Catholic church in Poland are against the idea that Silesians only 
 
80 A play on the words RAŚ (from Pol. Ruch Autonomii Śląska, Silesian Autonomy Movement) and rasiści 
‘racists’. 
81 While examples (1–7) and (8) were signed with different nicknames, the resemblance of the latter to the 
previous seven posts is obvious. Because of this and the fact that examples (1–8) were written from December 25th 
to December 29th, 2011, it could be that they were authored by the same person, although under different nicknames. 
The question of authorship does not, however, invalidate the significance of the post in (8) as well as the two 




represent a regional inflection of Poles. To prove that point, the commenter provides a direct 
quote from one of the priests. This suggestion is, however, rejected in (8b) where an anti-Silesian 
poster claims that authorities in the Catholic church put Poland and its national interest above 
anything else. 
 
(8a) Na szczęście to Wasi, [nickname omitted], polscy biskupi wstawiają się za 




"... Zwracając uwagę na rozległy i zróżnicowany świat ludzkiej biedy autor listu 
precyzuje, iż przejawia się ona „nie tylko w sferze materialno-ekonomicznej, ale 
także społeczno-politycznej, kiedy człowiek zostaje zepchnięty na margines 
społeczeństwa oraz kulturowej, kiedy odbiera mu się prawo przynależności do 
własnej grupy etnicznej”. 
 
‘Fortunately, it is your bishops, [nickname omitted], who are putting in a word for 




“Taking into consideration the vast and varied world of human poverty, the author 
of the letter specifies that poverty manifests itself «not only in the tangible, 
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economic sphere but in the sociopolitical one as well when a human is pushed 
aside to the margins of the society, and [in the] cultural [sphere] when one’s right 
for membership in their own ethnic group is taken away.»”’ 
 
(8b) Polscy biskupi to wstawiają się ale za ojczyzną całą, wolną, 
jednolitą... / i za wszystkimi jej "owieczkami" potrzebujacymi pomocy, 
także tymi czarnymi, grzesznymi, zabłąkanymi. Nigdy nie wstawią się za 
mniejszością szylzjerską, potem odrębnym językiem szlyzjerskim, potem 
odrębnym narodem szylzjerskim, potem odrębnym państwem 
szlyzjerskim wyhodowanym jak wrzód na ciele Polski, za 
volksdeutschowskie, a także i polskie pieniądze... Cud się nie zdarzy... 
 
‘Polish bishops are putting in a good word, but for the whole homeland, 
free, homogeneous… / And for all its “little sheep” in need of help, 
including black, sinful, and lost sheep. [The bishops] will never put in a 
good word for the Schlesier minority, then a separate Schlesier language, 
then a separate Schlesier people, then a separate Schlesier state cultivated 
like an ulcer on Poland’s body, for Volksdeutsch82 as well as Polish 
money… The miracle will not happen…’ 
 
In (8a), the pro-Silesian poster uses a quote from Władysław Zuziak, the former chancellor of the 
Pontifical University of John Paul II in Cracow, to construct an argument that will 
 
82 A Nazi-era term used with reference to ethnic Germans, people of German ancestry living outside 
Germany; in contemporary, metaphorical usage, it denotes pro-German traitors to the host nation. 
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counterbalance the statement made by Skworc in the interview. The quote comes from a 2011 
Christmas letter on the necessity of increased sensitivity to poverty written by Zuziak and clearly 
states that denying individuals the right to self-identify as members of their ethnic group 
represents an example of cultural poverty. Using this argument, the poster challenges the 
implications of Skworc’s pronouncement (“We live in Silesia, but we are Poles”) and draws 
attention to self-identified Silesians’ struggle for recognition in modern-day Poland (“For us, 
Silesians, an ethnic minority”!). What the commenter implies is that acceptance of Silesian 
identification as an autonomous identity position agrees with the voice of a prominent authority 
in the Catholic church. 
This perspective is consequently denied in (8b) where an anti-Silesian poster claims that 
authorities in the church are putting the Polish national interest first. In doing so, the poster uses 
the metaphor of “(black, sinful, lost) sheep” to indicate that self-identified Silesians are wrong in 
their convictions. The commenter strongly refutes the idea that authorities in the Catholic church 
in Poland will ever support Silesians as a separate community. Subsequently, the poster employs 
the keyword szlyzjer in its adjectival form for the first time, repeating it three more times in the 
following syntagmas: Schlesier (1) minority, (2) language, (3) people, (4) state. In the last three 
cases, the commenter emphasizes the alleged separatism of self-identified Silesians by 
consequently including the word “separate.” In doing so, this commenter implies that accepting 
Silesians as an ethnic group will only be the first step in the process that could lead to first 
cultural (language, people) and then political separation (state) of Silesia(ns) from Poland. This 
bleak perspective ends with a warning that the execution of such a plan would be synonymous 
with treason, which in the Polish cultural context ranks among the gravest crimes possible. 
Through several religious metaphors (sect, Bible translation, the ordination of priests, lost 
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sheep), members of the imagined community of Schlesiers are represented as those who—due to 
their ideological zeal in their struggle for recognition as an ethnic group—have strayed from the 
truth and isolated themselves within Poland. While the anti-Silesian commenters whose entries I 
have examined in this section admit the wrongdoings of the pro-Silesian camp, they nevertheless 
suggest that there may be a chance for self-identified Silesians to remedy this as long as they 
choose to reincorporate their formula of being Silesian into the larger framework of Polish 
national identity, with all its consequences and obligations. 
Overall, the neologism szlyzjer (including its derivatives) occurs 22 times in the examples 
analyzed in this section, always bearing similarly negative connotations about the intended 
referents, that is, members of the pro-Silesian camp. The repeated use of the word szlyzjerski in 
(8b) establishes members of the pro-Silesian camp as the addressees of this message and conveys 
the poster’s negative epistemic stance toward them. At the same time, this word choice indexes 
the poster’s anti-Silesian identification and, consequently, aids the discursive co-construction of 
the szlezjer mini-narrative initiated by poster F in this comment thread. Over the course of ten 
posts, three posters identified under different nicknames participate in the ongoing co-
construction of pro-Silesian posters as Schlesiers, attributing to them a wide array of negative 
characteristics. The discursive co-construction of the grand szlezjer narrative here is, first and 
foremost, executed through repeated use of the neologism szlezjer. Since the authors of the posts 
examined in this section all represent the anti-Silesian camp, szlezjer mini-narratives can be 
interpreted as stable and predictable performances of anti-Silesian identity positions in the 
discussion. In this sense, szlezjer mini-narratives become indexical of posters’ political and 




case study #2 (2013) 
In this section, I analyze examples that come from a comments thread that developed under an 
op-ed, in which the author offered his reflections about a series of articles on Silesia that 
appeared in another newspaper (Zasada 2013a). The articles critiqued appeared in the January 
26-27 (2013) weekend issue of Our Daily (Pol. Nasz Dziennik), a Catholic daily newspaper 
known for its strong right-wing profile. The op-ed lamented the bias of those articles in their 
portrayal of Silesia as a devastated region with demoralized inhabitants, among which are 
members of the Silesian Autonomy Movement whose activity may suggest that they are 
attempting to separate the region from Poland and incorporate it into Germany instead. 
In total, the op-ed elicited 80 comments. One of them bemoaned the journalist’s decision 
to comment on this series of articles, suggesting that it only further divides Silesians from the 
rest of Poland (9). Ironically, the poster changes the journalist’s name from Zasada to Kwas83 to 
imply that such op-eds can only embitter the relations between the two communities in question. 
 
(9) Marcin Kwas na posterunku.Antagonizowania Ślązaków z resztą Polski ciąg dalszy. / 
Jaki jest cel tak szerokiego omawiania idiotycznych artykułów o Śląsku, które ukazały 
się w jakiejś niszowej gazetce czytanej przez wąską warstwę ludzi o skrajnych 
poglądach? niech Pan odpowie Panie Marcinie, co chce Pan przez to osiągnąć? Bo ja 
widzę tylko chęć zdenerwowania ludzi na Śląsku. 
 
‘Marcin Acid stands guard, continuing to antagonize Silesians with the rest of Poland. / 
What is the purpose behind such broad discussion of idiotic articles about Silesia, 
 
83 Actually: Marcin Zasada (Pol. zasada translates as ‘base’ in chemistry), a Western Daily journalist; Pol. 
kwas translates as ‘acid’. 
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published in a niche newspaperlet read by a narrow class of people with extreme views? 
Please respond, dear Marcin, what’s your goal in doing that? Because the only thing I see 
is a desire to irritate people in Silesia.’ 
 
The poster’s attempt to speak in the name of all Silesians angers another commenter, as 
evidenced in (9a). 
 
(9a) za kogo ty sie wypowiadosz i kim ty ześ jest żeby take opinie wydowac . / w 
przeciwiynstwie do ciebie jo sie na sląsku urodzioł i pochodza z sląski rodziny ale 
jak czytom te twoje wypociny to umiołbych ci w pysk napluć . niy ciyrpia 
fałszywych kundli kere yno szczekaja jak som za bramom. próbujecie sie ty i tych 
poru ciuloni poszukac przijacioł wsród slązokow i wymysleiscie sie jakis 
szlyzjerow na własne potrzeby . jo nigdy w niymcach niy boł i niy ciagnie mie 
tam bo tu je moj hajmat bo jo je slonzok ale jak czytym ciebie to mi sie srac 
zaczyno chciec ,fałszywego gorola kery próbuje wsrod slazokow posłuch uzyskac 
. . każdy prawdziwy slonzok obojetnie po kery jest stronie to takicj jak ty to mo w 
żici i niy czaruj debilu ze ty u slonzokow jakes poparcie bydziesz mioł 
 
‘Whom are you talking for and who are you to offer such opinions? / Unlike you, 
I was born in Silesia and I come from a Silesian family, but as I read these 
scribbles of yours, I could spit in your face. I hate fake curs who only bark when 
they’re behind the fence. You’re trying – you and a couple of those assholes – to 
look for some friends among Silesians and you’ve come up with some Schlesiers 
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for your use. I’ve never been to Germany and I’m not drawn there because I have 
my Heimat84 here since I’m a Silesian, but when I read you, a false non-Silesian 
trying to gain authority among Silesians, I feel like I’m about to take a shit. Every 
real Silesian, regardless of the side s/he is taking, doesn’t give a damn about 
people like you, and don’t mislead that you’ll have any support among Silesians.’ 
 
In this post, strongly influenced by the Silesian variety (e.g., pochodza, niy ciyrpia, przijacioł, 
niy boł), the commenter self-identifies as a native to Silesia and a “real” Silesian. He then (as 
evidenced from the masculine past-tense forms used) accuses the author of the post in (9) of 
trying to gain support among self-identified Silesians by conceitedly posing as an insider. 
Further, the poster in (9a) accuses his addressee and others from the anti-Silesian camp of 
inventing the category of szlyzjers to further their agenda. To distance himself from the negative 
implications of this label, the poster indicates his attachment to the region as well as no intent to 
even go to Germany. This aggressive comment is met with a similar amount of hostility in (9b). 
 
(9b) Stul tyn swoj pomyjok Niymcu. / Pan Gorzelik mówi że Ślask to jego 
VATERLAND. Rozumisz? Tylko Niemcy albo co gorsza, gorole, 
twierdzą jak ty, że Śląsk to ich Heimat. Gorolem nie jesteś więc musisz 
być niemcem i tyla. 
 
‘Shut this trap of yours, you German [spelled in Silesian]. / Mr. Gorzelik85 
says that Silesia is his HOMELAND [in German]. Got it? Only Germans 
 
84 Germ. ‘local homeland’. 
85 See footnote 13. 
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or, even worse, non-Silesians, consider – like you do – that Silesia is their 
Heimat. You’re not a non-Silesian, so you must be a German and that’s it.’ 
 
Here, the author takes an an-Silesian position and strikes back at the commenter in (9a). After the 
initial insult, the poster explains the rationale behind the label szlyzjer by pointing to Jerzy 
Gorzelik’s use of the term Heimat in the sense of a local homeland. According to the poster, only 
foreigners to Silesia can use such terminology and because the commenter in (9a) self-identified 
as a Silesian, that must mean he is German. This explanation is key in the context of the ongoing 
co-construction of the grand szlezjer narrative because it reveals the logic behind the 
categorization of the pro-Silesian camp as ideological and ethnic outcasts from the Polish 
perspective. 
Further, this comment also bears traces of the ever-present linkage between language and 
(ethnic, national) identity characteristic for the Polish national narrative. Because Gorzelik refers 
to Silesia using a foreign (and, on top of that, German) word, he does not meet the criteria of 
acceptability for how the anti-Silesian camp defines the metaphorical ‘Us’ (Poles, Silesians who 
identify with Poland) and the metaphorical ‘Them’ (for instance, Germans who continue to be 
cast as Poland’s enemies). Such logic, I believe, also explains the choice of German as the source 
language in the process of coining the neologism szlezjer, which—although nativized in 
spelling—sounds foreign to the ears of a native Polish speaker. Similarly, identification with a 
Polish region but not Poland itself represents an identity position that goes against the hegemonic 




case study #3 (2013) 
This section examines comments left under an article reporting on the “Silesian dictation” (Pol. 
Śląskie dyktando) that took place in Bytom near Katowice in the Silesia Province (Nowacka-
Goik 2013). During the event, participants were first asked to translate a text from Silesian into 
Polish and then to do the opposite in the second stage. As Marian Makula, the organizer of the 
event, explained, the second phase of the event was more difficult because it required that 
participants be familiar with certain specialist terms in Silesian such as szteker (‘switcher, fuze, 
socket’), szlaubyncjer (‘screwdriver’), or kołkastla (‘coal container’). The article also included 
the Silesian text that participants had to translate into Polish as well as two direct calls to reader 
encouraging them to share their opinions about the language exercise (emphasis original): 
 
OTO TEKST DO PRZEKŁADU ZE ŚLĄSKIEGO NA POLSKI. DASZ RADĘ GO 
PRZETŁUMACZYĆ? NAPISZ W KOMENTARZU: 
‘This is the text to be translated from Silesian into Polish. Can you translate it? Write 




TRUDNE? NAPISZ W KOMENTARZU, JAK CI POSZŁO 
‘Difficult? Write a comment about how it went’ 
 
As a result, readers produced 245 comments under this article, many of which had a 
metalinguistic character. While some commenters criticized the Silesian text included in the 
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article, others used this report to express their disagreement with what they perceived as another 
example of Silesian linguistic separatism. This is also the case in (10). 
 
(10 ) Szlezjery, wiadomo, że nie udało się wam wykazać, że istnieje dziś "język śląski" / 
który byłby niezrozumiały dla Polaków. Dlatego proponuję, by jacyś szlezjerscy 
"naukowcy" wymyślili taki język. To chyba jedyne co wam zostało, by przekonać świat, 
że tzw. "narodowość śląska" posiada własny ojczysty język, odrębny od polskiego, haha 
 
‘Schlesiers, it is commonly known that you didn’t succeed in showing that there now 
exists the “Silesian language” / that would be unintelligible for Poles. That is why I 
propose that some Schlesier “scientists” invent such language. This is, I guess, the only 
[thing] left for you to convince the world that the so-called “Silesian nationality” 
possesses its native tongue, different from Polish, haha’ 
 
(10a) A dlaczego mamy się wykazywać . 
To język wywodzący z wspólnego ~~ pnia Słowiańszczyzny . 
Tylko czas i Historia tak pokierowała ze Ślązacy wytworzyli sobie kulturę . 
Kulturę bliższą zachodniej bardziej dojrzałą wypraną z nacjonalizmów. 
W której nie podpala się mieszkań ludziom o innym kolorze skóry. 
W Niemczech trwa proces ,sądzą tych co też podpalali. 
W Polsce taki proces będzie na ~~ ŚWIĘTEGO NIGDY. 
 
‘And why should we demonstrate that, 
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It’s a language stemming from the common Slavic trunk. 
So have time and history directed that Silesians have produced culture, 
A culture closer to Western culture, more mature, devoid of nationalisms, 
In which you don’t set someone’s apartment on fire because of different skin colors. 
There is a trial underway in Germany, they’re trialing those who also set [apartments] on 
fire. 
Such a trial will take place in Poland on [the feast of] SAINT NEVER.86’ 
 
Here, the poster speaks from an anti-Silesian position, mockingly suggesting that some 
“scientists” invent the Silesian language since no one was able to prove thus far that Silesian 
exists as a separate language that is unintelligible for Polish speakers. In doing so, the poster puts 
the phrases “Silesian language” and “Silesian nationality” in inverted commas, suggesting that 
these ideas are merely inventions. Further, the commenter includes two derivatives of the term 
szlezjer to index a negative epistemic stance about the idea of being Silesian as an identity 
position that is altogether separate from being Polish. Here, this is exemplified with the 
statements about the mutual intelligibility of Polish and Silesian, and the doubt expressed about 
the validity of what some call “Silesian nationality.” 
By repeating the keyword szlezjer in its two derivatives, the poster taps into the pre-
existing anti-Silesian prejudices, building on the assumption of ideological zeal among members 
of the pro-Silesian camp and thus contributing to the szlezjer mini-narrative skillfully developed 
by poster F (see section 4.1.). Pointing to what is perceived as failed attempts aimed at linguistic 
emancipation of Silesian, the commenter undermines the separatist narrative constructed by pro-
 
86 That is: ‘sometime in the unspecified future’. 
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Silesian posters, suggesting that only the invention of a new language can do the trick. This 
perspective is partially refuted in (10a) where the author of the post suggests that Silesian culture 
represents a separate construct, which is devoid of nationalist thinking, unlike the Polish culture. 
The pessimistic scenario presented by the poster at the very end of the comment implies that 
Poland still has a long way to go before its people come to accept difference, best exemplified in 
the metaphor of Saint Never. 
 
case study #4 (2013) 
The examples included in this section come from a discussion that developed under an article 
titled “Texas Silesians Visited the Opole Region” (Kownacka 2013). In it, the author outlines the 
story of emigrants from the historical region of Opole Silesia to the United States and Texas, and 
interviews some of their descendants who visited the region with the intent of learning more 
about their ancestors. This story, originally authored by the Polish Press Agency (Pol. Polska 
Agencja Prasowa, PAP), emphasizes the Polish orientation of migrants from Silesia, pointing out 
that they established settlements with pronouncedly Polish names: Panna Maria,87 Cestohowa,88 
and Kosciusko.89 The article elicited 115 comments, many of which took up the points made in 
the story to argue that Silesians de facto represent a regional inflection of Poles, as evidenced by 
the strongly pro-Polish orientation of the interviewees. This is also the case in (11) where the 
author of the post employs the well-known by now neologism szlezjerstwo: 
 
 
87 Pol. Virgin Mary. 
88 Częstochowa is a city and center of Roman Catholicism in Poland. 
89 Named after Tadeusz Kościuszko (1746–1817), military leader and national hero both in the lands of the 




(11) :) / I co na to szlezjerstwo? 
‘:) / And what does the Schlesierdom say to that?’ 
 
This comment, intended as an invitation for discussion, pokes fun at members of the pro-Silesian 
camp whose ideas the commented story disputes and seems to reject. The commenter, whom I 
call poster G, does not stop here but produces two more entries (12, 13) of similar content and 
tone, each time inserting the neologism Schlesierdom. 
 
(12) szlezjerstwo nie wie jak skomentować / Wg nich to hadziaje guberniani, bo jak to 
możliwe aby jakiś Ślązak uważał się za Polaka, prawda? 
 
‘The Schlesierdom doesn’t know how to comment. / According to them, these are non-
Silesians from Russian Poland, because how is it possible for a Silesian to consider 
himself a Pole, right?’ 
 
(13) średnia wieku szlezjerstwa to 60 lat / Głownie tacy wypisują tu komentarze. Coś mi 
się zdaje,że będziecie odchodzić z tego świata ze świadomością że większość Śląska leży 
w Polsce hehe 
 
‘The average age of Schlesierdom is 60 years old. / It’s mostly people like that who 
comment here. Something tells me that you’ll be departing from this world with the 




In both cases, poster G emphasizes the connection between Poland and Silesia in terms of 
ethnicity (12) and geopolitics (13). The use of the neutral term Ślązak (Pol. ‘resident of Silesia’) 
in the former example represents, I believe, a meaningful choice on part of the commenter 
because Silesians who identify with Poland are here juxtaposed with the co-constructed category 
of szlezjers. This goes hand in hand with the szlezjer mini-narrative constructed by poster F and 
continues into examples (14) and (15). 
 
(14) Szlezjerzy / To ^ są Ślązacy^, a nie tacy jak wy,zgermanizowane mieszańce 
popruskie. 
 
‘Hey, Schlesiers! / These ^are Silesians^, not Germanized post-Prussian mongrels like 
you are.’ 
 
(15) szlezjer to poniemiecki przybłęda / [zza Łaby]90 / germańska gnida. Ślązacy to 
Polacy Dziodek dobrze godo. 
 
‘A Schlesier is a post-German vagabond / [from beyond the Elbe river] A German louse. 
Silesians are Poles. The grandpa’s right.’ 
 
These two comments further develop the idea of Schlesiers, facilitating the co-construction of the 
grand szlezjer narrative in the Western Daily forum. In addition to that, the two posters reveal 
 
90 While I remove any identifying information from my data, including posters’ nicknames, here I make an 
exception by including the author’s nickname because (1) it does not represent a typical nickname, but in fact a 
continuation of the narrative started in the comment’s title (the part before the first forward slash), and because (2) 
the representation of Schlesiers developed in this comment would be incomplete had the nickname been omitted. 
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their understanding of what it means to be Silesian, providing their definitions of Silesians. In 
(14), Silesians are indirectly described as people who feel and express their connection with 
Poland and the Polish language; in (15), Silesians are equaled with Poles. Simultaneously, the 
authors of the two posts explain the meaning of the neologism szlezjer. While in (14) Schlesiers 
are defined as “Germanized post-Prussian mongrels,” members of the same group are called 
“post-German vagabond[s]” from outside of the territory of present-day Poland. In both cases, 
posters’ definitions of Silesians are in stark contrast with whom they regard as Schlesiers, 
characterized as either lacking connection with Polishness or associating themselves with 
Germany. 
As a result, members of the pro-Silesian camp are put in front of a binary choice between 
Poland (here portrayed as the positive choice) and Germany (here portrayed as the negative 
choice), tertium non datur. These two examples (as well as some from the previous sections) 
demonstrate and reflect well the pervasiveness of black-and-white thinking about ethnicity and 
nationality in contemporary Poland, according to which such identities are constructed and 
expected to represent crystal clear divisions of the social world, disallowing for any shades of 
grey. Consequently, the ongoing debate on self-identified is often reduced to attempts at ordering 
the seemingly chaotic amalgam of identifications and influences along the unambiguous 
Poland/Germany dividing line. As Bjork (2008) has convincingly shown, such demands are not 
new in the Silesian space and were characteristic of the region a century ago as well. Just like 
one hundred years ago nationalist activists sought to draw clear boundaries between the 
categories of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, building on the nationalized sociopolitical reality in which 
official institutions and their tools employed the national principle to organize peoples and places 
into distinguishable and unambiguous categories, so have members of the anti-Silesian camp in 
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the Western Daily forum embarked on the explanatory mission with the intent of bringing some 
order into the seemingly chaotic reality of ethno-national identifications in contemporary Silesia. 
This, I believe, has also been triggered by the considerable ambiguity of ethno-national 
choices in the last census (2011) when the majority of self-identified Silesians had also declared 
secondary—both Polish and German—identifications. Thus, the category of Schlesiers, 
promoted by the szlezjer mini-narratives examined in this chapter, can be viewed as an attempt at 
delineating those residents of Silesia who associate themselves with Poland from those who 
exhibit a more separatist stance, which, I argue, represents a major collective attempt at social 
control as anti-Silesian online posters and offline activists seek to identify potential allies and 
potential foes in the debate on Silesian identity. By introducing a clear-cut binary that only gives 
room to either Polish or German national identification, the potential for dissent and ethno-
national difference with some shades of grey is reduced or even altogether erased, as I have 
argued elsewhere (Borowski 2018a). This makes pro-Silesian posters reject such reductivism, 
which in turn fuels accusations of ethnic separatism and exhibiting a pro-German orientation in 
the anti-Silesian camp. Because accepting Poland as the larger formula for Silesian identity 
seems to pro-Silesian posters like an acknowledgment of surrender to what they perceive as 
pervasive nationalist thinking, this fuels suspicion and distrust for the activities of the anti-
Silesian camp. On another hand, the lack of clear identification along national lines, combined 
with the presence of German accents as discursive ways of subverting Polish authority over 
Silesia, brings forth in the anti-Silesian camp fears of separatism along with accusations that it is, 
in fact, Germany who stands to benefit from the conflict. In this context, szlezjer mini-narratives 
help minimize the anxiety caused by what many perceive as stubborn national ambivalence on 
part of self-identified Silesians by introducing and promoting a reductivist narrative that re-
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orders the seemingly chaotic world of ethno-national identifications in the region, re-establishing 
a well-known and easily decipherable division between Poland and Germany, the Polish national 
interest and the German national cause. 
 
case study #5 (2014) 
The comments examined in this section come from a discussion that developed under an article 
on Silesians who fought on both the side of the Allies and the Nazis during the Second World 
War (Semik 2014). Specifically, the article focuses on the Battle of Monte Cassino91 and features 
a link inviting readers to take a quiz testing their knowledge on this particular WW2 episode. 
The lead reads as follows: 
 
Co trzeci żołnierz armii polskiej na Zachodzie przeszedł z niemieckiego do polskiego 
wojska. Do dezercji pchały Polaków w Wehrmachcie względy patriotyczne, ale też 
niemiecka polityka narodowościowa. Ślązaków uznawano za żołnierzy drugiej kategorii. 
No i niekorzystny dla Niemców był przebieg wojny. 
 
‘Every third soldier of the Polish army in the West switched the German for the Polish 
army. Poles in the Wehrmacht92 were driven to desertion due to patriotic considerations 
as well as German ethno-national policies. Silesians were considered second-class 
soldiers. Plus, the course of the war was unfavorable for Germans.’ 
 
91 A hill in Italy, southeast of Rome, site of the Battle of Monte Cassino (January – May 1944) between the 
Allies and the Axis that involved Polish troops. As a result, Monte Cassino occupies a special place in the Polish 
national memory, interpreted as an example of patriotism and sacrifice for the greater cause and documented in the 
Polish military song Czerwone maki na Monte Cassino (The Red Poppies on Monte Cassino). 




Such narrative about Silesians who deserted the Nazi army in order to join the Polish armed 
forces created in Western Europe is picked by the author of the post in (16) who applauds their 
decision: 
 
(16) jak pisal K Kutz / ci sposrod Slazakow ktorzy mieli szczescie, walczyli i gineli po 
wlasciwej stronie. Jaka to strona kazdy wie, procz tympych slezierow.Pani redaktor moj 
dziadek nie mial tego szczescia, rzucony na front wschodni wraca ciezko ranny . Ale 
wraca do domu. Wszystkim Slazakom , ktorzy przymusowo wcieleni do wojska Hitlera 
gineli po niewlasciwej stronie , a przede wszystkim tym ktorzy przeszli na wlasciwa 
strone, moj gleboki poklon. 
 
‘As K[azimierz] Kutz93 wrote, / those from among Silesians who were lucky fought and 
died on the right side. Everyone knows what side that was, except for dumb Schlesiers. 
Dear Ms. editor, my grandfather did not have that luck, he was thrown on the Eastern 
front, he came back heavily wounded. But he came back home. I’m respectfully bowing 
to all Silesians who, conscripted into Hitler’s army, died on the wrong side, and above all 
to all those who went over to the right side.’ 
 
Here, the poster draws a clear division between the positively and the negatively evaluated side, 
stating that those from among Silesians drafted into the Wehrmacht who confronted the Nazis 
deserve every respect. In doing so, the poster employs the term szlezjer concerning those who 
 
93 See footnote 22. 
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seem not to know which side in the Second World War was morally “right.” Thus, the 
commenter repeats some of the tropes found in previous examples of szlezjer mini-narratives 
while contributing to the further co-construction of the larger narrative of Schlesiers who 
represent an ideologically and morally suspicious group. 
Several entries later, this comment is met with a rebuttal from a pro-Silesian poster (16a) 
who attempts to decrease the significance of the Battle of Monte Cassino while producing a 
counterargument to the claim that Poles heroically fought against the Nazis and never sided with 
them. 
 
(16a) Polacy gineli pod Monte Casino! / Polakow pod Monte Casino wyslano na rzez jak 
bydlo! facet nam Slazakom te twoje Monte Casino LOTTO! hehe Dzielni rzolnierze 
gineli a w polsce, polacy z usmiechem na ustach podpisywali Volkslisty hehe w tym 
15tysiecy polskich gorali.,a to musi bolec hehehe 
 
‘Poles died in [the battle of] Monte Cas[s]ino! / Poles were sent to Monte Cas[s]ino like 
cattle for slaughter! Dude, we, Silesians, don’t give a DAMN about this Monte Cas[s]ino 
of yours! Haha Brave soldiers were dying while Poles in Poland were signing the 
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Volksliste94 with a smile on their face haha, including 15 thousand of Polish 
Highlanders,95 and this must hurt hahaha’ 
 
The author of the post in (16a) speaks in the name of Silesians (hence the “we”) and takes a pro-
Silesian stance in the discussion. The poster implies that Polish soldiers were in the Battle of 
Monte Cassino used as cannon fodder while Poles in Nazi-occupied territories claimed German 
ancestry by signing the Volksliste. This topic is further developed in another comment (16b) 
whose author takes an anti-Silesian position. 
 
(16b) Ślązacy - obywatele II RP / z Katowic, Chorzowa, Mysłowic, Rybnika itd. - 
wpisani następnie na DVL z I, II, III i IV kategorią - rzeczywiście tak naprawdę byli 
Polakami, a nie żadnymi Niemcami i rzeczywiście niekiedy podpisywali DVL z 
uśmiechem - w sumie, to prawda, co napisałeś. I nic dziwnego, że tacy jak ty nie 
zrozumieją Monte Cassino - bo wy dla waszego heimatu potraficie tylko skamleć na 




94 A Nazi German institution established to classify residents of German-occupied territories according to 
their usefulness for furthering the interests of Nazi Germany and introduced during the Second World War in 
western parts of occupied Poland. At the top of the list sat the category of Volksdeutsche (Germ. ‘ethnic Germans’), 
people of German ancestry who resided outside of Germany and did not hold German citizenship. Compared to the 
local populace, members of the Volksdeutsche category enjoyed some privileges during the Nazi occupation. In 
contemporary usage in political discourse, the term Volksdeutsch(e) (nativized to folksdojcz(e) in Polish) is used 
figuratively and pejoratively as a synonym of a person considered to be a traitor to the Polish national cause and – 
simultaneously – politically aligned with and/or sympathizing with Germany. 
95 The poster refers to what is known in history as Goralenvolk, a Nazi initiative aimed at the creation of a 
separate nationality in Nazi-occupied Poland by extracting members of the Górale ‘Highlanders’ population in the 
mountainous Podhale region in southern Poland and claiming that they were part of the German race. Altogether, 
this attempt was largely unsuccessful and managed to attract only a relatively small number of adherents, some of 
whom were later executed for treason. 
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‘Silesians – citizens of the Second Polish Republic / from Katowice, Chorzów, 
Mysłowice, Rybnik, etc. – subsequently entered in the Deutsche Volksliste with category 
I, II, III, or IV – indeed were in fact only Poles and not Germans at all, and they indeed 
sometimes signed the Volksliste with a smile on their face – in sum, what you wrote is 
true. No wonder then that people like you will not understand Monte Cassino – because 
you, for your Heimat, can only whine in the forum. This is how much the Schlesier 
Heimat is worth – it is only worthy of whining in the forum [performed] by its “fighters” 
:D’ 
 
Here, the poster responds to the accusations about Poles becoming Germans during Nazi 
occupation by claiming that residents of Polish Silesia in the interbellum were in fact Poles and 
had nothing to do with Germanness. Then, the poster accuses the addressee of not being able to 
comprehend the significance of the Battle of Monte Cassino due to the implied cowardice of 
members of the pro-Silesian camp who can only “fight” in the forum like the Western Daily one. 
In doing so, the commenter inserts the German word for local homeland twice, mimicking the 
rhetoric style of the pro-Silesian camp (e.g., “Silesia is my Heimat” in 9a), and inserts the 
neologism Schlesier to strengthen the ideological message of this comment. With that, the 
commenter implies that such a lack of respect for patriotism and willingness to sacrifice one’s 
life in the service of one’s country seems to be inherent to members of the pro-Silesian camp for 




case study #6 (2015–2017) 
Unlike the comments examined in previous sections, the examples included in this section come 
from threads that developed under three different news articles published in 2015 (example 17), 
2016 (example 18), and 2017 (example 19). Nevertheless, their shared characteristic is the 
presence of the keyword szlezjer and/or its derivatives, which labels these comments as part of 
the larger narrative about Schlesiers developed in the Western Daily forum. In (17), the author of 
the post comments on the latest results of a presidential poll (TVN/x-news 2015) and suggests 
that in the 2015 elections people need to vote for a nationalist candidate who will keep Schlesiers 
under control. To talk about it, the poster uses the metaphor of reins (Pol. cugle) to talk about 
establishing control (Pol. coby... chodzili). This metaphor implies that the commenter believes 
that those from among self-identified Silesians categorized as Schlesiers (1) appear to be out of 
control, and therefore (2) some sort of control needs to be established over them. This comment, 
similar to those in (14) and (15), develops the theme of control by proposing concrete action(s) 
aimed at containing the possible Schlesier threat, and, as such, supports the ideological 
foundations of the grand szlezjer narrative. 
 
(17) Trzeba głosować na narodowca / Co weźmie szlezjerstwo w cugle, coby nom 
dobrze chodzili, hehehe. 
 
‘One should vote for a nationalist / who will discipline the Schlesierdom so that they 




The post in (18) was written under an article on the 1918–1921 developments in Silesia in the 
context of the First World War and the subsequent period during which both Germany and 
Poland claimed Upper Silesia (Wieczorek 2016). 
 
(18) Skoro szlyzjery mają tyle do powiedzenia / To na calutkim Śląsku powinno huczeć 
od wydawnictw, publikacji, a wszystko to w szlyzjerskim języku. Jeżeli są tępieni jak 
utrzymują, to co to za problem w dzisiejszych czasach drugi obieg? A tu nic. Paru 
[nickname omitted] adzia-badziakow cichcem podsrywa na forach. 
 
‘Since Schlesiers have so much to say / then the whole Silesia should rumble with 
presses, publications, and all that [should be] in the Schlesier language. If they’re being 
eradicated – as they maintain – then what kind of a problem is samizdat nowadays? 
While there’s nothing. A few bums [nickname omitted] silently spreading crap in the 
forum.’ 
 
The article starts with the following passage: 
 
Zacznijmy od historii w miarę współczesnej. Profesor Jerzy Maroń opowiada to tak: - 
Kolega, zresztą też historyk, Górnoślą-zak, prof. Leonard Smołka mówił mi, że jak 





‘Let’s start with somewhat contemporary history. Professor Jerzy Maroń retells it as 
follows: - A colleague, by the way also a historian, an Upper Silesian, prof. Leonard 
Smołka used to tell me that if [someone was] a Silesian, then [the person was] a Pole. 
Then I ask: So why not a German? Because a German is always who a Schlesier is.’ 
 
In this comment, the author addresses pro-Silesian posters in the discussion that developed in the 
comments section (225 comments in total), suggesting that their claims about the discrimination 
they face in present-day Poland are exaggerated. As a result, the argument goes, some members 
of the pro-Silesian camp take it to the Western Daily forum to express their frustration with this 
situation, but these ideas have little to no presence in the offline world. Further, the author of the 
post implies that such pro-Silesian publications should all be written in the local variety. In doing 
so, the commenter employs the familiar by now term szlyzjer twice – first as a group label and 
then as an adjective (“the Schlesier language”). 
In the former, the poster applies a non-virile ending to the plural form (-ry instead of -rzy, 
like in the title of the article: Ślązacy i Schlesierzy), which conveys the poster’s negative stance 
toward the community categorized with the neologism szlezjery. As for the latter, this example is 
part and parcel of the grand szlezjer narrative, according to which Silesian linguistic 
emancipation does not reflect the linguistic reality because the Silesian variety lacks widespread 
usage in the region, including self-identified Silesians. By suggesting that pro-Silesian ideals are 
disseminated through materials written in Silesian, the author of the post in (18) undermines the 
validity of Silesian as a linguistic code capable of serving a wide range of communicative 
purposes. As evident from the analyses of previous case studies, such ideas align with the 
representation of the pro-Silesian camp included in the greater narrative about szlezjers. By 
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repeating the neologism twice, the commenter helps co-construct and promote the ideologized 
narrative of Schlesiers as presented by poster F. 
One of the most popular arguments against the pro-Silesian camp—the numerical one—
is reproduced in (19), written under an article reporting on the 2017 Autonomy March96 in 
Katowice (Marsz 2017). 
 
(19) Zebrala się gromada szlezjerskich frustratów / podprzemyski firerek z leninowską 
brodką probował zaklinac rzeczywistośc. Nerwowe ruchy ciała zdradzały stres i obawe 
żeby go nie wygwizdali. Zreszta kto go kto go wygwizdać, ta garstka co dotarla na plac? 
No a gośc z Niemiec , niejaki Starosta to bylo kuriozum. 
PRYSK LUTKOFIE 
 
‘A bunch of Schlesier frustrates came together / the little Führer with a beard à la Lenin 
from the Przemyśl area97 tried to charm the reality. The nervous movements of [his] body 
betrayed stress and fear of being booed. Anyway, who is [supposed to] boo him, this 
handful that arrived at the square? And then the guest from Germany, one Starosta, that 
was an oddity. SEE YOU FOULKS’ 
 
Here, the author of the post comments directly on the 2017 Autonomy March, calling the 
participants “a bunch of Schlesier frustrates” attempting to “charm the reality.” The magical 
 
96 The Autonomy March is an annual manifestation of all things Silesian, organized in Katowice in mid-
July by the Silesian Autonomy Movement. During the event, people wishing to manifest their Silesian identity 
gather in a downtown square and march toward the Silesian Parliament Square (Pol. Plac Sejmu Śląskiego) where 
speeches are given, followed by a reception and accompanied by a fair of Silesian books and goodies. In terms of 
online discussions on Silesian identity, the event has a pronouncedly pro-Silesian character. 
97 A reference to Jerzy Gorzelik (see footnote 13). 
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metaphor used by the poster (Pol. zaklinać ‘to cast a spell, to bewitch’) undermines the rationale 
of the Silesian regionalist movement as one that has to change the reality as it is for its ideals to 
become true. In doing so, the poster includes the neologism szlezjer in its adjectival form, which, 
combined with the Adolf Hitler metaphor used in the initial part of the comment, helps reinforce 
the grand szlezjer narrative among the readers of the forum, six years after poster F introduced it 
in the comments section under the Skworc interview. 
As I have shown in previous sections, the grand szlezjer narrative represents a complex 
yet ideologically coherent construct that has been brought into the Western Daily discussion 
forum by poster F and other commenters. In doing so, they have repeatedly employed the term 
szlezjer and/or its derivatives, engaged in the back-and-forth with pro-Silesian posters, and thus 
secured narrative accrual for the narrative they have been co-constructing. In this section, I have 
used standalone examples from discussions that developed under three distinctive articles in 
2015, 2016, and 2017 to show how the grand szlezjer narrative leaks into various debates 
concerning the issue of Silesian identity in the Western Daily forum. Since this great narrative 
has already, by that point, accrued substantial narrative power, it has also become an economic 
way of indexing one’s position as a member of the anti-Silesian camp who considers the Silesian 
regionalist activism as a potential threat to the Polish national interest. 
Having completed the analysis of how various posters in various comment threads recall 
and co-construct the grand szlezjer narrative, I finish the analytic part of this chapter with the 
metanarrative comment below: 
 
(20) Problemem [nickname omitted], ale też i paru innych jest to, że nie myślą. Oni 
zakodowali w swoich zrytych głowach kilka zwrotów i powtarzają je - jak pacierz lub 
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mantrę. Najczęściej są to: szlezjerzy, Jerzy Gorolik, język śląski, narodowość śląska, 
faszyści, folksdojcze, Der DZ i kilka innych. Wszystkie ich wypowiedzi kręcą się wokół 
tych wyrazów. Tak w koło Macieja! Oczywiście każdy z nich, określa swoją osobę jako 
tego jedynego i prawdziwego Ślązaka! Wszyscy inni to szlezjerzy i folksdojcze! Takie 
wyrazy jak: tolerancja i integracja - są dla nich jak "terra incognita". Obca dla nich jest 
też definicja wyrazu naród! A definicja ta jest bardzo prosta i czytelna: "Naród – 
wspólnota ludzi, połączonych ze sobą tradycją, językiem czy też miejscem zamieszkania" 
- nic dodać, nic ująć - nasz Śląsk! Oni jednak odbierają nam prawo do stanowienia i 
decydowania zapominając o tym, że w naszej śląskiej historii było kilku takich, którzy 
próbowali odebrać nam to prawo - i jak na tym wyszli! Rozumiem Twoją próbę 
ucywilizowania tych troglodytów - ale wiem, że jest to orka na ugorze. Możesz przez 
wiele lat orać i siać - ich mózgi pozostaną ugorem! Szkoda Twoich sił! 
 
‘The problem of [nickname omitted] – and a few others – is that they don’t think. They 
encoded in their nut heads a few keywords and they keep on repeating them, like a prayer 
or mantra. Most often, these are Schlesiers, Jerzy Gorolik,98 Silesian language, Silesian 
nationality, fascists, Volksdeutchs, Der W[estern] D[aily], and a few more. All their 
utterances constantly revolve around these words. Round and round! Each one of them, 
of course, defines himself as the only true and real Silesian! All others are Schlesiers and 
Volksdeutschs! Words such as “tolerance” and “integration” are a “terra incognita” for 
them. Foreign to them is also the definition of the term “people”! While this definition is 
very simple and clear: “A people – a community of people linked with each other by 
 
98 Actually: Jerzy Gorzelik, a play on his last name and the word gorol ‘non-Silesian’, possible because 
Gorzelik’s mother’s family comes outside of Silesia. 
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tradition, language, or place of residence” – our Silesia – plain and simple! They, 
however, take away our right for self-determination and deciding [who we are], 
forgetting that there were a few of those in our Silesian history who tried to take that right 
away from us – and look how they ended up! I understand your attempt at civilizing these 
troglodytes – but I know that it’s like plowing the fallow ground. You can be plowing 
and sowing for many years – their brains will remain fallow! It’s a waste of your energy!’ 
 
The author of this post takes an anti-Schlesier stance by launching a critique of the szlezjer mini-
narratives produced in the forum. In doing so, the poster accuses its co-constructers of 
dogmatism, lack of tolerance for diversity, and, ultimately, the inability to change their way of 
thinking. As a result, the commenter crafts a long (over 1,150 words, which is considerably long 
in this particular forum) argument attacking the main ideas of the grand szlezjer narrative, 
analyzing some of its core components, including the commonly used vocabulary (and the 
neologism szlezjer). Pointing out how this narrative is actively co-constructed by several users of 
the Western Daily forum, the commenter skillfully deconstructs the underlying meaning of this 
narrative as well as the role of key repetition in the modus operandi of those who co-construct it. 
Given the examples analyzed in (1–19), what this metanarrative intervention ultimately proves is 
that the grand szlezjer narrative has become a powerful tool in the hands of members of the anti-
Silesian camp who made a collective effort to engage in its co-construction. With time and 
repetition, this narrative has accrued enough rhetoric power to serve the purpose of delineating 
and criticizing pro-Silesian posters and thus has become a linguistic index (sociolinguistic label) 




Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, I have considered the many ways in which anonymous posters co-construct a 
larger narrative about szlezjers, a newly coined label attributed to members of the pro-Silesian 
camp who reject a simultaneous Polish national identification. In doing so, I have analyzed 
examples produced in the Western Daily from 2011 to 2017 and pointed to the ideological 
homogeneity in how members of the pro-Silesian camp are represented in such narratives. I have 
shown that anti-Silesian representation of self-identified Silesians, signaled by szlezjer mini-
narratives, represent predictable rhetoric moves that produce stable representations of members 
of the pro-Silesian camp. Because of the inherently negative overtone of the neologism szlezjer, 
this word and its derivatives effectively become a negative epistemic stance marker, with which 
posters express their anti-Silesian identity in the discussion. While some posters limit themselves 
to the use of the word szlezjer or its derivatives, others develop whole arguments that serve the 
introductory and explanatory functions in that they (1) introduce the pro-German narrative about 
self-identified Silesians who reject a simultaneous Polish identification, (2) explain the 
ideological context of this narrative, and (3) promote this narrative through their repeated use of 
the word szlezjer or its derivatives. In both cases, further iterations help promote shared attitudes 
about members of the pro-Silesian camp whose alleged non-normativity is put under control with 
linguistic means, which brings forth the issue of social control through language. 
As I argue, the grand szlezjer narrative about self-identified Silesians becomes a 
linguistic way of exercising social control over those residents of Poland who embrace a Silesian 
identification without accepting an overarching, Polish national identification. Thus, szlezjer 
mini-narratives allow anti-Silesian posters to introduce a black-and-white division in terms of 
national and/or ideological allegiance (Poland vs. Germany), and to act on this division by 
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demanding that self-identified Silesians either embrace a larger identification with Poland and 
what is perceived as best for the country’s interests, or be othered, rejected, and accused of 
plotting against Poland by allegedly siding with Germany and German national interests. Thus, 
szlezjer mini-narratives achieve the desired goal of enforcing social control among Polish 
residents by (1) constructing Germany as a potential threat to Poland’s vital interests, (2) 
advocating for national unity (even at the cost of erasing regional differences) as a remedy for 
this threat, (3) criticizing the reluctance among self-identified Silesians to unambiguously 
identify with Poland as a perceived lack of unity, (4) presenting an either-or choice between 
Poland and Germany, and (5) accusing those who refuse to unambiguously identify with Poland 
as traitors to the national cause. 
Storytelling represents a basic human experience. The same is true about the Western 
Daily forum where storytelling about pro- or anti-Silesian users has become normal and 
expected. As members of both camps come to the forum to express their ideas in the debate on 
Silesian identity, they inadvertently produce, reproduce, and co-construct narratives about a 
typical representative of the opposite camp. As Bruner (1991) asserts, narratives are not 
necessarily real in the absolute sense of the word but merely representations of reality. In other 
words, a narrative is a “version of reality whose acceptability is governed by convention and 
‘narrative necessity’ rather than by empirical verification and logical requiredness” (4). This 
brings forth the issue of verisimilitude, approximation of truthfulness, which drives the ongoing 
co-construction of szlezjer mini-narratives in the Western Daily forum. 
Because my approach to these narratives is functional, I am not concerned with absolute 
truth conveyed by references to self-identified Silesians, but rather with truth-like claims about 
members of this community to study how such claims can inform our understanding of ethnicity, 
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nationhood, and collective memory in contemporary Poland. The analyzed comments and my 
analysis suggest that szlezjer mini-narratives aid the discursive process of constructing a specific 
social reality in the context of modern-day Poland, one in which Polish national identification 
trumps any other affiliation(s) groups or individuals may declare, be it ethnic, regional, or other. 
Hence, I argue, the implicit, constantly present in the forum need for self-identified Silesians to 
identify with Poland to become accepted members of the Polish society. As a result, such 
narrativizing activity helps anti-Silesian posters bridge the cognitive dissonance caused by the 
‘emergence’ of Silesian minority (some of whose members reject a simultaneous Polish national 
identification) in an otherwise homogeneous country. This brings forth the issue of constructing 
reality through narratives. 
The idea of story-worlds or entire realities through narratives is not new. As a social 
practice, narrating has the potential to both shape and modify social relationships as people 
“create and negotiate understandings of social realities” (De Fina 2003, 19). Further, narratives 
also “continuously modify the social relationships that exist among [people] and also, 
potentially, with others who are not present in the interaction” (ibid.). In this manner, the 
narrative activity becomes a repeated way of shaping the already shaped social reality. As De 
Fina asserts in her study of stories told by Mexican newcomers to the United States: 
 
Story telling reflects the interplay of all these levels of meaning, but also constitutes a 
type of discourse practice. When immigrants tell stories they create new meanings, they 
circulate and constitute images of themselves and others, interpretations of the migration 
process and of their roles in it. Other immigrants often act according to what they hear 
from stories and form opinions based on stories. In all these senses, story telling like 
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other discourse genres, is an unfolding social activity in that it both reflects and makes 
the world as it is (2003, 223). 
 
Like storytelling, constructing and participating in the co-construction of the grand szlezjer 
narrative is a collective activity that takes place in the Western Daily forum. According to De 
Fina, stories provide “a powerful occasion for narrators to classify and evaluate characters and 
their actions against implicit or explicit norms and values” (2003, 21). As I have shown above, 
through the repeated use of the label szlezjer or its derivatives, posters collectively construct 
classifying and evaluative arguments about self-identified Silesians. In doing so, they help build 
a joint, larger narrative and place it in a preconceived and ideologically systematized story-world 
where Poland and Polish national interest (as perceived by anti-Silesian posters) takes 
precedence. This points to the importance of narrative for the process of building ideological and 
ethical structures. In the case of szlezjer mini-narratives, anti-Silesian posters frequently use 
these stories as classifying and evaluative tools in their attempts to discursively (re-)organize and 
(re-)order the social world around them, in line with the beliefs and ideologies they hold to be 
true. Since the idea that individuals can self-identify as Silesians but discard a simultaneous 
Polish identification does not enter their ideological worldview, anti-Silesian commenters refute 
such claims and counter them by providing their constellation of possible ethno-national 
affiliations (see examples 5, 12, and especially 14 and 15). This is best exemplified in szlezjer 
mini-narratives that, ultimately, leave no space for ethno-national ambivalence. 
Another term helpful in understanding the sociolinguistic import of szlezjer mini-
narratives is that of “shared story” (Page 2018). Such stories typically occur across a range of 
contexts (including those involving various facets of computer-mediated communication) and 
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can develop as a reaction to news stories about, for instance, parliament votes or a celebrity’s 
comment that has gone viral. Because they are of shared nature, such stories can involve large 
numbers of people who collectively (re)produce or consume stories that may promote “a 
particular way of representing events, people and places: one that emphasizes common ground” 
(3). The idea of common ground is precisely what has taken root in szlezjer mini-narratives told 
and retold in the Western Daily forum. According to Page, shared stories in the context of news 
media are characterized by: 
• “narration shared between multiple tellers; 
• intertextual references which connect shared texts; 
• distributed linearity, whereby narrative content is produced and reproduced across 
multiple units; and 
• an assumption of commonly held beliefs” (ibid.). 
 
My analysis of szlezjer mini-narratives demonstrates that they function as shared stories (or, 
rather, one larger story) that are being told and retold in the Western Daily forum. Two of the 
features of shared stories, shared narrative multi-tellership, and distributed linearity, contribute to 
the iterative character of szlezjer mini-narratives. Because shared stories, as Page asserts, 
“typically lack a single end point” (20), they possess an innate narrative-generating potential. 
The same is true about szlezjer mini-narratives, which leads to one of the key conclusions of this 
chapter. As my data show, telling a story is not the point. Rather, it is about retelling the same 




As commenters retell the shared story about Schlesiers, they need not produce szlezjer 
mini-narratives in the course of the same discussion in the comments section. Instead, these 
entries may be temporarily spread out over several months or even years. Since this is the case 
for the data analyzed in this chapter, I wish to make an argument for a temporal expansion of the 
concept of shared stories as a narrative phenomenon that transcends the temporality and 
spatiality of a simple exchange of ideas in reaction to the topic(s) of the conversation. (If the 
process of leaking of narratives from the online to the offline world is to be accounted for, an 
argument could be made about a spatial expansion as well.) Conceptualized in that manner, 
shared stories become particular modes of talking about and representing in language particular 
ideas, people, or phenomena, and as such, they resemble some conceptualizations of discourses. 
This is even more so for the examples analyzed in this chapter as szlezjer mini-narratives 
remain ideologically similar despite their timestamps, authors, or news stories in reaction to 
which they were produced. Thus, szlezjer mini-narratives escape the narrow conceptualizations 
of narrative as chronotopically limited storytellings, instead suggesting that such and similar 
narratives have the potential to permeate the popular mindset at various timespace configurations 
due to their acutely ideological character that stems from and results in further narrative accrual. 
This is particularly the case with szlezjer mini-narratives, a powerful argument in the hands of 
the anti-Silesian camp, examples of which become indexical of poster’s stance in the discussion 
on Silesian identity in modern-day Poland. Ultimately, what my data suggest is that while single 
words or phrases do not represent narratives in the strict sense of the word, they can nevertheless 
function in a narrative-like manner and become what I have dubbed mini-narratives. In this 
capacity, szlezjer mini-narratives provide potential authors with a useful shorthand to express a 
particular stance on the idea of Silesian identity or minority in contemporary Poland. 
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Finally, a word about repetition is in place. As evidenced from the analysis, iterativeness 
represents a recurrent feature of szlezjer mini-narratives in the Western Daily forum. In this 
digital space, repetition becomes a device deployed to promote ideological and political (since, 
ultimately, it is about issues of power and power relations) narratives about self-identified 
Silesians. This points to the key modality of repetition for radicalization and radicalizing 
discourses, and, as such, has implications for current research on online and offline political 
discourse. 
While all this concerns the message the importance of the medium is not to be 
underestimated. Szlezjer mini-narratives possess an interactive and iterative character because of 
the technological affordances of the Western Daily forum. While it allows for open discussion in 
the comments sections, it does not represent an all-encompassing forum in the technological 
sense of the word (unlike, for instance, forums built with the popular phpBB software engine, 
which makes it possible to accumulate all discussions in one large, searchable space). Therefore, 
each comment thread under a single story represents a separate discussion that is not readily 
accessible to forum users, unlike in a typical phpBB scenario. This “discursive detachment,” 
triggered by the technological affordances granted by the Western Daily forum, causes forum 
conversations to appear singular and unrelated one to another, almost incidental. This results in 
repetitive breaches in communication, stifling the circulation of political messages and, 
ultimately, making it impossible for discourse circulators to successfully embed particular 
worldviews in the minds of forum users. The case of the neologism szlezjer illustrates how this 
can be prevented through repetition of the main message, encapsulated in the word szlezjer, 
under numerous stories across space (different comments sections) and time (my data comes 
from the 2011–2017 period) in order for these messages to become prominent and readily 
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distinguishable among both the active (posters) and passive (lurkers, readers) users of the forum. 
What this then suggests for conversation-based digital forums and spaces is their importance and 
potential as spaces of discursive power concentration and production. 
Due to their popularity and media coverage, mainstream digital platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are at the forefront of the battle against violent content as the 
general public is scrutinizing how they tackle this issue. Aside from other considerations, this 
battle also highlights the problems stemming from the innate features that the online world 
offers, with its power to serve as a magnifying glass for the various ideas transmitted through the 
spoken or written word. While the big companies are usually given the most attention, I believe 
that equal consideration should be given to other, perhaps statistically more minor, players in the 
digital arena, like online newspapers’ comments sections. The case of the neologism szlezjer in 
the Western Daily forum exemplifies the potential of such spaces, often read and visited by only 
narrow segments of society, for constructing and transmitting powerful ideological messages that 
have the potential to direct societal thinking about essential issues in a given province, state, or 
continent. The case of Gab (Coaston 2018), promoted as the “free speech social network,” is 
probably one the most in point yet. While these issues are becoming more and more burning in 
the present era of fake news, misinformation, and mass digital political propaganda, they fall 





This dissertation has set out to examine the spread of popular nationalism in online conversations 
from a sociolinguistic and critical discourse analytic perspective. The four analytical chapters 
have demonstrated the key importance of language for the production and spread of nonelite 
political discourses that permeate the Western Daily discussion forum. They have also 
investigated the phenomenon of nonelite political actors who become active in digital spaces 
and, consequently, become ideological opinion leaders. As they attempt to promote their 
worldviews and encourage others to embrace their opinions, they become leading carriers of 
popular nationalism. Since nationalist thinking is by definition exclusionary, this inadvertently 
leads to ideological conflicts, which can take the form of repetitive othering (chapters 1 and 2), 
verbal violence and overt hateful speech (chapter 3), or constructing discriminatory narratives 
about fellow discussants (chapter 4). Eventually, it becomes clear that popular nationalism in 
digital spaces breeds disagreement, factionalism, and, more nationalism as a result. 
The larger question driving this study was: What is the role of language in the emergence 
and spread of hateful speech in online spaces? As my analysis has demonstrated, language plays 
a paramount role when it comes to verbal violence and hateful speech. The three major trends 
identified in my data—othering, hateful speech, and narrativizing—are as common in the 
Western Daily forum as they are in other digital spaces where political discourse is produced. As 
I have shown, language use in text-based online conversations is instrumental for constructing 
and performing identity in the context of political discussions (that is, those that broadly have to 
do with the idea of power). My functional analysis of linguistic data points to several conclusions 





1. Linguistic othering results in the discursive construction of identities (chapter 1), 
2. Repeated associations of people with socioculturally charged language varieties 
through sociolinguistic approximation lead to discrimination (chapter 1), 
3. Neutral words can be charged with emotional value and become negative labels 
(chapter 2), 
4. Repetition of keywords builds bridges between the offline and online worlds (see 
chapter 2), 
5. In Polish, suffixation facilitate pejoration and discrimination through language 
(chapter 2), 
6. Single words or phrases can function as powerful ways of representing individuals or 
communities through the repeated use of sociolinguistic labels (chapter 2), 
7. Linguistic othering results in verbal violence and hateful speech (see chapter 3), 
8. Metaphors of movement away increase social distance, facilitating hateful speech 
(chapter 3), 
9. Language can be used as a means of social control (chapter 4), 
10. Single words and/or phrases can acquire narrative-like features to become 
sociolinguistic labels that lead to the emergence of “mini-narratives” (chapter 4). 
 
While these findings show that language and language use are the primary tools of popular 
nationalism, they also point to important recommendations concerning online discussion forums 
and social media platforms in general. These include issues of anonymity, content moderation, 
societal harmfulness, verbal violence, hate speech and hate crimes, among others, which are also 
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relevant for larger societal phenomena such as nationalism, racism, populism, interethnic 
violence, and the phenomenon of divided nations (as of 2020, visibly present both in Poland and 
the United States). Thus, my dissertation suggests that: 
1. online anonymity leads to disinhibition, 
2. content moderation is necessary to curtail the spread of online hate, 
3. nationalism breeds more nationalism, 
4. popular nationalism can be as socially harmful as mainstream nationalism, 
5. nonelite political actors strategically use online spaces to amplify their message. 
 
Since billions of people now regularly use participatory social media (including but not limited 
to online discussion forums), these suggestions and recommendations are pertinent to large 
social media companies, smaller online publishers, lawmakers and policymakers, and, finally, 
everyday users. While my analysis was firmly rooted in the ongoing Polish-Silesian conflict over 
identity, the results of this dissertation are emblematic of some larger processes taking place 
within the European Union, in Europe, and the Northern Atlantic in general. Thus, I hope that 
my findings can provide an intellectual stimulus for scholars, students, and professionals 
interested in the intersection of popular nationalism, participatory social media, and language in 
the early twenty-first century. Because the dynamics and processes described in this dissertation 
can be extrapolated to and/or contrasted with similar cases from other Euro-Atlantic contexts (cf. 
the szlezjer narratives in Poland vis-à-vis the idea of “bad hombres” in the United States, which 
represents another example of sociolinguistic approximation), the present study is intended as 
one small step in the larger enterprise of scrutinizing, analyzing, and explaining popular 




This dissertation started with the following research questions that drove the subsequent data 
collection, analysis, and elaboration: 
 
RQ: How nonelite political actors instrumentalize multiparticipant conflict discourse on 
Silesian identity to construct othering representations of their ideological enemies, and 
what are the implications for our understanding of the concepts of identity, language, and 
nation? 
 
Multiparticipant conflict discourse 
As the dissertation has demonstrated, the Western Daily discussion forum represents an arena of 
pervasive conflict discourse, in which nonelite political actors instrumentalize language to drive 
social change. Consequently, the online activity of pro-Silesian and anti-Silesian posters 
politicizes the issue of Silesian identity in contemporary Poland, turning it into a political 
struggle that is done with linguistic means. They focus on language and the different ways in 
which the relative plasticity of Polish as a synthetic language helps them achieve their immediate 
political goals. This preoccupation with language and discourse—at times driven to obsession—
results in the emergence, spread, and persistence of the three linguistic strategies described 
above: othering, hateful speech, and narrativization. 
In all this, the asynchronous, interactive, and multi-participatory social media serve a 
nontrivial role in this enterprise as they provide a virtually unrestricted arena for posters from 
both factions to communicate their views to the public, influence it, and even repeatedly 
reprimand it for not following what those posters believe to be (ideologically) ‘correct’ and true. 
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From this perspective, this dissertation serves as a critical treatment of the nascent phenomenon 
of doing politics on social media through language by nonelite political actors in the early 
twenty-first century. As this work has shown, social media have the potential to significantly 
amplify nonmainstream political discourses, such as the debate on Silesian identity, which 
receives little attention in the mainstream Polish political discourse. Consequently, participatory 
social media allow nonelite political actors to craft their identities and personas (political, 
linguistic, ideological) in the course of the discussion, which they can then utilize to further their 
political goals. Because repetition remains a crucial factor for political discourse in general, such 
conditions gave rise to repetitive linguistic performances that serve political and ideological 
goals. As the two factions of pro-Silesian and anti-Silesian posters morph into respective 
communities of practice, they normalize such performances throughout the Western Daily forum 
as apparently innocent forum discussions turn into diachronically stable political manifestations. 
In this manner, language, discourse, politics, and social media come together as the key factors 
come together to create a fertile ground for othering, verbal violence, and hateful speech. 
 
Constructing othering representations 
The four-chapter analysis shows that Silesian identity is represented an essential threat to the 
sociopolitical and sociocultural fabric of the Polish society, which sees itself and Poland as an 
ethnically, linguistically, and culturally homogenous community—both retroactively and 
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presently. Thus, the presence of an unrecognized, self-identified Silesian minority represents a 
challenge to this cognitive schema, causing a societal effect akin to that of “moral panic”99: 
 
“Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A 
condition, episode, person or groups of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to 
societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion 
by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops politicians and 
other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and 
solutions; ways of coping are evolved (or more often) resorted to; the condition then 
disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible” (Cohen 2011, 1). 
 
To cope with the post-1989 “emergence” of Silesian identity in public discourse, including 
digital spaces such as the Western Daily forum, anti-Silesian posters discursively frame it as a 
“threat to societal values and interests,” to quote Cohen (2011), which opens the door for the 
variety of linguistic strategies (othering, associating, naming, verbal violence) subsequently used 
in direct conversations with self-identified Silesians. Consequently, the idea of Silesian identity 
is presented as made-up, without a durable, recognizable, or glorious past behind it, and invented 
for political activity. The latter, in turn, allows for establishing a link between the idea of Silesian 
identity and Silesian regional activism, most often exemplified with the Silesian Autonomy 
Movement and the struggle for regional autonomy. 
 
99 As Johnstone (1994, 10) posits, the rhetorical strategy of repetition “can be a very basic ordering 
principle that is reassuring.” Viewed from this perspective, it can then be argued that constant repetitions of similar 
tropes and themes when discussing self-identified Silesians helps members of the anti-Silesian camp to do away the 
moral panic related to their “emergence” and ongoing activism in the public arena in post-1989 Poland. One of the 
most common examples of such repetition is the trope of “camouflaged German option” that is pervasive in the 




Nonelite political activism 
Similarly, pro-Silesian posters and, more broadly, self-identified Silesians are portrayed as 
nationally ‘suspect’ actors of undesired change who have instrumentalized a pre-existing 
attachment to the Silesian Heimat to achieve their economic and political goals. Here, one 
important finding of this dissertation needs to be stressed. My ongoing research on the topic and 
analysis of hundreds of online conversations on Silesian identity and minority indicate that the 
idea of a Silesian identity per se does not pose a threat to the stability of the Polish society, 
nation, and state. Instead, it is the dissociation of self-identified Silesians from the rest of the 
Polish society by way of rejecting a straightforward equation of Silesians as a regional inflection 
of Poles that stirs controversy, causing a negative backlash against Silesian identity and all things 
Silesian. As my data show, declaring a Silesian identity while framing it under the larger 
umbrella of being Polish does not pose a problem, unlike attempts to establish Silesians as a 
separate and independent community.100 
Throughout this dissertation, it is evident that Silesian independence (whether ethnic, 
linguistic, or other) does not find a palatable societal reception as evidenced in the Western Daily 
discussions. Instead, Silesian identitarian activism, augmented in the public space and the Polish 
mediascape of the early twenty-first century by long-term involvement of the Silesian Autonomy 
Movement in the linguistic, cultural, and political advocacy for self-identified Silesians, is 
viewed with suspicion. First of all, this is because of the dissociative character of the Silesian 
identitarian movement explained in the previous paragraph. Secondly, the reason for this type of 
 
100 This way of thinking is also present in some comments about the results of the 2011 census, which claim 
that the numerical strength of Silesians is much smaller than 847,000 because most respondents declared both 
Silesian and Polish ethno-national identification (about 50% of all Silesian declarations) while less than half of them 
only declared to be Silesian. The 2011 final results confirm this trend (GUS 2015). 
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societal reception lies in the sociohistorical circumstances that make Silesia—and, by extension, 
its residents—a rather unique community within the twenty-first-century Polish state. Their 
distinctly different historical and political experiences throughout the last several centuries have 
on one hand facilitated the development of a unique regional awareness, but on another have 
contributed to the ambivalent stance with which Polish authorities—and later ethnic Poles—
approached the complex sociocultural fabric that self-identified Silesians call their own. This 
approach became apparent in the fears that led to the establishment of post-WW2 national 
verification in the region (see the Silesia, Silesian, Silesians sub-section of the Introduction) and 
that, to a large degree, resurfaced in Poland after the fall of communism, finding their fullest 
expression in the now-notorious passage about the “camouflaged German option” (see chapter 
2). As I have shown in chapter 2, this particular representation of self-identified Silesians has 
leaked into the online world, finding its support and continuation among some of the anti-
Silesian posters in the Western Daily forum. In most recent years, the idea of Silesians as 
“camouflaged Germans” or actors of undesired sociopolitical change working against the Polish 
state but for the benefit of Germany became magnified by the growth of anti-German sentiment 
in the country and mainstream political discourse in particular (see chapter 2, but also (Sitnicka 
2019). 
 
Implications on identity 
As for broader implications of the research question posed in the Introduction, the conclusions 
are both synchronically and diachronically indicative of larger ideological conceptualizations and 
cognitive schemas that have pervaded the Polish national and collective mindset for the last two 
centuries or so. Thus, the online conversations in the Western Daily forum indicate that identity 
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is still largely seen as something stable, innate, and essential to the person, as evidenced by the 
arguments of the anti-Silesian camp. In the words of one of the posters, Silesians “can even self-
identify as Martians, freedom and democracy do exist, after all. But, at the end of the day, 
they’re doomed to assimilation.” This vision clashes with the more constructivist approach to 
identity, demonstrated by members of the pro-Silesian camp who use the Western Daily forum to 
consciously construct and perform their identity. These divergent conceptualizations of identity 
are at the foundation of the ongoing and seemingly never-ending debate on Silesian identity. In 
the eyes of the anti-Silesian posters, ethno-national identity is only spacious enough to 
accommodate the Polish national identification combined with a local or regional identification 
such as Silesian (a vertical perspective) but does not offer enough flexibility to allow for two or 
more identifications, with each one largely independent of the other one(s) and on fairly equal 
levels (a horizontal perspective). This finding resembles the sociocognitive pattern that Pasieka 
(2015, 9) identified in her ethnography of Poland-based religious minorities and labeled as 
“hierarchical pluralism,” defined as “a changeable configuration of social relations that both 
allows for and acknowledges difference, while simultaneously making it clear which 
(ethnic/religious) group is dominant and norm-defining.” 
 
Implications on language 
As for language-related issues, the ideas and perspectives expressed in the collected data 
similarly leave little room for ambiguity. For the non-Silesian speakers, the Silesian language 
variety overwhelmingly remains nothing but a Polish dialect, with some regional peculiarities 
and idiosyncrasies, which nevertheless do not make it a separate Slavic language. Instead, 
Silesian is viewed as a local curiosity that needs not be approached seriously and systematically, 
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since it lacks the history of independent existence as a full-fledged language (Borowski 2018b). 
Judging from the conversations examined, anti-Silesian posters exhibit a rather confused stance 
toward the Silesian language variety and their confusion increases with the pro-Silesian posters’ 
attempts at explaining why Silesian is not merely a Polish dialect. The use of Germanisms (or 
replacement of Slavic words with their Germanic equivalents) is approached with suspicion and 
largely viewed as politically motivated attempts at establishing a durable difference between 
Polish and Silesian speakers, as evidenced by the excerpt below. Thus, the issue of language is 
quickly politicized and becomes an unresolvable conundrum. 
 
Why do they lecture Silesians that we count eins, zwei, drei? Why “das bunny brings 
präsents”? Who, aside from Roczniok, talks like that? What kind of gibberish is that? (see 
the analysis in chapter 2). 
 
Implications on nation 
Finally, the data examined in this dissertation allows to draw some conclusions about the societal 
imagination concerning the Silesian minority and the Polish nation, as studying the minority 
always necessarily involves studying the majority against which it defines itself. In the case of 
online discussions on Silesian identity in the Western Daily forum, the concept of nation (and 
people) emerges as an equivalent of the ultimate community of paramount importance. Thus, 
collectivism goes before individualism as all members of the national community are required to 
put national interest before individual interest. This way of thinking is also pervasive in the 
analyzed data, as pro-Silesian posters are routinely accused of working against the Polish nation 
and state. In the eyes of anti-Silesian posters, Silesian identitarian activism harms and threatens 
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the Polish national community, which must be kept strong, united, and unified, the implicit 
argument goes. Given Poland’s turbulent history and experiences of political subjugation to more 
powerful neighbors, this belief in the unquestionable necessity for national unity frames almost 
all discussions about the harmfulness of Silesian ethnic, linguistic, and political activism in the 
country. The fears of secession, cultivated due to the experience known in Polish historiography 
as Partitions of Poland (1795–1918), are further fueled by the borderland status of Silesia 
throughout the centuries and the Polish-German competition over the region. Since the postulate 
of autonomy put forward by the Silesian Autonomy Movement is by the Polish public opinion 
often confused with outright separatism, this paves the way to framing the Silesian identitarian 
activism as potentially threatening the territorial integrity of the Polish state, resulting in a further 
backlash against the ideas proposed by the Silesian minority. 
Stancetaking in non-Anglophone settings 
Besides its contribution to the broader field of Polish studies, this dissertation has also produced 
some noteworthy results pertinent to the area of sociocultural linguistics. Most importantly, the 
dissertation has pointed to the variety of linguistic instantiations of stancetaking that go beyond 
the original proposition based on English-language examples. Aside from identifying four major 
discursive modalities of stancetaking present in the collected data, the analysis has also 
determined three linguistic instantiations of stancetaking. These include (1) nouns as markers of 
stance, (2) neologisms, and (3) the related process of derivation that facilitate the process of 
taking a stance in the Western Daily forum. 
In the original formulation of stancetaking by Du Bois (2007), much attention was 
devoted to verbs (especially verbs of thinking that serve as natural markers of stance in English-
speaking cultures) and adjectives. Focusing on mostly Polish (and sometimes mixed Polish-
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Silesian, Silesian-German, Polish-German, or just Silesian) data, this dissertation has taken the 
concept of stancetaking to a non-Anglo-centric setting to uncover that the work of taking a 
stance may as well be performed by other parts of speech, in particular nouns. In the Western 
Daily forum, nouns and nominal phrases are among the top linguistic tools used by members of 
the pro-Silesian and anti-Silesian camps to promote their worldviews. In doing so, they either 
employ the modality of othering (e.g., Paljaki vs. Ślonzojcze in chapter 1), associating (e.g., Der 
[Western] Daily in chapter 2), or naming (e.g., szlezjerki in chapter 4). Regardless of the 
modality used, all such examples demonstrate how nouns and nominal phrases can and do 
function as markers of subjective stances toward the topic of the discussion and/or the 
discussants themselves. Since online discussions on Silesian identity are highly ideological, 
nouns and nominal phrases marking stance are also ideologically motivated. Interestingly, all 
such instances of taking a stance are constructed negatively, that is, they all mark negative 
stances through a range of attitudes that can be represented on a spectrum from disinterest and 
disregard (low level of involvement, e.g., Jorguś ‘Georgie’ instead of Jerzy [Gorzelik]) through 
sarcasm, irony, and ridicule (medium level of involvement, e.g., Szlyzjerland ‘land of Schlesiers’ 
instead of Śląsk ‘Silesia’) to outright insults (high level of involvement, e.g., Volksdeutschs). 
In this capacity, neologisms occupy a particular place. Since the Western Daily represents 
a text-only discussion forum, this has heightened the posters’ awareness of language use and 
linguistic forms used in the ongoing discussions that require them to get their message across 
and, hopefully, do it forcefully enough so that their arguments need no repetition. While 
fortifying your communication in such a way is one of the possible solutions, another one is to 
take a more refined approach by crafting apparently neutral messages using ideologically 
significant keywords such as, for instance, szlezjer and the whole discourse behind it. As this 
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dissertation shows, this neologism has become a pronounced marker of one’s stance toward the 
idea of Silesian identity and Silesian identitarian activism in general. Further, such a way of 
representing self-identified Silesians has spread in the Western Daily forum through the 
intentional derivation of even newer terms, using the word szlezjer as the lexical base (see, e.g., 
Table 6 in chapter 4). While suffixation is not as prevalent in typologically analytical languages 
such as English, it is very common in most Slavic languages, including Polish. Whereas the 
original formulation of stancetaking was not concerned with how typological differences 
between world language can influence the ability to take stance in language-in-use, or even 
uncover new ways of conveying stance through linguistic devices and processes foreign to the 
English language, this dissertation indicates that the typological characteristic of Polish as a 
synthetic language becomes the foundation for the unrestricted linguistic creativity in the 
collected data. This, in turn, suggests that linguistic concepts and models developed using Anglo-
Western data need to be tested and evaluated in non-Anglo-Western languages and environments 
as well. The data analyzed in this dissertation point to derivation as a powerful linguistic tool that 
users of synthetic languages can exploit in interaction for numerous reasons, including identity 
work, disagreement, ideological distance, and, last but not least, stancetaking. 
Limitations and further research 
As all works that use digital language data to study societal imaginations about salient social 
scientific concepts from a qualitative approach, this dissertation necessarily comes with some 
limitations. Firstly, there is the issue of generalizability and how universal the findings are in the 
context of the community of self-identified Silesians and the broader Polish society. Related to 
this are the issues of representability and sampling. The data collected for this dissertation was 
selected based on its qualitative features and not quantitative premises that would yield 
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statistically relevant results. In studies that deal with digital discourse and user-generated 
conversations, the question of sampling is commonly approached in terms of availability 
(convenience and/or snowball sampling) rather than equal distribution and statistical relevance. 
While these concerns are relevant for all works with a similar methodological approach, they 
nevertheless do not undermine the overall quality of the results and insights produced in the 
course of the four analytic chapters presented here. 
With the outpour of studies dedicated to numerous topics within the domain of computer-
mediated communication within the last three decades, this interdisciplinary field has greatly 
contributed to our understanding of various issues, including those at the intersection of language 
and society. Because this dissertation has taken a novel approach to old problems, it has 
necessarily sailed out into largely unchartered waters in search of an effective way to combine a 
functional linguistic approach to the study of society with the focus on digitally mediated 
communication. While the analysis has produced numerous insights on issues that lie at the 
juncture of these areas as well as some surrounding phenomena, it has merely scratched the 
surface given the vast amounts of data already available and still being produced. It is hoped that 
future research addresses these and related issues from a multitude of theoretical and 
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